This is the transcript of Lindsay Clancy’s hearing in Plymouth Superior Court on Tuesday, September 29, 2026, her first court appearance since the September 4 mistrial. It covers the full argument on her renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty, the Commonwealth’s response, Martin Weinberg’s argument to unseal the September 3 jury note and sidebars, the Boston Globe and WBZ’s request for access to sidebar conferences, Kevin Reddington’s “tired of hearing persecution” exchange with Judge William Sullivan, and the discussion of a trial date, in which Reddington told the court, “I can’t do a trial before June.”
Our report on what the hearing decided is here. The short version: the not-guilty motion and the jury-note motion are under advisement, and the double jeopardy motion, the holdout juror inquiry and the gag order request were set for November 2.
How this transcript was made
- Source. The CBS News video of the hearing posted to YouTube (“Lindsay Clancy back in court for first hearing since mistrial | full video,” about 63 minutes). The recording begins a few seconds into the first matter, so the opening moments of the hearing are not included.
- Method. Machine transcription with speaker separation, then reviewed by us. This is not an official court transcript. The official record is the court reporter’s transcript, which may differ.
- Speaker names are ours. The recording does not identify speakers. We assigned names from context and checked them against courtroom reporting: Assistant District Attorney Shanan Buckingham argued the not-guilty motion for the Commonwealth, Assistant District Attorney Jennifer Sprague argued the other motions, Martin Weinberg argued the jury-note motion, and attorney Heather O’Connor appeared for the holdout juror (“Juror Doe”). Where we could not tell, we used a generic label. A few speaker changes may fall a few words early or late.
- Edits. Brief crosstalk (“All right,” “Thank you”) is omitted. Words in [brackets] are our corrections of obvious transcription errors, such as case names, or mark words we could not make out. Timestamps are minutes into the recording.
Key moments
- [03:54] The Commonwealth objects to arguing the double jeopardy motion, saying it learned Friday the defense wanted to argue it. Sullivan moves it to November 2.
- [06:19] Sullivan says he saw the gag order motion “about 5 o’clock this morning” and that it “raises some significant constitutional questions.” Set for November 2.
- [08:09] Reddington begins the Rule 25 argument. “There was no investigation. It was not even a horrendous investigation.”
- [19:15] “This entire case is based on speculation. Where is the admission?”
- [29:35] Buckingham responds: the claim that there is no evidence Clancy killed the children is “a laughable argument.” She cites the chaplain conversation and DNA on the ends of the exercise bands.
- [39:40] Sullivan takes the not-guilty motion under advisement.
- [40:16] Weinberg argues for unsealing the September 3 jury note and the sidebars.
- [47:07] Sprague opposes, warning of a “chilling effect” on future jurors.
- [52:30] Counsel for the Boston Globe and WBZ: the motion “isn’t asking for a ban on all sidebars.”
- [56:05] Reddington: “I am so tired of hearing persecution, attacking.”
- [59:16] Sullivan: “The discussion three weeks ago was let’s try this thing in a week, right. And now no one wants to pick a trial date.”
- [60:32] Reddington: “I’ll tell you right now I can’t do a trial before June.”
The transcript
THE COURT [00:00]: Than later. So. So when we put that on for, Let me say, November 2nd. I also have.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [00:18]: Thank you, Honor.
THE COURT [00:19]: Well, counselor, don't go anywhere because I have another one. I saw that you filed a motion for limited release relief from impounded records. Yes, I know. That was filed just yesterday.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [00:31]: It was, Your Honor.
THE COURT [00:31]: Problem is, I didn't get the memorandum. And it wasn't clear what exactly the relief was, what it was that you wanted access to. So I don't know if you want to supplement that, and I can take a look at it if we have to. We can deal with it on the second.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [00:51]: I can supplement. I think part of the issue is there's a number of documents that have been impounded in the case that I can't even see to actually request what they are. So we're essentially looking for anything that has been impounded that would address that issue so that we can prepare fully.
THE COURT [01:06]: Well, it said there's a memorandum. Was there a memorandum filed?
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [01:10]: There was a motion filed and an affidavit,
THE COURT [01:11]: But I think the motion actually referred to a memorandum. That's what I was looking for.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [01:16]: Oh, I apologize.
THE COURT [01:17]: Well, so is it your intention to file [a] memorandum? [Ms. O'Connor: We can file supplemental.] Because, you know, I kind of need to know what it is that you're looking for. So why don't you file that? If I can. I'll take a look at it. If we can't resolve it on the papers, then we can deal with it on the second.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [01:35]: I believe that is also assented to, Your Honor.
THE COURT [01:37]: Yeah, I know, but that, you know, it's something I have to look at.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [01:39]: Sure.
THE COURT [01:40]: All right. Because I impounded it for certain reasons, not just counsel's. Everybody else. There's a lot of this bigger picture and a lot of these issues that I need to address. So I understand it's a set to do, but I need to know exactly what it is that you want so I can evaluate it and make a decision.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [01:58]: Attorney Sprague, my only concern. And I'm suggesting maybe an interim date because I believe that in order for counsel to argue her motion on the second, she may need some with those materials.
THE COURT [02:10]: Okay. I gave an interim date. That's the earliest day we have. I've been trying to get an interim date.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [02:15]: I understand. I'm just.
THE COURT [02:16]: I'm not. I'm not jumping around you. I understand.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [02:19]: I'm just trying to prevent a continuance of.
THE COURT [02:22]: I'm trying to move this as fast as we can.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [02:26]: If I'm able to supplement the memorandum. Are you Able to decide it on the papers.
THE COURT [02:30]: I'll take a look at it if I can. Depends on what's in the papers.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [02:33]: Sure.
THE COURT [02:34]: All right, so why don't we keep that date? If after looking at it, I feel that we need an interim date, I could reach out. Maybe we could. Even if it's done, let's worry about that. If we have to worry about that. All right, so I'll take no action on Juror Doe's motion for limited relief from impounded records. Waiting on the memorandum. And if I can resolve it in the papers, I will. And then that may answer the problem we have. If not, we'll deal with that. But we'll keep the motion, as I said, regarding juror records and request for limited inquiry on for November 2nd. Okay.
MS. O'CONNOR (for Juror Doe) [03:17]: Thank you, your honor.
THE COURT [03:18]: Thank you, counsel. All right, then I have motion to order, juror notes, sidebar discussions not subject to impoundment. Parties ready to argue that. That. I think that's the defendants. Okay. All right.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [03:40]: Yes, your honor.
THE COURT [03:40]: Okay, so we'll argue that. Then there's the motion to dismiss. Defendant's motion to dismiss. [Defendant ready to argue that].
MR. WEINBERG [03:51]: Yes, you, honor.
THE COURT [03:52]: Okay. Commonwealth ready.
PROSECUTOR [03:54]: Your honor, the commonwealth is. I know.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [03:56]: I relate it to madam clerk, but we are objecting to proceeding on that motion today. The reason for that is that we received the motion last Monday. It was our understanding that today was scheduled for possible trial assignment. And the Rule 25 motion, we learned on Friday, when defense counsel or someone working with him sent an email to the clerk that they would like to argue the motion today, we were not aware that that was going to happen. And so we really had a very limited time in which to delve into this 34 page memorandum that was submitted by defense counsel and prepare for this motion today. So we are asking for more time on that than what. Than what we've had up to this point.
THE COURT [04:40]: All right. Help.
MR. WEINBERG [04:43]: Matter of your honor's discretion. I'm prepared to argue that today. The commonwealth has had eight days. It's a significant motion raising important issues that if your honor was to decide in favor of the defendant, it would root out a lot of the other issues, require an end to this litigation. I'm prepared to argue today.
THE COURT [05:06]: Well, I appreciate that, but to be fair to both sides, this was a significant motion file within the time span. There's certainly nothing. Not criticizing the defense for filing it in the timing of it, But I do understand the commonwealth may need some additional time. So can we put that also on for that November 2nd date.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [05:29]: Yes, your honor.
THE COURT [05:34]: We. We will hear that motion to dismiss on November 2. The commonwealth intend to file a memorandum in opposition.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [05:49]: Yes, your honor.
THE COURT [05:50]: All right, so if you could file that maybe at least a week before that hearing date, that would be helpful.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [05:54]: Yes, your honor.
THE COURT [05:59]: There's also was filed, I think yesterday or this morning, commonwealth's motion to bar prejudicial extrajudicial statements. Commonwealth, are you ready to argue that motion? Defendant? Well, the other question is whether I am. All right. This is a motion filed late yesterday. I didn't see it until about 5 o' clock this morning, so I've had not. I was also reviewing a number of the other motions. This raises some significant constitutional questions as well as under the Massachusetts law. I'm going to suggest that we set a date on that so that the court can be ready as well as the counsel put that on November 2nd as well. All right. And then. I know there's a related motion filed by the globe regarding access to arguments inside bar conferences. I just received that last night as well. So I'm not ready to address that. We'll mark that up for hearing. We'll reach out to counsel who filed that. We can set that up for a hearing. All right, so why don't we go forward first on the motion for review required finding, and then we can deal with the other motions and then talk about schedule. Okay. All right, Mr. [Reddington]. Or. Or [Mr. Weinberg]. I don't know which. Are you going to argue the Rule 25? Sure. Okay.
MR. REDDINGTON [08:09]: Thank you, your honor. You know, the posture at this point obviously is that the government rested. I filed the motion under Rule 25 for required finding. The court denied the motion. We then proceeded with the defense. When the defense rested, I renewed the motion for required finding. Procedurally, the court denied the motion. The government then commenced their rebuttal case. When the government rested, the rebuttal case in the case concluded. I renewed the motion for required finding. And this is a request for the court at this point to enter an order allowing a motion for required finding of not guilty. The issue is really two. You've got. As it goes back to the motion for bifurcation, you may recall. I know you do. That I had filed the motion requesting that the court bifurcate the trial itself, arguing the Massachusetts constitution, the difference in the language between the Mass. Constitution and the federal constitution as it relates to presenting evidence against oneself, whether or not it's an impingement on a Defendant's rights for due process, as well as their Fifth Amendment and 14th Amendment due process rights to require a person who is asserting a defense of lack of criminal responsibility to have. To have both issues tried. In other words, whether the person committed the offense and whether or not the person at the time of the commission of the offense lacked criminal responsibility. Two separate issues. But the way our present statute and law is set up, and as your honor denied that motion in your memorandum, you indicated obviously that we have to go forward on one trial. Whether or not it's because of money, that it would cost a lot of money to try two cases for anybody asserting a defense of lack of criminal responsibility or whether or not it's logistics, I don't know. But I suggest to the court that it's readily apparent that you are put in a conundrum where you have to, in effect, admit culpability, if you will, to raise the issue of lack of criminal responsibility. Now, many, many lay people have difficulty understanding the concept of the bifurcation and say, well, you know, she admitted that she did it, so she's guilty, and therefore she's just guilty. And then they go off on a tangent about all of these horrific allegations of, you know, that she's a demon and she's possessed and she should be executed. And this is coming from politicians, from president Trump all the way down. So we end up trying the case. I tried to raise the issue as best I could on the issue of probable cause. The jury was instructed by you that they did have the obligation to make a determination as to whether or not the government has presented evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this young woman was actually guilty of this offense. Your honor then proceeded to indicate appropriately that in the event that the jury determined that there was evidence that in fact she had indeed committed the offense, they would then proceed to the issue of whether or not the government suspended, sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that in fact she was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, such as, which would have an effect on her being either unable to appreciate the criminality of the conduct alleged, or, in a disjunctive, conform the conduct to the requirements of the law, which is our black little law definition of lack of criminal responsibility. So I'd like to kind of bifurcate this argument this morning in the same way. And what I would do is address first the issue of the government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And it's not riding the horse two ends against the middle and trying to play Games with the system or gamesmanship or anything. This is a constitutional due process obligation that the government. When the government charges a person with a criminal offense, they have that burden of proof on each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt. Your honor knows from your review and recollection of the evidence that was presented. I submit to the court that a motion for required finding of not guilty should have been entered on the total and complete lack of evidence to indicate to a rational juror which is consistent with the Latimore standard. Consistent with Jackson vs. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307. Where the courts note that to sustain the denial of a directed verdict, they call it directed verdict. We call it required finding. It is not enough for the court to find that there was some record evidence, which is always what the government always argues. There's some record evidence here. There was an evidence on this evidence, on that element. Dr. Saathoff testified to something, and there's enough for a jury. It's a question of fact. No, that's not the standard. The standard is whether or not that there is evidence that a court is able to determine that there's record evidence to support each essential element of the offense. It must find that there is enough evidence that could have satisfied a rational trier of fact of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. We consider the directed verdict standard required by Jackson vs. Virginia to be comparable to that heretofore applied in Commonwealth vs Cooper, and that's in Latimore. Jackson case. Further indicates that the evidence must not just be some record evidence. It has to be reliable, and it has to be sufficient that would allow a rational juror to make a determination beyond a reasonable doubt, not just that there's some record evidence that touches on each element of the offense. So I asked the court to hearken back to the evidence that was presented and ask yourself, where's the evidence that she did this? Where is the evidence that she did this? You have a situation where Patrick comes home. Your honor recalls the evidence that he indicates that when he came home, that he enters the house, he puts the food down on the table, comes back from the restaurant. It's quiet, eerily quiet, as the government indicates in their motion that he then indicates that he goes upstairs into the bedroom after yelling downstairs to the basement. There's no response. He goes upstairs, and when he goes upstairs, he goes into the bedroom. And your honor will recall that the evidence is that he's able to make an observation that the window is open. It's called in the room. He sees blood. My memory is that it appeared as though it was sprayed on the walls. In fact, your honor will recall, it was not sprayed on the walls. It was a lot of, I would say, copious blood drops on the floor and on the mirror. When you consider the evidence that the government has, you have the exercise bans, you have the woefully deficient DNA, you have the woefully deficient fingerprinting, you have the horrific, ridiculous investigation, using the term loosely by the, by the police. There was no investigation. It was not even a horrendous investigation. There was no investigation. And then you ask yourself some questions that we always do as defense attorneys, prosecutors, investigators. So when he goes into the bedroom, there's a lock on the knob. His blood. He's able to use some type of a little key in spite of the lock, jaw lock that was on the doorknob, opens the door, goes into the room, Goes into the room. Now, the evidence is that she cut her wrists, cut her throat standing in front of the mirror, blood drops, then went over to the window and propelled herself out of the window. Your honor heard evidence that she indicated, indicated that the screen was cut. Your honor also heard evidence that in fact the screen was not cut. Your honor could infer, obviously, as a rational jury could infer, that in fact this is a false memory that she had because she believes that the screen was cut and it wasn't. But in any event, she propels herself out the window and sustains the injuries that your honor is well aware that she sustained. She then is on the ground. She has no shoes on. Why does she not have shoes on? It's 30 something degrees outside. There's snow, it's the winterim date. She has no shoes. She's wearing black socks. Where's the blood on the black socks? Where's the blood on the shoes? When did the shoes get taken off? And why, you, honor, recalls looking at the blood. Much better evidence. And the drops on the floor, where are the smears from a person who has just cut their wrists, cut their throat, is in a state of psychosis that throws themselves out a window. Where are the smears from that person walking across the blood up to the window and then propelling themselves out the window? Where is the evidence that the cut that was on the nightstand contained crushed up, not just medication, crushed up medication. Where's the evidence of that? Where does that come from? Did the police even seize that cup? No. Did they examine the residue, the white residue? No. Patrick said that in fact it was medication. Patrick said that in fact it was crushed up medication? Where is the crushed. Where's the pill crusher? Where are the two spoons to use the crusher? Where's the residue? Why is it not on the table? Why is it not on the floor? Why is it not in the bed? Why is there no blood on the bed with the copious bleeding? They don't seize that. They don't test the substance. She ends up in the hospital. Your Honor recalls the evidence of the removal of the bands from the children's necks, the horrific experience and testimony that was presented as far as removal of the bands, the government's demonstration with Dr. [name unclear] that in fact the bands exploded wide open. They were not tied. You, Honor. Heard the testimony that in fact they were tied. This entire case is based on speculation. Where is the admission? Where does she say that she did this? And what's most chilling is the fact that when she comes out of this obvious coma that she is in that when she comes out of it. You want to have heard the testimony from the psychiatrist and from the doctors at Brigham and Women's Hospital. She was told what happened. She had no memory of what happened. Why does she recall cutting the screen? Why does she recall killing the children where she's told what happened and had no memory? There's no evidence that she admitted that she did this. So you have no evidence from the defendant. In Massachusetts, an uncorroborated statement of the defendant obviously is not evidence. You have to have corroboration. I submit to the court, there is no evidence she made any statements as far as the actual killing of the children, which forms the basis of the indictments. The time frame does not match. Even the government, in their own closing, indicated to the jury that she did not have enough time to do this. The timeline is ridiculous. As far as him leaving the house, sending off the 524 email, whether it was from his laptop, whether it was from his cell phone, driving the cvs, driving down to the restaurant to pick up the food. You got videos from both of those places. He's coming back. He's got shoes. He takes his boots off is what he says. You only can see in the photographs. As far as the sneakers are concerned, whatever he takes off, he takes it off. The time frame does not match the core body temperature. If you talk to a perfusionist, a perfusionist would indicate that it would take at least two hours for a human being to get down at core body temperature of 82 degrees. They would have to warm the blood, which they did in the hospital. To bring that person to the level where they're not ready to expire. And in fact, your honor knows that she did obviously expire. She died in the hospital, massive transfusions. And it just goes on and on and on. There is, there was and there cannot be evidence under the Latimore standard that this woman killed those children. As lawyers, as judges, we look to the evidence. And when the government charges somebody with a criminal offense, they have the burden of proof, not the defendant. And I submit to the court that when you consider all of the standards, all of the. I mean, I argued under Bowden for you to give a Bowden instruction. I've had many, many cases, obviously, in this courtroom, many courtrooms all over the state. If ever a case called out for Bowden instruction, it was this one. And Bowden, as you know, judge, and I'm sure you argued it before you were a judge. A jury can draw an inference or can determine that there is reasonable doubt based upon the lack of an adequate investigation. In this case, there was no investigation. They just immediately assumed that this woman was guilty. After you get over that hurdle, assuming you get over that hurdle, the government then has the obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that in fact, she was not suffering from a disease or defect. As I indicated, under the McHoul standard, your honor would harken back to the evidence. And this is where we have the law and the situation. As your honor instructed the jury that any statements made by a defendant pursuant to the government's motion or defendant's motions to have the person evaluated by a physician, psychiatrist is not an admission that carries independent weight. So what are we left with as far as the disease or defect? We have the government's rebuttal witnesses. Dr. Mack, Dr. Heilbrun, Dr. Saathoff. I suggest, first of all, goes to credibility. Not one of those rebuttal doctors were qualified to get on that witness stand and tell that jury their opinion of her mental state as a result of a psychosis because of postpartum depression. Postpartum psychosis. I'll leave it at that because I know your memory is strong as to cross examination of each one of these individuals. Defendant presented testimony from, I suggest to the court, quote, qualified experts that indicated, I mean, Dr. Philip Resnick, you can't get any more qualified than that doctor who had a significant impact on the jury that was sitting there listening to this evidence. And Dr. Resnik clearly and unequivocally indicated in his extensive involvement dealing with filicide, dealing with evidence that we presented to the jury, that shows it. At the time, time of this incident, in the event the jury determined that she did as she was suffering from postpartum, she was suffering from psychosis, he indicated that was his opinion, based on his evaluation of the evidence, based on his evaluation of her statements, and based on his continued evaluation of her. Dr. [name unclear], same thing indicated, as I indicated in the memorandum, clearly and unequivocally, that when a person is in a psychosis that they are capable and able to perform normal everyday activities and be in a full bloom of psychosis. The government spent a lot of time minimizing the whole concept. Originally, the government comes into this courtroom and says that the reason that she killed these kids is because she was sick of being a mother. She wanted to move on with her life, apparently. Well, they backed off on that like a poodle on the linoleum floor. Once the case got to the jury on a closing argument. Now all of a sudden, oh, yeah, well, she did try to kill herself. We spent a week trying to show that, in fact, it was a legitimate suicide. They said it was not a suicide. It was just a fake attempt. Then they agreed that it was a real suicide. Then they go on with their argument. Well, maybe she was sick. Maybe she did suffer from a disease or defect, but. But she knew what she was doing. And then you can hearken back to the government evidence and the government doctors and the guy looking up at the ceiling and talking about taking five minutes to answer a question. You even had to tell them, look, just, you know, answer the question. The government's theory that she was not in the psychosis, they would sprinkle throughout their eyeglass. Is there any evidence that she's seeing a purple unicorn in the corner of the room? Was she able to talk to her friends? Was she able to walk and breathe at the same time? Was she able to take care of the kids and build a snowman? Was she able to send a message on a text? Was she able to talk to her husband? Was she able to talk to her friends and her family? Yes. Argument being, she was fine. Why? Why? Forget about the law, forget about the motions, Forget about everything. Talk like human beings. Why would this woman, who the evidence shows clearly and unequivocally was a nurse, a mother, a friend, did nothing wrong in her life. Why would she kill those three children? All five of the doctors, six of the doctors, indicate that she was suffering from a mental disease or defect? Not just a mental disease or defect. She was suffering from a serious mental disease or defect. Maybe a Little difference. I under the DSM as to what the [cookbook] would say, well, she's suffering from this, but she's suffering from that. Basically, it's a severe mental disease and defect. The evidence shows clearly and unequivocally that she was in a state of psychosis. The government did not present evidence under Jackson in Virginia under Latimore. If you get out from underneath the usual argument that, well, there's enough evidence because we hit on all the elements. No, that's not the standard. The standard is whether or not it is reliable, whether or not it is evidence that a rational jury, a fact finder, would be able to apply to the facts that they find and determine that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. And as this woman sits in front of you today, I suggest to the court they did not prove probable cause and they certainly did not prove that she was not acting at the time of a psychosis and should be found not guilty.
MS. BUCKINGHAM (for the Commonwealth) [29:35]: Your honor, the commonwealth did file a written opposition, and I'd mostly rely on the written opposition for a summary of the facts of the case based on my best memory. Obviously, we don't have full transcripts to cite to for the particular pieces of evidence, but I think the commonwealth did present a fair representation of pertinent facts, although this was a lengthy trial and I certainly don't proclaim that it's an exhaustive list of all of the relevant facts. But as we're here addressing a motion for required finding under Rule 25, which counsel has cited to the job of the court of your honor is to decide based on the evidence presented at trial whether the evidence was sufficient for the Commonwealth for any rational trier of fact to find that the commonwealth has met its burden as it applies to each and every element. We're hearing now for the first time in this argument that counsel is challenging first the sufficiency of the evidence as it applies to the three counts of murder. What we heard throughout the course of trial over and over from counsel was that there was objections to the presentation of commonwealth's evidence, the underlying murders, because the defendant admits the defendant stipulates whether the commonwealth agreed to the stipulation or not. And now for the first time, the defendant is arguing that there's no evidence that she did this. I'd suggest to you that the entire record is voluminous as to the information supporting the fact that she did this. We have. She's the only one in the home with three young children. We have that her husband testified under oath that he Left the house, that she sent him out on those errands, that he went to the exact places where she directed him to go. Not only did she direct him to go based on his testimony, but we confirmed that with her own cell phone data that says that she made the call to the restaurant, that she made the call to cvs, that he then went there. He's on video surveillance at those locations during the time period in which these murders occurred. He comes home, and he finds the children in the manner that they were in, and he finds the defendant where she was. We have all that information. We have there was DNA on those exercise bands that was attributable to this defendant, and it was on the ends of those bands. The ends of those bands that she had to pull in order to strangle each and every one of those children. We have that she woke up in the hospital and spoke to a chaplain within days of regaining consciousness, where she talks about the fact that she had these hallucinations telling her what she had to do, that she had to kill the kids, and that she was glad that the kids were safer now. So there is plenty of information to support the essential elements of the charges of murder. There's information that. Or facts that support deliberate premeditation. There's facts that support extreme atrocity or cruelty, Much of them which I would more focus on and discuss with criminal responsibility. But I ask your honor to consider a lot of these facts in both contexts. So the. The first point, that there isn't enough evidence to prove that she did it, I would suggest as a laughable argument and based on what your honor sat through several weeks of the trial, that the commonwealth met its burden as it applies to that. As far as the motion for required finding as to the lack of criminal responsibility, I did try to outline in the commonwealth's response the law, as it pertains to this issue, because it is a little different, would suggest then what we traditionally see with required motions for required findings when it comes to a defense of lack of criminal responsibility. Your honor is aware that that's something that comes into effect only when raised by the defense. And when it's adequately raised, then the burden switches to the commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not lack criminal responsibility, that they were criminally responsible. And the case law is specific when it comes to required findings, that when that is the case again for required finding, the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the commonwealth and that the court, unless they find defense case, proves that the commonwealth case is conclusively incorrect, that the court doesn't necessarily rely on the defendant's case in order to address what whether the commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence. So I bring that up just as a kind of procedural issue with arguments that counsel made about defendants experts and defendants evidence. But what I would point to, you, honor, when determining the sufficiency of the evidence as opposed to criminal responsibility is we've talked a lot about the fact that there are two prongs to criminal responsibility and that the commonwealth can prove the defendant criminally responsible by either proving one, that the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect or by the second prong where we're talking about substantial capacity as it applies to the defendant's arguments that we haven't proved that she did not suffer from a mental disease or defect. I'd remind the court that mental disease or defect is in fact a legal term, that there is no clear definition. That is a complicated topic. And there was sufficient evidence presented in the commonwealth case in chief or substantial evidence, I should say that the defendant was having signs and symptoms of mental illness in the months prior to the murder. There was no dispute about that. Again, confining your honor's rulings to what you heard as far as trial evidence in this courtroom, not what was said in pretrial arguments, not what was said in press conferences or what was said in arguments at other points of time, what the jury heard, what your honor heard as trial evidence in this case is that she was displaying signs of and symptoms of mental illness. She was seeing several medical providers. She was getting treatment, she was on medication, she went to the hospitals, she went to the inpatient at McLean. That is all clear in evidence. But the commonwealth doesn't have to rely on that in order to say that she is in fact criminally responsible. The next part of the analysis comes into play, and I'd suggest that that's where the focus of the evidence is. It's on the defendant's substantial capacity, capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct and to control her conduct to the or confine her conduct to the requirements of the law. And the case law is clear that not every defendant with a mental illness lacks criminal responsibility. That's Commonwealth versus Fujita. That's Commonwealth versus Rezak. A defendant who has mental illness can commit crimes and can be criminally responsible. That's why the court SJC has repeatedly addressed this issue and identified various ways in which the commonwealth can prove that a person does have criminal responsibility despite suffering from a mental disease or Defect or mental illness. I caution that those terms should not be used interchangeably, although I understand that we tend to do so. But in the context of what the court might look at or what a jury might look at in order to find a person was criminally responsible. Responsible. The SJC has given us clear guidance on the types of facts or the types of evidence. The Commonwealth may prove criminal responsibility through inferences arising from circumstances of the offense or admissible evidence of defendants words conduct before, during and after the offense. That's Commonwealth versus Cullen from 1985, again reiterated in Commonwealth versus Lawson in 2016. I believe the Commonwealth may prove criminal responsibility by showing intention, goal directed conduct, evidence of rational motive. A fact finder may infer sanity from evidence and inferences. The defendant was oriented to time, place and person. That's Commonwealth versus Cole. The fact that counsel wants to argue, defense counsel wants to argue that she was psychotic is an argument and he can make it. But that doesn't mean that the commonwealth hasn't proved otherwise. With evidence of the defendant's conduct, with evidence of people's observations of her, with evidence of how she interacted with medical professionals, even on the day before this incident occurred, that she was not displaying any signs of psychosis, the court considered that. The fact finder can consider that and you should consider it. In determining that the commonwealth has met its burden in this case, Defense counsel refers to why she would do this in motive. Your honor is well aware that motive is not an essential element of either the underlying offenses of murder or of criminal responsibility. But I would suggest to your honor and I argue in the motion that the commonwealth did in fact present and argued to the jury that there was a motive here. Whether the court finds it to be rational, whether a fact finder finds it to be rational, it's a question of fact. But the commonwealth presented evidence not that the defendant was a bad mother or unhappy with being a mother and trying to start a new life. It was the fact that she was in a point in her life where she felt that she was never going to be the same. She was never going to be the person that she was before. She was frustrated with the system that she had been dealing with. She was frustrated with the results that she was getting. And she had succumbed to the idea that she didn't want to be here anymore and that she was going to commit suicide and that she was going to take those kids with her because no one could care for them like she could. She didn't want them to suffer. Those are all based on statements that she has made not in the context of a forensic interview, but at various points to different people, including people at the Brigham and Women Hospital after this incident occurred. So the idea that this was altruistic filicide, as the Commonwealth expert talked about, is in fact a motive, and it is fact rational based on everything that we know about the situation with the defendant during that time period. So to say that we haven't shown why it's just a misrepresentation of the evidence, I'd suggest. So based on these arguments here and as well as resting on whatever arguments that I haven't addressed that are contained within my motion, the Commonwealth would ask that you deny the motion.
THE COURT [39:39]: Thank you. I'm going to take that motion under advisement. So the other motions that we. Well, there's a motion to order. Juror notes, sidebar discussions not subject to parties Ready to argue that. Yes, go ahead, counsel.
MR. WEINBERG [40:16]: Judge this motion involves the constitutional right to a public trial. We've cited to the SJC's decision in Commonwealth v. Cohen that the Cohen case relies on A series of U.S. supreme Court decisions that talk about the centrality of a public trial, particularly in criminal cases, and they make clear that part of the right to a public trial of a criminal trial is for judicial documents, documents that would provide the predicate for the court's decision making to be public. It's not an absolute right. There are exceptions, but the exceptions need to be as narrow as possible. They need to be supported by particularized need. They need to be the least restrictive, and they need to be accompanied by judicial findings. In this case, we've particularly asked for two categories of documents to be provided to us so that we can rely on them publicly in support of the motion for double jeopardy. Motion to dismiss, one being the jury notes. One of the two notes that are central to the determination whether there was manifest necessity for a mistrial, which converts to whether or not there would have been a predicate for a discharge of a juror and for the continuation of jury deliberation rather than a mistrial, was cited in public on September 4 when the arguments were made out here in public. But the first of the two critical notes from the juror that was essentially providing notice, which we contend required of voir dire, remains under seal because it was discussed at sidebar with counsel, but with counsel objective to the sidebar debate about the implications of that note and about what remedies the court might apply. The fact that there were sidebars, of course, are not illegal Many lawyers assent to it. Mr. Reddington did not, at least as the transcripts of September 3rd and September 4th reflection. So I'm making the argument to your honor that we have filed a redacted motion to dismiss. It has blanked out and redacted, for the public and for the media, the content of Juror Note 2, which was the note on September 3rd, the first of the two notes. And we've redacted the transcript to the extent it was at the sidebar, but there is no particularized need for it. We believe that redactions still remained possible. That if the commonwealth or the court believes that a redaction of the transcript is required to protect some important value that outweighs the public right to a public trial and to review any documents that might be the predicate for important decisions that the court made. The decisions being to deny the defendant's motion to voir dire the juror, to deny the motion to voir dire the foreperson, and to deny the defendant's objection to the mistrial. There needs to be some weight that outweighs the public right of access. When I read it, there simply is no particularized need that I can identify, judge, other than the need to redact the name of the juror consistent with your honor's impoundment orders. Likewise for the juror notes. You know, they've been discussed in general in open court. One of them has been quoted in open court. There is no particularized need to preclude the other note, the note that was discussed alone at sidebar earlier on September 3, from becoming part of the public record. And so we've made this motion essentially to facilitate your honor's consideration of what is the real cornerstone motion in this case that remains to be resolved following the Rule 25 motion, that being whether or not the commonwealth gets to reprosecute Ms. Clancy, whether or not the declaration of a mistrial was supported by manifest necessity, whether or not the alternative of voir diring a juror or jurors, that could potentially have supported the court's assumption that the juror remained as a juror following the law, but not necessarily whether or not a voir dire could have led to answers that would have been inconsistent with that juror's statement. In answer to the one question the court asked. And so I ask you really to, in order to facilitate important litigation about a federal and state constitutional issue, whether or not, through the end of deliberations, Ms. Clancy had a jury composed of 12 impartial jurors, all of whom were following Your Honor's instructions, all of whom were obeying both their oath and their duty of jurors. That's a sixth Amendment right declaration under the twelfth Amendment, twelfth clause of the state constitution. And then the corollary of that, whether or not the double jeopardy clause would be. Would be violated by subjecting Ms. Clancy to the anxiety, the burdens, the perils of re prosecution. And so for those reasons, we've asked the court to make this limited ruling, to unseal the bench conferences from September 2, 3 and 4, and to provide the jury questionnaire, the jury notes, with a redaction of the name of the jury.
THE COURT [46:34]: Your position would still be as put out in the motion, that the defendant would assent to the redaction of any juror names or other identifying information reflected in the notes?
MR. WEINBERG [46:45]: Absolutely, Judge. There is a particularized need. We don't contest that. There is none. But that would be the limits of the redaction that I think would be consistent with the constitutional public trial. Right.
THE COURT [46:57]: Thank you, Counsel.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [46:58]: [inaudible] Your Honor, we would object to this motion in. In defence counsel's motion, they cite that the. The courts recognize a strong presumption in favor of a public trial overcome only by overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher value. And I suggest that what the higher value here in this case is is the sanctity of our system, our judicial system, and more specifically, our jury system. What has been happening with this case outside of this courtroom in press conferences has had a chilling effect on whether a juror would even want to serve on a case in this commonwealth. And then if we go further to make public notes sent by the jury regarding specific individuals, that would have an even further chilling effect on whether, if we get a jury, will that jury feel comfortable in sending a note to the court knowing it might become public? And then further, those conversations that the parties have about that note and the opinions that they have, it just all would pile on to have this repeated chilling effect that would harm irreparably our judicial system. And I think that if you look at it from a different perspective, where here we have a lone holdout juror allegedly looking for a guilty verdict versus those looking for a not guilty verdict by lack of criminal responsibility, if you flip that into defendant facing a jury where 11 people are voting guilty and one is the holdout looking for not guilty, and the chilling effect it would have on that person to know that the public will know their position. The public will be able to see notes about them, will hear discussions about Them will know that they were the one who didn't hold that person responsible. That would be a travesty. And so it shouldn't be allowed because this juror might have favored the defendant if that's how it worked out. So I would suggest to you that there is an extremely high value here to protect our system, protect our jury system. And the court has found previously in the Globe vs. The Commonwealth, 407 Mass. 879, that the public has no presumptive right of access to lobby conferences or side by discussions. And so I think here we need to protect our system and deny this motion.
THE COURT [49:35]: Thank you. Take that matter under advisement. Counsel, did you want to add anything?
MR. WEINBERG [49:43]: Just. Judge, you don't have to. Well, I would add it because this is. This has been, you know, the predicate of last night's motion by the Commonwealth. You know, we're not responsible because the juror, you know, has gone on TV because the juror has hired a lawyer that condemns Mr. Reddington's good faith ethical representation of. Ms. Clancy.
THE COURT [50:07]: That's not what I heard. I mean to interrupt you, counsel, but I'm gonna interrupt you. That's not the argument. We will discuss the motion that we put over to November 2 regarding extrajudicial statements on November 2. I understand the argument because defense is made understand the Commonwealth's argument. I think that the. The other arguments are going to go to the extrajudicial statements that are best saved until the verify.
MR. WEINBERG [50:39]: Agreed. So I would say just one other thing, which is that everything the prosecutors said has been in public, except the detail of the note. There's. There's nothing in this case that has. That would surprise any. Anyone, but we would have an accurate judicial record. And that's why I pressed the motion to disclose the notes and the sidebar conferences. Judge.
THE COURT [51:02]: Thank, counsel. Thank you. All right, so I'm going to take that motion under advisement. I think those are the only motions that we are going to address today. I do know there is. I mentioned They filed a motion to access the counsel's sidebar conferences, but seems to kind of fold in a little bit some of the discussions we just had here. I don't know if the counsel for the Globe is here. Commonwealth, have you seen this motion?
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [51:41]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT [51:42]: Right. Are you ready to respond to this? This?
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [51:46]: I. I think my arguments would be identical.
THE COURT [51:48]: I kind of thought so. I guess they didn't want to force it. Defendant, have you had an opportunity to review this motion? Okay. You ready to respond to that.
MR. WEINBERG [51:59]: Well, we. I think we're aligned in terms of at least the extent to which the Globe is seeking the same relief that we've been seeking when it choose to cipher said.
THE COURT [52:11]: That sounds like a yes. You ready to address this? All right, Counsel, Because I think it's probably something that's probably a good idea to, to hear this as opposed to putting it off to November 2, because that's going to be kind of folded along with the arguments I just heard. So. Yeah.
COUNSEL FOR THE BOSTON GLOBE AND WBZ [52:30]: Counsel, thank you, your honor, John Albano here on behalf of the Globe and WBZ. The motion we filed on, to a certain extent, the relief we were requesting was granted today because there were substantive motions argued from counsel table rather than at sidebar. I do want to say the motion isn't asking for a ban on all sidebars. It's not saying, oh, God, if you have one, you need to let people follow lawyers up to the sidebar. That's not the point at all. And, and I agree with the Commonwealth when they said there is that line in the Globe Drumgold case about no right of access to sidebars and, or to go into chambers with the court and counsel. The line to be drawn there, though, I believe there's two. One, we cited some cases that say, yes, you can do those sidebars if the defendant doesn't object. So that's one principle. But the other is the line between when does holding a substantive argument at sidebar essentially undo the rule of public trials? The extreme would be, it's sort of you're watching a silent movie, but there's no, no captions. That's, that's not consistent with the rules governing a public, public access to the trials. And the last thing I'd say is I do. I think everyone does understand the important and sensitive issues that arise in this case. But I guess I would like to say, say this, that helping the public better understand what has happened in this case and what will happen in the future in this case and to promote the legitimacy of an acceptance of the criminal judicial system. All of that is served by people being able to, those willing to, to educate themselves by, by hearing the arguments of counsel and the questions of the court. So that's the gist of the motion. I won't belabor the point beyond that, Counsel.
THE COURT [55:22]: Thank you.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [55:24]: The only thing I would add to my argument earlier is that any motion regarding the individual juror, information about that person should be held at sidebar and should be protected because the Commonwealth believes that a juror's right to Privacy. A jury's right to come to a verdict without any type of fanfare or unwanted attention or persecution. It should be sacrosanct. And so we would object to any type of public hearing where information, private information about that juror would be discussed.
MR. REDDINGTON [56:03]: Can I be heard?
THE COURT [56:04]: Sure.
MR. REDDINGTON [56:04]: Thank you very much. I am so tired of hearing persecution, attacking. I am doing all these terrible things to this juror. I filed one motion and said nothing. Every comment I have made has been in reaction to people from Donald Trump on down to Nancy Mace, down to Cruz. Not the DA but the politician calling for her execution. I have responded to these outlandish comments, including the guy from Houston. I just wanted to say that, Judge.
THE COURT [56:37]: we're talking about this motion for access to arguments regarding sidebar conferences. Anything else you want to add to that on edge?
MR. REDDINGTON [56:48]: On what?
THE COURT [56:48]: On the issue that we've just been talking about, the Globe's motion.
MR. REDDINGTON [56:51]: No, I'm just tired of hearing about me persecuting people.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [56:55]: I never said anything.
THE COURT [56:57]: Well, listen, we talk about this motion. All right? I'm gonna take it under advisement. I think I understand everybody's position, so. So that matter will be under advice. Thank you. All right. I think those are the motions that we have. We're gonna take a number under advisement. Now, just in regards to schedule, I know we have a November 2nd date for hearing regarding some other motions that will be heard. I'm going to suggest at this point, and please, Counsel knows this, but anybody who's sitting out there, don't read into the fact that we're going to get another date. This is not indicating that how I'm going to rule on any of the other motions, but I think it's important that this case move forward if it has to move forward. Motion dismisses a lot, well, then that's fine. It's a different thing. But rather than wait 30 days or 60 days to pick the next trial date, my thought is to pick that now, and then we can work towards that, backfill the dates in regards to that. So. So really, I guess that brings us back to the original reason we're going to be here. Status. So, Commonwealth, what's the status in regards to the trial or trial dates at this point?
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [58:28]: Your honor, I think we need to obviously argue these motions have rulings. There are appellate rights to those rulings. And so once all of that's complete, I think we could select the trial date once we know what those rulings are. And appellate rights could take some time. So I think if we select a trial date. Now, that might not actually be a real trial date, depending on how this case proceeds and what happens with any appellate rights from. From either side.
THE COURT [58:58]: Well, let me hear from the defense.
MR. REDDINGTON [59:01]: Believe it or not, I agree with it. So we'd like to stand together and say we'd rather defer until you make your rulings and then any appellate arguments are presented. Rather than pick a trial, why don't
THE COURT [59:16]: we just pick a trial and that will get this case moving. The discussion three weeks ago was let's try this thing in a week, right. And now no one wants to pick a trial date.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [59:29]: That is not the commonwealth position. So I think that when you you factor in that this could take some real time to go through these issues and then exercise any rights. I'm just concerned that any trial date we pick might not be realistic.
MR. WEINBERG [59:47]: I agree.
THE COURT [59:48]: Then the parties can move to continuing. Why don't we do this November 2nd. Be prepared to talk about picking a trial.
MS. SPRAGUE (for the Commonwealth) [59:56]: Yes.
THE COURT [59:56]: All right. And one way to. I'll leave it at that. All right. This is a matter I want to all I'm hearing about how important this is to get this resolved, to deal with this for all the parties. That's what I'm trying to do. All right. And I'm not saying I'm not blaming counsel for that, but that's my goal in this thing, is to get this thing tried, assume this process proper without sacrificing anyone's rights, anyone's position. But I don't want this thing to then just start to kind of get kicked down the road, punted and go forward.
MR. REDDINGTON [60:32]: It's not going to get punted, but I'll tell you right now I can't do a trial before June. I'll just let you know that right now it's not a matter of hunting or kicking or anything.
THE COURT [60:42]: Talk about that on November 2nd. Take a look at their schedule.
MR. WEINBERG [60:47]: So
THE COURT [60:50]: anything else? We've got November 2nd, they'll be here 9 o'. Clock. So we will be in recess at this time. Thank you.
Frequently asked questions
Is there a transcript of Lindsay Clancy’s September 29 hearing?
This page has an unofficial transcript made from the CBS News video of the hearing. The official transcript is prepared by the court reporter and may differ.
Who argued at the Clancy hearing?
For the defense, Kevin Reddington (the Rule 25 motion) and Martin Weinberg (the jury-note and sidebar motion). For the Commonwealth, Assistant District Attorneys Shanan Buckingham and Jennifer Sprague. Heather O’Connor appeared for the holdout juror, and a lawyer argued for the Boston Globe and WBZ. Judge William Sullivan presided.
What did the judge decide?
He took the not-guilty motion and the jury-note motion under advisement and set the double jeopardy motion, the juror inquiry and the gag order request for November 2, 2026, when he also wants to discuss a trial date.
Sources: CBS News video of the September 29, 2026 hearing in Commonwealth v. Clancy, Plymouth Superior Court, transcribed by machine with speaker separation and reviewed by us; speaker identifications checked against contemporaneous reporting by Fox News Digital, Boston 25 News, LA Magazine and Charista Snell. Unofficial transcript; not the court’s record. Lindsay Clancy is presumed innocent.