SJC to Evicted Tenant: Use the Regular Appeal Process

CourtSupreme Judicial Court

DocketSJC 13998

ReleasedNovember 9, 2026

Full opinionRead the full text of the decision

Question

Did the single justice abuse her discretion in denying a petition for extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3, when the petitioner sought restoration of possession and return of personal property after eviction, where final judgments had entered in the underlying Housing Court cases and ordinary appeal processes remained available?

Rule

General Laws c. 211, § 3, authorizes a single justice to exercise general superintendence over inferior courts. A single justice is not required to intervene if the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy or if the single justice determines, in his or her discretion, that the subject of the petition is not sufficiently important and extraordinary as to require general superintendence intervention. Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24-25 (2019).

When a single justice exercises discretion not to reach the merits of a G.L. c. 211, § 3 petition, the full court asks only whether the single justice abused his or her discretion in making that decision. Boone v. Commonwealth, 494 Mass. 1011, 1012-1013 (2024).

Relief from final Housing Court judgments is available through ordinary appeal processes under G.L. c. 211A, § 10; G.L. c. 231, § 113; and G.L. c. 239, § 5. Kim v. Newton Hous. Auth., 493 Mass. 1029, 1030 (2024). Relief from denial of a postjudgment motion is likewise appealable. Briscoe v. LSREF3/AH Chicago Tenant, LLC, 481 Mass. 1038, 1038 (2019).

General Laws c. 239, § 4(h), expressly provides for relief regarding personal property retained in violation of § 4 by way of a petition in the court that heard the underlying summary process action.

Holding

The single justice did not abuse her discretion. By the time Moton filed his petition for extraordinary relief, final judgments had entered in both underlying Housing Court cases. Moton therefore had adequate alternative remedies available through ordinary appeal processes under G.L. c. 211A, § 10; G.L. c. 231, § 113; and G.L. c. 239, § 5. He could also have appealed from the denial of his postjudgment motion for relief under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

Moton argued that because he had already been evicted, an ordinary appeal would have taken too long to afford meaningful relief. The court rejected this argument, noting that Moton had not demonstrated why he could not have moved to expedite his appeal in the Appeals Court.

As for Moton’s claim that the FRHA retained his personal property in violation of G.L. c. 239, § 4, that statute expressly provides for relief through a petition in the court that heard the underlying summary process action. Moton’s petition did not sufficiently demonstrate why such relief, including ordinary appeal from any adverse ruling, was inadequate.

Because Moton failed to demonstrate the absence of an adequate alternative avenue to pursue his claims, he was not entitled to relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3.

Result

The court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying the petition for extraordinary relief. The court did not reach the merits of Moton’s underlying claims, leaving him to pursue those claims through ordinary appeal processes if he chooses to do so.

Players

Court: Supreme Judicial Court, on appeal from denial of petition for extraordinary relief by single justice
Petitioner-Appellant: Jerome Moton, pro se
Respondent: Fall River Housing Authority
Below (single justice): Single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, August 2026 (petition denied)
Below (Housing Court): Southeast Division of the Housing Court Department (summary process judgment December 2025, execution issued; civil action dismissed July 2026)
Below (Appeals Court): Single justice of the Appeals Court (stay motions denied March 2026 and later date)

Jerome Moton, evicted from his Fall River public housing unit in late 2025, tried every procedural avenue to get back in. After losing in Housing Court, he sought stays from single justices of the Appeals Court (twice) and the Supreme Judicial Court. He filed a Rule 60(b) motion. He brought a separate civil suit challenging the judgment. All failed. In August 2026, after his eviction, he filed yet another petition with a single justice of the SJC, seeking extraordinary relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice said no, and the full court affirmed on November 9, 2026. The message: when final judgments have entered and ordinary appeals are available, extraordinary relief is not.

The Eviction Saga

The Fall River Housing Authority brought a summary process action against Moton. After an agreed judgment and an amended agreed judgment in favor of the FRHA, the authority moved for execution. Execution issued in December 2025. Moton moved to stay it. The Housing Court denied the motion.

Moton then sought a stay from a single justice of the Appeals Court. The justice temporarily stayed the execution but ultimately denied the motion in March 2026. Execution reissued. Moton petitioned a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for a stay under G.L. c. 211, § 3. That petition was denied. He went back to a single justice of the Appeals Court. Denied again. In Housing Court, he filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment. Also denied.

Meanwhile, Moton had filed a separate civil action in Superior Court against the FRHA, challenging the validity of the summary process judgment and seeking postjudgment relief. The case was transferred to the Housing Court, where it was dismissed on the FRHA’s motion in July 2026.

In August 2026, Moton filed the petition at issue. He sought an extraordinary order from a single justice of the SJC to be returned to possession of the property, to recover personal property taken by the FRHA, to vacate the underlying judgments and eviction orders, to vacate the transfer order in his civil case, to remove any filing restrictions, and to remand with instructions that the Housing Court address his arguments on the merits.

The Single Justice’s Decision

The single justice denied the petition without reaching the merits. She concluded that Moton had adequate alternative remedies available and that the petition did not present the type of exceptional matter requiring extraordinary intervention under Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482 Mass. 22, 24-25 (2019).

What the Full Court Held

The Supreme Judicial Court reviews a single justice’s denial of a G.L. c. 211, § 3 petition for abuse of discretion only. The court found none here.

By the time Moton filed his petition for extraordinary relief, final judgments had entered in both Housing Court cases. That meant relief was available to him in the ordinary course of appeal under G.L. c. 211A, § 10; G.L. c. 231, § 113; and G.L. c. 239, § 5. He could have appealed the summary process judgment. He could have appealed the dismissal of his civil action. He could have appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.

Moton argued that ordinary appeal would have taken too long because he had already been evicted. The court was unpersuaded. Moton had not shown why he could not have moved to expedite his appeal in the Appeals Court, citing Stegemann v. Commonwealth, 456 Mass. 1004, 1005 n.3 (2010).

As for his personal property, Moton claimed the FRHA retained it in violation of G.L. c. 239, § 4. The court noted that § 4(h) expressly provides for relief through a petition in the court that heard the summary process action. Moton’s petition did not sufficiently explain why that remedy, plus ordinary appeal from any adverse ruling, was inadequate.

Because Moton failed to demonstrate the absence of adequate alternative avenues, he was not entitled to extraordinary relief. The single justice did not abuse her discretion.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces a basic principle: G.L. c. 211, § 3, is not a substitute for ordinary appeal. The statute authorizes extraordinary relief only when no adequate remedy exists or when a matter is sufficiently important and exceptional to warrant superintendence intervention. A petitioner who has lost in the trial court and wants relief must use the regular appellate process, even if that process feels slow.

For tenants facing eviction, the lesson is procedural. Once a summary process judgment becomes final, the path forward is appeal under G.L. c. 239, § 5, not a fresh petition for superintendence relief. If speed is critical, a motion to expedite in the Appeals Court is the tool. A claim that ordinary appeal takes too long will not open the door to § 3 relief unless the petitioner shows why expedition was unavailable or inadequate.

The decision also clarifies that relief under G.L. c. 239, § 4(h), for wrongfully retained personal property, is itself subject to ordinary appeal. A petitioner cannot bypass that process by seeking superintendence relief unless he can show the statutory remedy is truly inadequate.

Moton’s case illustrates the limits of persistence. He sought stays and relief from multiple single justices, filed a Rule 60(b) motion, and brought a separate civil action. None of those efforts succeeded, and none of those failures made extraordinary relief appropriate. The court did not reach the merits of his underlying claims, leaving those claims to be pursued, if at all, through ordinary appeal.

Read the full opinion from the court: Moton v. Fall River Housing Authority (SJC-13998, November 9, 2026) (PDF, mass.gov).