Commonwealth v. Walker (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-024-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑1687 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. HENRY WALKER. No. 11‑P‑1687. February 12, 2013. Sex Offender. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion. Witness, Expert. After a jury-waived trial, a judge of the Superior Court found the defendant to be a sexually dangerous person, as defined in G. L. c. 123A, § 1,[1] and committed him pursuant to § 14(d) thereof. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judge’s conclusion that the defendant represents a menace to the health and safety of others, and (2) the propriety of certain testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert witness. The thrust of the defendant’s appeal concerns the nature of the defendant’s predicted sexual offenses together with any resulting harm.[2] The defendant avers that the judge’s conclusions, viewed in their entirety, suggest a risk of reoffending limited to acts of exhibitionism, the injury therefrom consisting of shock and alarm to the public — in contravention of Commonwealth v. Suave, 460 Mass. 582, 587-588 (2011). While the judge did not have the benefit of Suave at the time of trial, we discern no reason to disturb his extensive findings or ultimate conclusion. We affirm. “In response to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we inspect a finding under the settled standard: ‘whether, after viewing the evidence (and all permissible inferences) in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential elements of sexual dangerousness, as defined by G. L. c. 123A, § 1.’” Commonwealth v. Husband, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 4 (2012), quoting from Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 267, 271 (2009) (Ireland, J., concurring). “Weighing and crediting the testimony of witnesses during proceedings under G. L. c. 123A ‘are for the trier of fact, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.’” Commonwealth v. Sargent, 449 Mass. 576, 583 (2007), quoting from Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 291 (2004). With regard to the second element of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case (see note 1, supra), a determination that the defendant suffers from a “[m]ental abnormality” turns in relevant part on whether his disorder makes him “a menace to the health and safety of other persons.” G. L. c. 123A, § 1, as inserted by […]