SJC: Parent Company Can’t Enforce Noncompete Without Subsidiary’s Signature: Anaplan Parent v. Brennan (SJC-13917, November 17, 2026)

Massachusetts high court rules that a noncompete signed by a parent company, not the subsidiary that employed the worker, violates the state Noncompetition Agreement Act and cannot be enforced, even when the employee received equity in the parent.

CourtSupreme Judicial Court

DocketSJC 13917

ReleasedNovember 17, 2026

ArguedSeptember 9, 2026

PanelBudd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, & Wolohojian, JJ

Full opinionRead the full text of the decision

Question

Does a noncompetition agreement satisfy the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act when it is signed by the parent company of the employee’s employer, but not by the employer itself? Does such an agreement fall outside the MNAA as a “noncompetition agreement[ ] outside of an employment relationship”?

Rule

The MNAA, G. L. c. 149, § 24L, sets “minimum requirements” for a noncompetition agreement “[t]o be valid and enforceable.” One such requirement is that “the agreement must be in writing and signed by both the employer and employee.” G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b) (ii).

The act defines “employee” as “an individual who is considered an employee under [G. L. c. 149, § 148B]”; it “shall also include independent contractors under” that statute. G. L. c. 149, § 24L (a). The independent contractor statute provides that “an individual performing any service” shall be an employee unless three conditions are met. G. L. c. 149, § 148B (a). Under the MNAA, an employee is thus “an individual performing any service for an entity, regardless of whether the individual is classified as an employee or an independent contractor.” It follows that an employer is “an entity for which an individual performs any service.”

The general rule. “The entity for [which] the individual directly performs services is ordinarily the individual’s employer.” Jinks v. Credico (USA) LLC, 488 Mass. 691, 696 (2021). Thus, “generally ‘one entity is not the employer of a different entity’s employees.'” Jinks, 488 Mass. at 698-699. A parent is not ordinarily the employer of its subsidiary’s employees.

Noncompetition agreements covered by the act. A “[n]oncompetition agreement” is one “under which the employee . . . agrees that he or she will not engage in certain specified activities competitive with his or her employer after the employment relationship has ended.” G. L. c. 149, § 24L (a). The agreement must be “between an employer and an employee, or otherwise arising out of an . . . employment relationship.” The act excludes “noncompetition agreements outside of an employment relationship.” Id.

Holding

The parent was not the employer. The court held that the parent company was not Brennan’s employer under the MNAA. The record showed Brennan performed services for the subsidiary, making the subsidiary his employer. The record did not support that Brennan performed any services for the parent. The parent’s only relationship with Brennan was through the equity incentive agreements by which Brennan received equity in the parent and became a limited partner in exchange for restrictive covenants benefiting the subsidiary.

The court rejected the argument that “employer” should be defined as in G. L. c. 149, § 1 to include “any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly.” That definition is expressly limited to other sections of chapter 149, not § 24L. The Legislature knew how to adopt that definition when it wished and chose not to do so for the MNAA.

Because the subsidiary was Brennan’s employer and did not sign the equity incentive agreements, those agreements failed to satisfy the requirement that the employer sign the noncompetition agreement. G. L. c. 149, § 24L (b) (ii).

The covenants arose out of an employment relationship. The court rejected the argument that the noncompetition covenants fell outside the MNAA as “noncompetition agreements outside of an employment relationship.” Brennan entered into the covenants in connection with his employment with the subsidiary. The covenants imposed postemployment restrictions on competition with the subsidiary. The equity agreements identified the subsidiary as a third-party beneficiary and provided consideration to Brennan in exchange for his promise not to compete with his employer after employment ended. The covenants therefore “arose out of an employment relationship” and were “noncompetition agreements” as defined by the act.

An agreement does not fall outside the employment relationship simply because the employer failed to sign it. Where a noncompetition agreement is tethered to the employee’s employment relationship with his or her employer, it does not fall within the exception for agreements “outside of an employment relationship” simply because the employer failed to sign it.

Result

The order denying the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is affirmed.

Players

  • Court: Supreme Judicial Court, on direct appellate review transferred sua sponte from the Appeals Court
  • Opinion by: Wendlandt, J.
  • Panel: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, Dewar, and Wolohojian, JJ.
  • Below: Superior Court (Suffolk), Justice Debra A. Squires-Lee, motion heard and denied in August 2025
  • Plaintiffs: Anaplan Parent, LP (parent company and limited partnership) and Anaplan, Inc. (subsidiary, enterprise software company)
  • Defendant: Timothy Brennan (former employee of Anaplan, Inc., hired 2019, left for competitor Pigment in July 2025)
  • Counsel for plaintiffs: Leigh Ann Buziak of Pennsylvania and Russell Beck
  • Counsel for defendant: Patrick J. Hannon and Hampton M. Watson
  • Amicus curiae: Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association (Michaela C. May); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and Associated Industries of Massachusetts (Samuel Larson, Stephanie Swanson, Mark C. Fleming, and Adam Ellis Harper)

A parent company cannot enforce a noncompetition agreement against its subsidiary’s employee when the subsidiary did not sign the agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court so held in affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by Anaplan Parent, LP and its subsidiary Anaplan, Inc. against Timothy Brennan, who left the subsidiary to join a competitor. The ruling turns on the text of the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act, which requires that noncompetes be “signed by both the employer and employee.”

The Facts

Brennan worked for Anaplan, Inc., an enterprise software company, starting in 2019. At hiring, he signed an employment agreement with the company that included a noncompete provision. Neither side contends that agreement is enforceable under the MNAA, which took effect in October 2018.

Three years into his employment, Brennan entered into an equity incentive agreement with Anaplan Parent, LP, a limited partnership formed to invest in and control the subsidiary. The parent granted Brennan an equity interest, making him a limited partner. In exchange, Brennan agreed not to compete with the subsidiary for twelve months after his employment ended. The agreement stated that the equity grant “serve[d] as fair and reasonable consideration” for the restrictive covenants.

The parent’s interim chief financial officer signed the agreement on behalf of the parent. Brennan signed it. The subsidiary did not sign, though the agreement expressly named the subsidiary as a third-party beneficiary. Over the next two years, Brennan entered into two more equity incentive agreements with the parent, each with materially identical terms and the same signature arrangement.

The record shows that Brennan performed services for the subsidiary as its employee. It does not show he provided any services to the parent. Brennan expressly denied doing so. In July 2025, Brennan notified the subsidiary he had accepted an offer from Pigment, another enterprise software company that competes with the subsidiary.

The Procedural Story

The parent and subsidiary first sued in federal court seeking a temporary restraining order, then dismissed that suit. They filed in Superior Court the same day. The judge denied their motion for a preliminary injunction in a detailed opinion. She found they had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits because the noncompetition covenants were unenforceable under the MNAA. The subsidiary, Brennan’s employer, had not signed the equity agreements. The judge also rejected the argument that the covenants fell outside the act’s scope as agreements not arising from an employment relationship.

The parent and subsidiary appealed. They unsuccessfully sought an injunction pending appeal from both the Superior Court judge and a single justice of the Appeals Court. The SJC transferred the case on its own initiative.

What the Statute Says

The MNAA sets “minimum requirements” for a noncompetition agreement to be “valid and enforceable.” Among them: the agreement must be in writing and signed by both the employer and employee. It must be supported by fair and reasonable consideration independent from continued employment if entered into after employment starts. The employee must receive at least ten business days’ notice and an express statement of the right to consult counsel. The agreement cannot restrict competition for more than one year (two in cases of employee wrongdoing), must protect legitimate business interests, must be reasonable in geographic reach and scope, and must include garden leave or other mutually agreed consideration.

The act defines “employee” broadly to include both statutory employees and independent contractors under G. L. c. 149, § 148B. That statute classifies anyone performing a service as either an employee or independent contractor. The MNAA thus covers any individual performing any service for an entity. It follows that an “employer” is an entity for which an individual performs any service.

A “[n]oncompetition agreement” under the act is one “between an employer and an employee, or otherwise arising out of an . . . employment relationship.” Certain agreements are excluded, including “noncompetition agreements outside of an employment relationship.”

The Court’s Analysis

Justice Wendlandt, writing for the full court, began with the principle that “the entity for [which] the individual directly performs services is ordinarily the individual’s employer.” The court has applied this rule under both the wage laws and the independent contractor statute. A parent is not ordinarily the employer of its subsidiary’s employees. Two exceptions exist: corporate disregard and joint-employer status. Neither applied here, and neither the parent nor the subsidiary argued otherwise.

The record established that Brennan performed services for the subsidiary. It did not show he performed any services for the parent. The parent’s only connection to Brennan was through the equity agreements by which Brennan became a limited partner in exchange for restrictive covenants benefiting the subsidiary. The parent and subsidiary maintained separate corporate forms and cannot disavow that separation when convenient.

The parent argued that “employer” should be defined as in G. L. c. 149, § 1, which includes “any person acting in the interest of an employer directly or indirectly.” The court disagreed. That definition is expressly limited to other sections of chapter 149. The Legislature knows how to adopt that definition when it wants to and chose not to for the MNAA.

The parent also suggested the judge could have “adjusted the definition of ’employer'” under the MNAA provision allowing courts to reform noncompetition agreements to protect legitimate business interests. The court dismissed this argument. That provision concerns discretionary authority to reform agreements, not statutory construction.

The Exception Argument

The parent and subsidiary alternatively argued that the covenants fell outside the MNAA as “noncompetition agreements outside of an employment relationship.” They reasoned that because the act defines a noncompetition agreement as one “between an employer and an employee, or otherwise arising out of an . . . employment relationship,” and because the exception refers to agreements “outside of an employment relationship,” the exception must contemplate agreements arising from employment that are also outside it. Since the parent was not Brennan’s employer, they argued, the covenants were outside the employment relationship.

The court rejected this reading. An agreement does not fall outside the employment relationship simply because the employer failed to sign it. The proper inquiry looks to whether the agreement itself constitutes a noncompetition agreement under the statutory definition. Here, Brennan entered the covenants in connection with his employment with the subsidiary. The covenants restricted his postemployment competition with the subsidiary. The agreements identified the subsidiary as a third-party beneficiary and provided consideration in exchange for Brennan’s promise not to compete with his employer. The covenants arose out of an employment relationship.

The court acknowledged the canon against surplusage but noted that canons are not absolute. Courts need not favor an unusual meaning to avoid surplusage over a more natural one. Construing the exception to exclude agreements signed by an affiliate rather than the employer would frustrate the Legislature’s signature requirement. The act expressly covers agreements “otherwise arising out of an . . . employment relationship,” not just agreements between employer and employee. Where a noncompetition agreement is tethered to an employment relationship, it does not escape the act simply because the employer failed to sign.

The Windfall Question

The parent and subsidiary questioned whether the result was equitable. They called the signature requirement “technical” and said employees like Brennan would receive a windfall if noncompliance rendered the covenants invalid.

The court acknowledged that the failure to obtain the employer’s signature resulted in an invalid agreement in this case. However, the Legislature determined this minimum requirement must be met. The requirement applies regardless of the corporate form chosen by a parent and subsidiary. Courts are not at liberty to disregard the Legislature’s mandate based on policy arguments better directed to the Legislature.

The court also noted that the covenant not to compete was only one of several restrictive covenants for which Brennan received compensation. The agreements included provisions unaffected by the MNAA: confidentiality obligations, nonsolicitation of employees and customers, and nondisparagement. Shortly before Brennan started at Pigment, the parent and subsidiary obtained a separate temporary restraining order prohibiting him from accessing the subsidiary’s confidential and trade secret information.

Why It Matters

The decision clarifies that parent companies cannot sidestep the MNAA’s requirements through affiliated-entity structures. A noncompete with a subsidiary’s employee must be signed by the subsidiary, not just the parent. The ruling reinforces that the entity for which the individual directly performs services is ordinarily the employer, and corporate separateness cannot be maintained for some purposes and disavowed for others.

Practitioners should note that compliance with the MNAA’s minimum requirements is not optional or “technical.” The court rejected arguments that judicial reformation authority or policy concerns about windfalls could save an agreement that failed to meet statutory requirements. Companies using equity grants from parent entities to secure noncompetes must ensure the actual employer signs or risk unenforceability.

The holding is narrow in one respect: nothing prevents a parent from enforcing a noncompete with its subsidiary’s employee if the MNAA’s requirements are met. The parent and subsidiary did not explain why the subsidiary failed to sign. At oral argument, counsel suggested unspecified tax consequences and partnership-law formalities, but the court found that explanation insufficient to alter the statutory requirement.

Read the full opinion from the court: Anaplan Parent, LP v. Brennan (SJC-13917, November 17, 2026) (PDF, mass.gov).

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