Commonwealth v. Bois (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-177-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-10725 COMMONWEALTH vs. RYAN BOIS. Norfolk. January 12, 2016. – November 10, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Homicide. Rape. Armed Home Invasion. Felony-Murder Rule. Insanity. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 30, 2007. The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on October 12, 2012, was heard by her. Dennis Shedd for the defendant. Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. In 2009, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder. The jury found that, on August 4, 2007, the defendant broke into his grandmother’s house and then raped and strangled his six-year-old cousin, who was staying there for the night. The defendant was convicted also of nine other charges, including home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 18C.[2] At trial, the defendant conceded that he had killed the victim, but argued that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. On appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant asserts that (a) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence relevant to his insanity defense and to object to the jury charge on the insanity defense; (b) the judge did not respond adequately to reports that a juror slept through certain portions of the trial; (c) the evidence was insufficient on an element of the home invasion charge, and the judge incorrectly instructed the jury on that element; (d) the instructions on felony-murder impermissibly removed from the jury’s consideration one of its elements; and (e) the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. The defendant asks also that, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we reduce the murder conviction to murder in the second degree as more consonant with justice, because his actions were the product of mental illness. We affirm the conviction of murder in the first degree, and decline to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt […]