Malden v. Supervisor of Public Records of the Commonwealth (AC-25-P-235, November 3, 2026)

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25-P-235

Appeals Court

CITY OF MALDEN vs. SUPERVISOR OF PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH & others1 (and two consolidated cases2).

No. 25-P-235.

Middlesex. February 12, 2026. – November 3, 2026.

Present: Rubin, Henry, & Wood, JJ.

Public Records. Municipal Corporations, Public record. Supervisor of Public Records. Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation Act. Administrative Law, Judicial review. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Action in nature of certiorari, Declaratory proceeding, Review of administrative action, Party pro se, Self-representation, Attorney's fees.

Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 13, November 21, and December 16, 2024.

A special motion to dismiss was considered by William F. Bloomer, J.; a special motion to dismiss was heard by Christopher K. Barry-Smith, J.; and a special motion to dismiss was heard by Adam L. Sisitsky, J.

Bruce Friedman, pro se.

1 Secretary of the Commonwealth and Bruce Friedman, doing business as OpenCommonwealth.

2 The consolidated cases involve the same parties. James R. Donnelly (Felicia S. Vasudevan also present) for the plaintiff.

HENRY, J. This interlocutory appeal concerns the proper avenue for a public agency or municipality to challenge an order of the Commonwealth's supervisor of records (supervisor) issued pursuant to the public records law, G. L. c. 66, § 10A (§ 10A), concerning a particular requestor and request.3 The plaintiff, the city of Malden (city), filed three separate lawsuits in the Superior Court against the defendants: the supervisor; the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary); and Bruce Friedman, a private citizen of Malden who operates a website called OpenCommonwealth.org and who requested public records from the city.4 In its lawsuits, the city sought to challenge orders of the supervisor through (1) judicial review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14; (2) certiorari review pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 4; and (3) a request for a declaratory judgment pursuant G. L. c. 231A.

3 The supervisor is a public official within the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary), appointed by the Secretary pursuant to G. L. c. 9, § 4, and is tasked with the supervision of public records pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 1. Among other duties, the supervisor upholds the public records law and makes determinations on a requestor's appeal from a municipality's or an agency's response to a request for public records. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A.

4 Neither the supervisor nor the Secretary filed a brief in this appeal. Under the statutory framework set forth in § 10A, the procedure for a public agency or municipality to challenge an order of the supervisor in the context of a specific records request is to refuse to comply. See id. § 10A (b). If the records requestor or the Attorney General then brings an action to enforce the order, the public agency or municipality has the burden to prove that it is entitled to withhold the records notwithstanding the supervisor's order. See id. § 10A (d) (1). Because the Legislature has provided the city with a mechanism to challenge the supervisor's determinations if the Attorney General or the records requestor brings an enforcement action, the supervisor's orders, standing alone, did not cause the city a cognizable injury at the time the city filed these suits. Accordingly, the city's lawsuits against Friedman are based solely on his protected petitioning activity. We therefore conclude that Friedman's special motions to dismiss should have been granted in cases two and three. Accordingly, we reverse the orders denying those motions and remand cases two and three for the entry of orders dismissing the city's complaints against Friedman and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.5 The appeal in case one is dismissed because it is not

5 Friedman has asserted counterclaims against the city in all three cases. In his brief, Friedman requested that his counterclaims be remanded for trial. At oral argument, however, Friedman expressed willingness to have all three actions properly before us. However, any further proceedings in case one should be consistent with this opinion.

Background. We recite the facts as alleged in the pleadings and attached documents in each of the three cases before the Superior Court. See Bristol Asphalt Co., Inc. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc., 493 Mass. 539, 542 (2024) (Bristol Asphalt).

1. Case one. On May 20, 2024, Friedman submitted a public records request to the city by e-mail message. In the request, Friedman sought "[a]ny and all electronic mail and calendar information exclusively for [a city employee's e-mail address] including any draft and any deleted items." Eight days later, the city denied the request on the grounds that it was overly broad and therefore did not comply with the public records law. Friedman appealed to the supervisor later that day, requesting that the supervisor order the city to provide all responsive records. The city responded to Friedman's appeal, stating that the request was overbroad and that a "precursory search of the records requested" by Friedman showed that there were at least 49,000 e-mail messages that were responsive to his request.

dismissed. On remand, he can pursue his counterclaims or ask that they be dismissed. As discussed below, Friedman also may seek his costs. On June 4, 2024, Friedman sent an e-mail message to the supervisor, claiming that the city failed to provide either a good faith response or a fee petition within ten business days of his records request.6 See G. L. c. 66, § 10 (e) ("A records access officer shall not charge a fee for a public record unless the records access officer responded to the requestor within 10 business days . . ."); 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 32.06(4)(g) (2021) ("petitions seeking a waiver of statutory limits to fees assessed to segregate and/or redact public records must be made within ten business days following receipt of a request for public records"). The next day, the city filed a fee petition with the supervisor, requesting to charge a fee of $62,368.75, based on an estimated 2,496.75 hours to segregate and redact the requested documents. The supervisor denied the fee petition because she concluded that the city did not submit the petition

6 A fee petition is a request by an agency's or municipality's records access officer to the supervisor for permission to charge the records requestor a fee under G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d), which limits the fees that a records access officer may charge for responding to a public records request, would not otherwise allow. See, e.g., G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d) (ii) (C), (iii) (C), (iv) (prohibiting fees for time spent segregating or redacting records); G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d) (iii) (A), (iv) (prohibiting municipalities from assessing fees based on rate in excess of $25 per hour). The supervisor may approve such a fee if they find that the records request is for a commercial purpose, or that the fee is a good faith, reasonable estimate of the cost necessary to comply with the request and is not designed to limit or deter access to the records. G. L. c. 66, § 10 (d) (iv) (A), (B). within ten business days of receiving Friedman's request.7 The city sought reconsideration, which the supervisor denied.

In September 2024, the city filed a complaint in the Superior Court, seeking review of the supervisor's order denying its fee petition pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14; G. L. c. 249, § 4; and G. L. c. 231A. In January 2025, Friedman filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231 § 59H, arguing that the city's lawsuit was based solely on Friedman's petitioning activity and meant to silence him. The motion judge denied Friedman's motion without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 9A of the Rules of the Superior Court (2018) (rule

7 Friedman submitted his request at 10:33 P.M. on May 20, 2024. The city filed its fee petition on June 5, 2024. The city argued that a request at 10:33 P.M. should be considered received on the next business day. The city also argued that the supervisor erroneously counted Memorial Day, May 27, 2024, as a business day. Although we do not resolve the timeliness issues, the supervisor and the parties may want to consider G. L. c. 30, § 24 (State government departments' office hours are from 9 A.M.to 5 P.M., and "[w]hen the day or the last day for the performance of any act, including the making of any payment or tender of payment, authorized or required to be performed at such an office falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the act may be performed on the next succeeding business day"). See also G. L. c. 4, § 9 (when last day for performance falls on Sunday or legal holiday, performance on next business day suffices); 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 32.02 (2016) (defining "business day" as excluding "Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, or other weekdays where a custodian's office is closed unexpectedly"); 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 32.03(3) (2021) (computation of time under public records regulations begins with first business day following receipt of request); 950 Code Mass. Regs. § 32.06(2)(e) (2021) (request received on Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or day custodian's office is closed is deemed received following business day). 9A). Rather than refiling his special motion, Friedman appealed.

2. Case two. If the supervisor determines that a request is "part of a series of contemporaneous requests that are frivolous or designed to intimidate or harass, and the requests are not intended for the broad dissemination of information to the public about actual or alleged government activity, the Supervisor of records may . . . relieve the agency or municipality of its obligation to provide copies of the records sought." G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c).

The basis for case two arose from three separate petitions that the city filed with the supervisor pursuant to G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c), concerning Friedman's records requests. In each petition, the city sought relief from its obligation to provide the requested records, arguing that Friedman's requests were intended to harass the city (harassment petitions).8 The supervisor ultimately rejected all three harassment petitions on the grounds that the city did not demonstrate that Friedman's requests were "frivolous and not intended for the broad dissemination of information to the public about actual or

8 The first petition concerned twenty-six requests, the second petition concerned fourteen requests, and the third petition concerned two requests. alleged government activity, as required by G. L. c. 66, § 10 (c)."

In November 2024, the city brought case two in the Superior Court, seeking judicial review of the supervisor's order rejecting the harassment petitions. In its complaint, the city again stated counts pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14; G. L. c. 249, § 4; and G. L. c. 231A. The city alleged that Friedman's harassing behavior included sending a "personal investigator" to the home of a former city employee; publicly posting records disclosing a former city employee's home address and social security number; and submitting an "outrageous volume" of requests, many of which were duplicative of each other.9 The city sought to be relieved from its obligation to respond to Friedman's pending public records requests and all of Friedman's future requests. The prayer for relief in the city's complaints did not seek any relief related to the assertions concerning the personal investigator or the posting of an employee's personal information.

In January 2025, Friedman filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, arguing again that the city's

9 By the time the city filed case two in November 2024, Friedman had submitted 165 public records requests, ninety-two appeals, and eighteen requests for reconsideration to the city that year. lawsuit was based solely on his petitioning activity and meant to silence him. A second motion judge denied Friedman's motion, finding that the city's complaint had a legitimate basis beyond Friedman's petitioning activity because Friedman misused certain public records that he obtained and engaged in conduct that extended beyond bona fide petitioning. Friedman appealed.

3. Case three. On August 30, 2024, the city received four public records requests from Friedman. On September 17, 2024, the city responded to Friedman's request with a fee estimate and submitted a fee petition to the supervisor. As in case one, the supervisor denied the city's fee petition, concluding that the city had failed to submit its fee petition within ten business days of receiving Friedman's requests. The city requested reconsideration of the order, which the supervisor denied.

In December 2024, the city brought case three in the Superior Court, again seeking review of the supervisor's order pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14; G. L. c. 249, § 4; and G. L. c. 231A. In January 2025, Friedman filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, which was initially denied without prejudice for noncompliance with rule 9A. Friedman subsequently filed a renewed special motion to dismiss that was compliant with rule 9A. A third motion judge denied Friedman's renewed special motion, finding that the city's claims were substantially based on how the supervisor calculates time restrictions, rather than Friedman's petitioning activity. Friedman timely appealed. Friedman's appeals in the three cases were consolidated.

Discussion. Friedman argues that his special motions to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, should have been granted in cases two and three. We agree.10

1. Anti-SLAPP statute. The anti-SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, allows a party to bring a "special motion to dismiss" claims, counterclaims, or cross claims that are "based on" that party's "exercise of its right of petition under the constitution of the United States or of the commonwealth." G. L. c. 231, § 59H. If the court grants the special motion, the underlying claim is dismissed and, ordinarily, the moving party recovers costs and reasonable attorney's fees. G. L. c. 231, § 59H.

The Supreme Judicial Court has recently simplified the framework that courts use to evaluate a special motion to

10 We agree with the city that the denial of Friedman's special motion to dismiss in case one is not properly before us because the motion was denied without prejudice for failure to comply with rule 9A. See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 520- 521 (2002), S.C., 441 Mass. 9 (2004) ("It is settled that absent special authorization, . . . an appellate court will reject attempts to obtain piecemeal review of trial rulings that do not represent final dispositions on the merits" [quotations and citation omitted]). In any event, any subsequent proceedings in that matter should be consistent with this opinion. dismiss. See Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at 542. Under that framework, the analysis proceeds in two stages. Id. at 554-560. At the first stage, the special motion proponent — here, Friedman — must show that the claims against him are based solely on his petitioning activity. Id. at 554-556. If he does, the burden shifts, at the second stage, to the special motion opponent — here, the city — to show that Friedman's petitioning lacked any reasonable factual or legal basis and caused the city actual injury. Id. at 557-558. If the opponent cannot make that showing, the special motion to dismiss must be allowed. Id. at 557. We apply this framework to cases two and three. As explained below, Friedman satisfies the first stage, and the city cannot satisfy the second.

2. Stage one: petitioning activity. To prevail on a special motion to dismiss pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 59H, the moving party must first make "a threshold showing through the pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are based on the [party's] petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities" (quotations and citation omitted). Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. 555 & appendix. Friedman has made that showing in cases two and three.

a. Case two. The second motion judge denied Friedman's special motion on the ground that the city's complaint had a basis beyond Friedman's petitioning activity because Friedman misused public records that he had obtained and engaged in conduct extending "beyond bona fide petitioning." On this record, we disagree.

Although the city's complaint referenced Friedman's alleged misuse of records and his hiring of a private investigator, the city's prayer for relief sought no remedy related to that conduct. The relief the city sought in case two, to be relieved of its obligation to respond to Friedman's requests, arises entirely from Friedman's public records requests, appeals, and requests for reconsideration to the supervisor, which are themselves protected petitioning activity. Had Friedman not petitioned the supervisor, the city would have had nothing to challenge. Because the city's claims in case two therefore depend entirely on Friedman's protected petitioning activity, Friedman made the required threshold showing under the first stage of the anti-SLAPP framework.

b. Case three. The third motion judge similarly found that the city's claims were substantially based on how the supervisor "calculates time restrictions under the law," rather than on Friedman's petitioning activity. We disagree.

The city's fee petition was denied, and this lawsuit followed, only because Friedman submitted public records requests to the city on August 30, 2024, and the supervisor determined that the city's fee petition was untimely relative to those requests. Therefore, although the city challenges the supervisor's interpretation of the law, the challenged order, and consequently the city's claims, arose from Friedman's petitioning activity. Therefore, as to case three, Friedman has made the required threshold showing under the first stage of the anti-SLAPP framework.

3. Stage two: no reasonable basis or actual injury. Once a special motion proponent makes the required threshold showing, the burden shifts to the special motion opponent to show that the proponent's "exercise of [his] right of petition 'was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law' and . . . 'caused actual injury to the [special motion opponent].'" Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at 557, quoting G. L. c. 231, § 59H. Passing over whether the city showed that Friedman's public records requests, appeals, or communications with the supervisor were devoid of reasonable factual or legal support, the city has not shown that Friedman's petitioning activity caused the city actual injury. Indeed, the city may not suffer any injury unless and until someone seeks to enforce the supervisor's orders and it is ordered to turn over records to Friedman without being able to recoup its costs. (Even then, should the city not prevail, we would be hesitant to conclude that being ordered to comply with the law is an injury for purposes of G. L. c. 231, § 59H.)

Section 10A expressly permits someone who has requested public records, in this case Friedman, to seek judicial review of an order issued by the supervisor: "A requestor, aggrieved by an order issued by the Supervisor of records . . . may obtain judicial review only through an action in superior court seeking relief in the nature of certiorari under section 4 of chapter 249 . . . ." G. L. c. 66, § 10A (a). More broadly, "a requestor may initiate a civil action to enforce the requirements of . . . chapter [66]." G. L. c. 66, § 10A (c).11 The statutory scheme does not expressly provide a means for a public agency or municipality aggrieved by an order of the supervisor to bring suit under G. L. c. 249, § 4, or any other statutory scheme. We interpret this absence to mean that the Legislature intended to foreclose public agencies and municipalities from initiating actions to challenge orders issued by the supervisor with respect to a specific requestor. See Donis v. American Waste Servs., LLC, 485 Mass. 257, 266 (2020) ("If the Legislature intentionally omits language from a statute, no court can supply it" [citation omitted]); Connolly

11 Under certain circumstances, the Attorney General may also file an action to compel a public agency or municipality to comply with an order made by the supervisor. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (b), (e). v. Sullivan, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 318 (2010) ("we do not read into the statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put there, whether the omission came from inadvertence or of set purpose" [quotations and citations omitted]).

But that does not foreclose public agencies and municipalities from ever challenging an order of the supervisor. A public agency or municipality may refuse to comply with such an order. When a requestor or the Attorney General brings an action to enforce (or that implicates the correctness of) the supervisor's order, the public agency or municipality must prove that it is entitled to withhold the records on the grounds that withholding the requested records is lawful. See Boston Globe Media Partners, LLC v. Department of Criminal Justice Info. Servs., 484 Mass. 279, 282 (2020), quoting G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv) ("Under the public records act, 'a presumption shall exist that each record sought is public and the burden shall be on the defendant agency or municipality to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such record or portion of the record may be withheld in accordance with state or federal law'"). If no enforcement action is ever brought, then the public agency or municipality suffers no harm.

Put differently, the Legislature has established a framework in which, to challenge the lawfulness of the supervisor's order with respect to a requestor and request, the public agency or municipality must first refuse to comply with the supervisor's order. At that point, either the requestor or the Attorney General can bring an action to enforce the order. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (b), (c), (e). In such an enforcement action, the public agency or municipality has the burden to prove that it is entitled to withhold the records notwithstanding the supervisor's order. G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iv). If no enforcement action is ever brought, then the public agency or municipality suffers no harm.

Here, the city contends that under this interpretation of the statutory framework, a public agency or municipality seeking to challenge the supervisor's decision must risk paying the requestor's attorney's fees if the requestor ultimately prevails in an enforcement action. See G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (2). The city is correct about the statutory framework, but its argument should be addressed to the Legislature. See Donis, 485 Mass. at 270 (public policy argument "is best addressed to the Legislature"). If anything, the attorney's fee provision in the statutory scheme "reflects the Legislature's recognition that '[t]he public has an interest in knowing whether public servants are carrying out their duties in an efficient and law-abiding manner' and that broad access to governmental information is 'an essential ingredient of public confidence in government'" (citation omitted). Attorney General v. Mystic Valley Regional Charter Sch., 497 Mass. 251, 253 (2026).

The absence of an actual injury not only defeats the city's claims at the second stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis, it also defeats the city's claims for certiorari, declaratory judgment, and judicial review pursuant to G. L. c. 30A.

a. Certiorari action. General Laws c. 249, § 4, "permits a party to bring '[a] civil action in the nature of certiorari to correct errors in proceedings' under certain circumstances." Marchese v. Boston Redev. Auth., 483 Mass. 149, 162 n.14 (2019). "The purpose of the certiorari procedure is to provide a remedy, where none would otherwise exist . . ." (citation omitted). Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Bourne, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 605, 607 (2002). To bring such an action, the party must sufficiently allege "(1) a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding, (2) from which there is no other reasonably adequate remedy, and (3) a substantial injury or injustice arising from the proceeding under review" (citation omitted). Frawley v. Police Comm'r of Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 726 (2016).

Here, because the city cannot prove an injury at this time, the city fails stage two of the anti-SLAPP doctrine. For the same reason, the city cannot satisfy the substantial injury element of an action in the nature of certiorari. Because the absence of substantial injury is dispositive of the certiorari claim, we need not consider whether the city has satisfied the remaining elements.

b. Declaratory judgment. General Laws c. 231A authorizes a party to seek a declaration of rights where an actual controversy exists, but a party has standing only if it "can allege an injury within the area of concern of the statute or regulatory scheme under which the injurious action has occurred" (citation omitted). Enos v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 432 Mass. 132, 135 (2000).

As discussed above, the city has not suffered any injury yet. Moreover, this is not a circumstance where "the absence of declaratory relief would prevent [the statutory scheme] from being administered properly and thus contravene the Legislature's intent." Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health, 469 Mass. 323, 336 (2014).

Here, because the Legislature created a statutory scheme in § 10A that provides an avenue of relief for public agencies and municipalities, the city may not bring an action under G. L. c. 231A to challenge the supervisor's orders about a particular requestor or request. If a public agency or municipality could seek declaratory relief before the requestor or the Attorney General brings an enforcement action, it would circumvent the statutory scheme, which gives only the records requestor and the Attorney General the right to file suit. Moreover, a records requestor may have no intention to press the matter in court and cannot be forced to do so, as the city has attempted to do here. The threat that a records holder may sue a records requestor and require the requestor to defend that suit may deter requests for public records.12 See Frawley, 473 Mass. at 724 ("a party may not seek declaratory relief to effect an 'end run' around the absence of a private right of action where the Legislature intended to foreclose certain remedies" [citation omitted]).

c. Chapter 30A review. General Laws c. 30A, § 14, entitles "any person or appointing authority aggrieved by a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding" to judicial review in the Superior Court. G. L. c. 30A, § 14. "[T]o maintain an action for review [under c.30A, § 14], a party must be aggrieved in a 'legal sense' and show that 'substantial rights' have been 'prejudiced'" (citation omitted). Board of Health of Sturbridge v. Board of Health of Southbridge, 461 Mass. 548, 557 (2012). An "[a]djudicatory proceeding" is "a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named persons are required by constitutional right or by any provision of the General Laws to be determined after opportunity for an agency hearing." G. L.

12 In addition, the public records law requires the Superior Court, "when feasible," to expedite enforcement actions brought under § 10A. G. L. c. 66, § 10A (d) (1) (iii). The declaratory judgment statute does not include such a provision. c. 30A, § 1 (1). Absent a hearing requirement, there is no "adjudicatory proceeding" to review, and G. L. c. 30A, § 14, does not apply. See Springfield Hotel Assoc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n., 338 Mass. 699, 702 (1959) ("Since no hearing was required by any provision of law, the petitioners were not entitled to a judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14").

The city has not shown that the supervisor's orders prejudiced any of its substantial rights and therefore cannot establish that it is a "person aggrieved" entitled to judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14. The city also cannot satisfy the separate requirement that the supervisor's orders have been rendered in an "adjudicatory proceeding." See G. L. c. 30A, § 14. Section 10A does not require the supervisor to hold a hearing before ruling on a records request or fee petition, and no provision of the public records law or its implementing regulations requires sworn testimony, cross-examination, or any of the other procedural hallmarks of an adjudicatory hearing. Because no hearing was required, the supervisor's determination does not qualify as a "final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding" within the meaning of G. L. c. 30A, §14, and the city is therefore not entitled to judicial review under that provision. In sum, the city has failed to establish actual injury from Friedman's petitioning activity, and thus failed to satisfy its burden at the second stage of the anti-SLAPP framework. See Bristol Asphalt, 493 Mass. at 557. The statutory requirements governing the city's three causes of action likewise provide no basis for relief from the supervisor's orders at this time.

4. Attorney's fees and costs. Although Friedman's special motions to dismiss should have been granted in cases two and three, he is not entitled to attorney's fees because he was self-represented and has not incurred such fees. See G. L. c. 231, § 59H ("If the court grants such special motion to dismiss, the court shall award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney's fees, including those incurred for the special motion and any related discovery matters").13 See Miller

13 Section 6F of G. L. c. 231 (§ 6F) provides a helpful contrast. In § 6F, which addresses insubstantial, frivolous or bad faith claims or defenses, the plain language of the statute addresses self-represented litigants, providing:

"If such a finding is made with respect to a party's claims, the court shall award to each party against whom such claims were asserted an amount representing the reasonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred in defending against such claims. If the party against whom such claims were asserted was not represented by counsel, the court shall award to such party an amount representing his reasonable costs, expenses and effort in defending against such claims."

The absence of similar language in G. L. c. 231 § 59H indicates that the Legislature did not intend for self-represented litigants to be compensated for their own efforts in bringing a v. Commissioner of Correction, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 114, 120 (1994) (noting that a self-represented litigant "is not entitled to attorney's fees for his own services" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

However, Friedman is entitled to costs. See G. L. c. 261, § 1 ("In civil actions the prevailing party shall recover his costs, except as otherwise provided"); Mass. R. Civ. P. 54 (d), as appearing in 382 Mass. 821 (1980) ("Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the Commonwealth or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . . "); Mass. R. A. P. 26 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1655 (2019) ("Except as otherwise provided by law or ordered by the court, [1] if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed to by the parties; [2] if a judgment is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant; [3] if a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee; [4] if a judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified, or vacated, costs are taxed only as ordered by the appellate court"). Friedman's appellate costs shall be taxed pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 26.

Conclusion. The appeal in case one, docket no. 2481CV02456, is dismissed, though any further proceedings in

successful special motion to dismiss pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. that matter should be consistent with this opinion.14 In cases two and three, docket nos. 2481CV03069 and 2481CV03277, we reverse the orders denying Friedman's anti-SLAPP motions and remand those cases to the Superior Court for entry of orders dismissing the city's complaints against Friedman and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including resolution of Friedman's counterclaims should he choose not to dismiss them.

So ordered.

14 If the city does not voluntarily dismiss its claims in case one consistent with this opinion, Friedman may move to dismiss them.