Manufactured Home Park Owner Cannot Clear Land to Maximize Sale Price: Blackman’s Point Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Call (AC 25-P-1078, November 18, 2026)

Appeals Court rules that owner of manufactured housing community cannot discontinue park and remove homes to sell vacant land at higher price, holding both the Manufactured Housing Act and a 1988 settlement agreement require continuing operations until bona fide offer and right of first refusal.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DocketAC 25-P-1078

ReleasedNovember 18, 2026

ArguedMarch 9, 2026

PanelDesmond, Tan, & Wood, JJ

Full opinionRead the full text of the decision

Question

Two questions. First, may an owner of a manufactured housing community discontinue the park and remove tenants’ manufactured homes to facilitate selling the land at a higher price? Second, is a 1988 settlement agreement requiring the owner to operate the park until sale enforceable, or does it constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation that lapses under G. L. c. 184, § 23?

Rule

The Manufactured Housing Act, G. L. c. 140, §§ 32A-32S, establishes two distinct procedures for ending a manufactured housing community. Section 32L (7A)-(9) governs a good faith change of use by the current owner, requiring the owner to “demonstrate[] that such change of use or discontinuance is in good faith,” provide notice of “planned alternative use,” and compensate tenants. Section 32R (b)-(e) governs sales to third parties who intend a different use: the owner must give notice, and “[a] group or association of residents representing at least fifty-one percent of the manufactured home owners . . . shall have the right to purchase, in the case of a third party bona fide offer to purchase that the owner intends to accept, or to lease in the case of a third party bona fide offer to lease that the owner intends to accept, the said community.” The Legislature designed the act “to avoid discontinuances of manufactured housing communities and to ensure that tenants of such communities are not left at the peril of their landlords due to a practical inability to relocate a manufactured housing unit.” Greenfield Country Estates Tenants Ass’n v. Deep, 423 Mass. 81, 86 (1996).

On restraints on alienation. “Reasonable restraints on alienation may be enforced.” Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 766 (1983). Reasonableness turns on five non-determinative factors: whether the party imposing the restraint has an interest in the land, the restraint is limited in duration, enforcement accomplishes a worthwhile purpose, the prohibited conveyances are unlikely to be employed, and the number of persons to whom alienation is prohibited is small. G. L. c. 184, § 23, provides that “[c]onditions or restrictions, unlimited as to time, by which the title or use of real property is affected, shall be limited to the term of thirty years.” The statute applies to land restrictions that burden the land itself, not personal contracts imposing obligations on a particular party. See Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 662 (2007).

Holding

The act prohibits the Blackmans from discontinuing the park, removing the homes, and then offering the land for sale. The plain language establishes “separate and distinct procedures” for change of use by the owner (§ 32L) and sale to a third party for a different use (§ 32R). An owner cannot “invoke the change of use procedures prescribed by G. L. c. 140, § 32L, to facilitate a sale to a third party who does not plan to continue operating the manufactured housing community.” The Blackmans must continue operating the park as a manufactured housing community until they receive a bona fide third-party purchase offer, then give the homeowners’ association “the opportunity to exercise their statutory right of first refusal.” Only if the association declines or cannot exercise that right may the Blackmans sell to the third party.

The 1988 settlement agreement independently bars discontinuance. It has not lapsed under G. L. c. 184, § 23, because that statute applies only to land restrictions, not personal contracts. The settlement agreement “is a personal contract between the Blackmans and the homeowners’ association” in which “the Blackmans promised that they will use the land for a specific purpose.” The agreement does not impose an unreasonable restraint on alienation. All five factors support reasonableness: the homeowners’ association has an interest in the land, the Blackmans may end the agreement by selling pursuant to § 32R, enforcement accomplishes the worthwhile purpose of preventing tenant displacement, the agreement does not prohibit a type of conveyance, and it does not limit who may buy but only requires offering the land with the park on it. Rights of first refusal “work[] a de minimis restraint on the alienation of property.” Bortolotti v. Hayden, 449 Mass. 193, 204 (2007).

Result

Judgment for the Blackmans vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. The court vacated declarations that the Blackmans complied with the act’s discontinuance requirements and that the settlement agreement is void or unenforceable, and vacated the finding for the Blackmans on the G. L. c. 93A claim. The matter returns to the Housing Court for entry of declarations consistent with this opinion and reconsideration of the c. 93A claim under the proper legal framework.

Players

  • Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court, on direct appellate review
  • Opinion by: Wood, J.
  • Panel: Desmond, Tan, and Wood, JJ.
  • Below: Housing Court, Southeast Division; Anne Kenney Chaplin, J.; summary judgment motions decided following remand from Appeals Court in 103 Mass. App. Ct. 711 (2024), judgment entered 2024
  • Plaintiffs-Appellants: Blackman's Point Homeowners' Association, Inc. (homeowners' association for the park); John Flanagan and Thomas Oram (individual tenants and association members)
  • Defendants-Appellees: Nancy Blackman Call, trustee of the Blackman Realty Trust; Dana Lewis Blackman and Roger Bradford Blackman, as trustees of the Blackman Realty Trust; Blackman's Point R.V. & Camping, LLC (licensed park operator); collectively referred to as the Blackmans, who have owned and operated the park for decades
  • Counsel for Plaintiffs: Donald M. Solomon
  • Counsel for Defendants: Steven S. Broadley
  • Amicus Curiae: Attorney General Andrea Joy Campbell (brief submitted by Daniel A. Less, Assistant Attorney General)

The Blackman family has operated a seasonal manufactured housing community on oceanfront land in Marshfield for decades. They want to discontinue the park, evict the tenants, remove the manufactured homes, and sell vacant land at what they believe will be a higher price. One defendant admitted in an email that she did not “want to make this easy” for the homeowners, calling the manufactured homes “clutter” that “lessens the possible asking price.” The Appeals Court said no. Both the Manufactured Housing Act and a 1988 settlement agreement require the Blackmans to continue operating the park until they receive a bona fide third-party purchase offer and give the homeowners’ association a chance to exercise its right of first refusal.

This is the second time the case has reached the Appeals Court. The first appeal, decided in 2024, held that the settlement agreement prohibited discontinuance but remanded for the Housing Court to address enforceability. On remand, the trial judge ruled for the Blackmans, declaring the settlement agreement void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation and finding that the Blackmans had complied with the act’s discontinuance procedures. The Appeals Court reversed on both counts.

The Facts

The park operates seasonally, from May 1 to September 30, with tenants able to store their manufactured homes during the off-season. Tenants own their homes but not the underlying land. This arrangement makes them particularly vulnerable: manufactured homes are essentially permanently affixed to the land, and selling a home off-site is typically impossible. If forced to move, tenants stand to lose most of their investment.

The dispute dates to the 1980s, when the Blackmans first expressed interest in discontinuing the park or selling the land. In 1987, the homeowners’ association and several tenants sued, claiming the Blackmans were violating statutory rights including a right of first refusal. The parties settled on March 22, 1988. The settlement agreement required the Blackmans to reopen the park each year unless they notified the association by April 1 “of any bona fide offer to buy the [p]roperty that the Blackmans intend to accept.” The agreement also gave the association a contractual right of first refusal, set rental rates for 1988, and limited future increases.

The Blackmans continued operating the park. In 2014, they sued to determine whether they could raise rents to fair market rates. A 2018 stipulated judgment enjoined increases beyond what the settlement agreement permitted and stated that the settlement agreement was “still in force and ha[d] not been amended, modified, or terminated.”

While the 2014 lawsuit was pending, the Blackmans sent tenants a March 2018 notice stating an intent to sell under G. L. c. 140, § 32R(a). Two subsequent notices, in June and August 2018, stated an intent to discontinue under § 32L but made no mention of § 32R or any intent to sell. The Blackmans have been candid about their strategy: they want to discontinue the park, remove the homes, and sell vacant land at a premium.

The homeowners’ association and two tenants filed the instant suit in Housing Court in March 2020, alleging violations of the act, the settlement agreement, and G. L. c. 93A. After an initial judgment for the Blackmans and the first appeal, the case returned to the Housing Court, which again ruled for the Blackmans.

The Core Issue

May an owner of a manufactured housing community discontinue it and remove tenants’ homes to facilitate selling the land at a higher price, or must the owner continue operations until receiving a bona fide offer and giving tenants a chance to buy?

What the Court Held

The Blackmans cannot discontinue the park to maximize the land’s sale value. The act requires them to continue operating until they receive a bona fide third-party offer, then give the homeowners’ association an opportunity to exercise its right of first refusal. Only if the association declines or cannot match the offer may the Blackmans sell to the third party. The 1988 settlement agreement independently imposes the same requirement and is fully enforceable.

The Statutory Framework

The Manufactured Housing Act establishes two distinct pathways for ending a manufactured housing community. Section 32L (7A)-(9) governs a good faith change of use by the current owner: the owner must demonstrate good faith, disclose the planned alternative use, and compensate tenants for either relocation costs or the appraised value of their homes. Section 32R (b)-(e) governs sales to third parties who plan a different use: the owner must give notice and offer the homeowners’ association a right of first refusal on any bona fide third-party offer the owner intends to accept.

The court read these provisions as “separate and distinct procedures for two different means of ending a manufactured housing community.” An owner cannot use the § 32L change-of-use procedures to facilitate a § 32R sale to a third party. The Legislature intended to protect tenants from displacement, recognizing that manufactured homes are practically immovable and that tenants who cannot sell their homes on-site may lose their entire investment. Allowing owners to discontinue a park, clear the land, and then trigger § 32R’s right of first refusal would defeat this protective purpose.

The court rejected the Blackmans’ argument that they should be allowed to discontinue the park under § 32L, remove the homes, and only then offer the land for sale under § 32R. The plain language is unambiguous, and the statute must be read as an internally consistent whole. The act does not prohibit the Blackmans from selling to someone who does not want to operate a park. It simply prescribes the procedure: continue operations, receive a bona fide offer, give the homeowners’ association a realistic opportunity to exercise its right of first refusal, and then, if the association declines, sell.

The Settlement Agreement

The 1988 settlement agreement independently prohibits discontinuance. The court addressed two defenses raised by the Blackmans: that the agreement lapsed under G. L. c. 184, § 23, and that it constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation.

Section 23 limits “[c]onditions or restrictions, unlimited as to time, by which the title or use of real property is affected” to thirty years. The court held this statute applies only to land restrictions that burden the land itself, not personal contracts. The settlement agreement is a personal contract in which the Blackmans promised to use the land for a specific purpose. The cases applying § 23 all involve restrictions running with the land and binding future owners. This is different. The settlement agreement does not bind future owners; it imposes obligations on the Blackmans arising from their promise, not from ownership of the land.

The settlement agreement is not an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The court applied the five-factor test from Franklin v. Spadafora: the homeowners’ association has an interest in the land (as a duly incorporated organization with a statutory right of first refusal); the restraint is limited in duration (the Blackmans can end it by selling pursuant to § 32R); enforcement accomplishes a worthwhile purpose (preventing tenant displacement); the settlement does not prohibit a type of conveyance; and it does not limit who may buy, only requiring that the park be offered intact. Rights of first refusal work a “de minimis” restraint on alienation. The settlement agreement is enforceable.

The Consumer Protection Claim

The plaintiffs also sued under G. L. c. 93A. The trial court ruled for the Blackmans on that claim, but the ruling rested on the now-rejected premise that the Blackmans could lawfully discontinue the park. The Appeals Court vacated the c. 93A finding and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal framework. Whether the Blackmans’ conduct violated c. 93A remains open.

Why It Matters

Manufactured housing communities are home to some of Massachusetts’s most vulnerable residents. Tenants own their homes but not the land, leaving them exposed if an owner decides the land is worth more without the park. This decision reinforces the Legislature’s judgment that owners cannot manipulate discontinuance procedures to avoid giving tenants a fair chance to purchase the community and preserve their homes. An owner who wants to sell to a buyer planning a different use must continue operating the park, obtain a bona fide offer, and give the homeowners’ association the opportunity to match it. The holding applies both under the act and under settlement agreements that track the act’s protections. Owners cannot discontinue first and offer later.

Read the full opinion from the court: Blackman’s Point Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. Call (AC-25-P-1078, November 18, 2026) (PDF, mass.gov).

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