A nurse challenged the Board of Registration in Nursing’s indefinite suspension of her license, claiming she lacked required educational credentials and had engaged in deceptive conduct to obtain licensure. While her appeal was pending, the board reconsidered, withdrew its finding of deceptive conduct, and acknowledged its error. The nurse also remedied her educational deficiencies, and the board reinstated her license.
The nurse then sought additional relief, including compensation for harm suffered during the suspension and sanctions against the board’s executive director. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed dismissal of the appeal as moot, holding that the statutory authority under G.L. c. 112, section 64 is limited to reviewing and reversing or affirming the board’s suspension decision. The statute provides no basis for awarding damages or imposing sanctions beyond that scope of review. Because the nurse received all available relief by having her license reinstated, the matter became moot and presented no live controversy for the court to resolve.
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SJC-12359
CARLINE VILBON vs. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN NURSING.
April 18, 2018.
Board of Registration in Nursing. Nurse. License. Moot Question. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.
Carline Vilbon appeals from a judgment of the county court dismissing as moot her appeal under G. L. c. 112, § 64, from an order of the Board of Registration in Nursing (board) indefinitely suspending her nursing license. The grounds for the suspension were that Vilbon had not satisfied the educational requirements for licensure in Massachusetts and that she had engaged in deceptive conduct to obtain a license. While the matter was pending before the single justice, the board reconsidered and withdrew its finding that Vilbon had engaged in deceptive conduct, acknowledging that it had erred in making this finding. In addition, Vilbon remedied the deficiencies in her education. The board therefore reinstated her license. Vilbon now argues that, despite the reinstatement of her license, she has suffered further harm for which the board should compensate her and that sanctions should be imposed on the executive director of the board. However, under the “plain and unambiguous language of G. L. c. 112, § 64,” Hoffer v. Board of Reg. in Medicine, 461 Mass. 451, 456 (2012), our authority is limited to “revising or reversing the decision of the board” suspending her license. The statute does not provide for any further relief. As Vilbon has received all the relief that is available under G. L. c. 112, § 64, the single justice properly dismissed the matter as moot. See Padmanabhan v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 476 Mass. 1018, 1019 (2017), citing Rasten v. Northeastern Univ., 432 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2000).
Judgment affirmed.
Carline Vilbon, pro se.
Carrie Benedon, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.