Beacon South Station Associates, LSE v. Board of Assessors of Boston (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-048-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑739 Appeals Court BEACON SOUTH STATION ASSOCIATES, LSE[1] vs. BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF BOSTON. No. 13‑P‑739. Suffolk. February 12, 2014. ‑ May 14, 2014. Present: Kafker, Milkey, & Sullivan, JJ. Taxation, Abatement, Exemption, Leased property, Real estate tax: abatement, exemption. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. Boston. Contract, Lease of real estate. Real Property, Lease. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. Anthony M. Ambriano for the defendant. Stephen H. Oleskey for the plaintiff. KAFKER, J. The principal issue in this case is whether certain real estate in Boston owned by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) and leased to a private, for-profit entity was exempt from taxation pursuant to G. L. c. 161A, § 24, in fiscal years 2009 and 2010.[2] The property in question is the South Station Headhouse (Headhouse), which the MBTA leases to Beacon South Station Associates, LSE, also known as EOP-South Station, LLC (EOP). The Headhouse consists of an enclosed concourse through which the public passes to access MBTA and Amtrak train platforms, an underground subway connection, office and retail space, a surface facility and parking area, and the surrounding sidewalks. The real estate taxes assessed on the Headhouse were $ 1,439,974.76 in 2009, and $ 1,135,463.55 in 2010. EOP filed challenges to the 2009 and 2010 fiscal year assessments on the property with the board of assessors of Boston (assessors), and then appealed to the Appellate Tax Board (board) following the assessors’ refusal to abate the taxes. The board ruled that G. L. c. 161A, § 24, “expressly exempted the property of the MBTA from taxation, whether or not leased for business purposes,” and granted the abatements. The assessors appealed. On appeal, the assessors’ primary argument is that the board erred in its conclusion, and the § 24 exemption did not apply to the Headhouse at all because EOP, a private entity, leased the Headhouse from the MBTA and operated it for profit in the tax years in question. Alternatively, the assessors argue that even if the Headhouse was not subject to a blanket assessment for the years in question, EOP could be taxed on the tenant improvements made to the property because EOP owned these improvements according to the terms of the lease, and they were therefore not property of the MBTA. Examination of G. L. c. 161, § 24, as […]
Loring Towers Associates v. Furtick v. Boston Housing Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-033-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑799 Appeals Court LORING TOWERS ASSOCIATES[1] vs. MELVIN FURTICK; BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, third-party defendant. No. 13‑P‑799. Essex. December 3, 2013. ‑ March 27, 2014. Present: Grainger, Brown, & Carhart, JJ. Summary Process. Practice, Civil, Summary process, Complaint, Parties. Boston Housing Authority. Due Process of Law, Housing. Summary process. Complaint filed in the Salem Division of the District Court Department on April 23, 2012. Following transfer to the Northeast Division of the Housing Court Department, a motion to dismiss a third‑party complaint was heard by David D. Kerman, J. Michael J. Louis & Angela Marcolina for Boston Housing Authority. Laura Gallant (James Breslauer with her) for Melvin Furtick. BROWN, J. Melvin Furtick, a physically disabled and mentally ill senior citizen, has been a participant in the Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, better known as “section 8,” for over thirty years.[2] The Boston Housing Authority (BHA) terminated Furtick’s housing assistance benefits, a protected property interest, in violation of his due process rights. Such a result cannot be countenanced by any court of law. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Housing Court in this summary process litigation restoring Furtick’s housing benefits retroactively to the date of the unlawful termination. Facts. Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed. On January 17, 2012, the leased housing division of the BHA sent a letter addressed to Furtick at his subsidized apartment in Salem, notifying him of the proposed termination of his housing assistance benefits based upon his failure to attend two section 8 voucher recertification meetings scheduled for November 28, 2011, and December 22, 2011. See § 13.6.2 of the BHA Administrative Plan for Section 8 Programs (revised December 6, 2011) (BHA administrative plan). The BHA letter informed Furtick that he had the right to an informal hearing regarding the proposed termination before the BHA’s department of grievances and appeals as long as he requested a hearing within twenty days. See id. at § 13.6.3. When Furtick failed to respond within the twenty-day appeal period, the BHA, by letter dated February 7, 2012, and mailed to his apartment, terminated Furtick’s subsidy effective March 31, 2012. As Furtick was in jail during that time, he had no actual knowledge of any of this.[3] Upon his release, Furtick returned to his apartment and discovered that […]
Filepp v. Boston Gas Company, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-017-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13‑P‑115 Appeals Court TOM FILEPP vs. BOSTON GAS COMPANY, INC. No. 13‑P‑115. February 27, 2014. Notice, Action alleging injury caused by defect in public way, Timeliness. Way, Public: defect. Negligence, Municipality. Municipal Corporations, Liability for tort. Gas Company. Public Utilities. The plaintiff suffered injuries after falling from his bicycle while riding on Harvard Street in Brookline on May 31, 2005. The plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that his fall was caused by a two-inch wide “rut” in the pavement, created by Boston Gas Company, Inc. (Boston Gas) incident to work it performed on gas lines running under the street. Boston Gas moved for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to send notice of his claim to Boston Gas within thirty days of his injury.[1] See G. L. c. 84, §§ 15 & 18.[2] A judge of the Superior Court allowed Boston Gas’s motion, and entered a judgment of dismissal. This appeal followed. The case is controlled in material respects by Wolf v. Boston Water and Sewer Commn., 408 Mass. 490 (1990) (Wolf), and Ram v. Charlton, 409 Mass. 481, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822 (1991) (Ram). As the court observed in Ram, the statutory entitlement to notice as a precondition to any action seeking recovery of damages extends to both private and governmental entities. See id. at 490. See Hurlburt v. Great Barrington, 300 Mass. 524, 526 (1938) (fire district). And Wolf illustrates that, contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the repair obligation held by a “person by law obliged to repair” a way need not be either continuous in time or coextensive with the entirety of the way; it is enough that the obligation extends (as it does in the present case) to repairs necessary to restore a way to its condition before it was disturbed by the work giving rise to the alleged defect. See Wolf, supra at 493. The plaintiff places misplaced reliance on Jones v. Boston, 188 Mass. 53 (1905), Seltzer v. Amesbury & S. Gas Co., 188 Mass. 242 (1905), and D’Urso v. Methuen, 338 Mass. 73 (1958). Jones v. Boston is distinguishable on its facts, as the contractor in that case was obliged by contract, rather than by law, to repair the way at issue. See 188 Mass. at 58. D’Urso v. Methuen “premised liability on […]
Alford, et al. v. Boston Zoning Commission, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-124-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1579 Appeals Court MARK ALFORD & others[1] vs. BOSTON ZONING COMMISSION & others.[2] No. 12‑P‑1579. Suffolk. May 8, 2013. ‑ October 9, 2013. Present: Milkey, Carhart, & Sullivan, JJ. Boston. Zoning, Amendment of by‑law or ordinance, Appeal, Educational use, Hearing, Judicial review. Quasi‑Judicial Tribunal. Administrative Law, Adjudicatory proceeding, Conflict of interest, Hearing. Practice, Civil, Zoning appeal. Constitutional Law, Right to hearing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 9, 2009. The case was heard by Frances A. McIntyre, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Orestes G. Brown for the plaintiffs. Michael K. Murray for Trustees of Boston College. Adam Cederbaum for Boston Zoning Commission. Denise A. Chicoine for Boston Redevelopment Authority. CARHART, J. The plaintiffs, who own property that abuts property owned by Boston College, appeal from summary judgment entered by a Superior Court judge, who determined that art. 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not apply to review and approval by the Boston zoning commission and the Boston Redevelopment Authority of Boston College’s Institutional Master Plan. The judge also ruled that the approval of the Institutional Master Plan was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the plaintiffs’ request to defer summary judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(f), 365 Mass. 824 (1974), was without merit. We affirm. Background. In the spring of 2003, Boston College (BC) embarked on a strategic planning process to redevelop its Chestnut Hill and Brighton campuses. In November, 2003, the Catholic Archdiocese of Boston announced its intention to sell sixty-five acres of property located in Brighton. In May, 2004, BC purchased approximately forty-three of those acres and, in subsequent transactions in 2006 and 2007, purchased the remaining acreage. After BC finalized the purchases, it hired a campus architecture and planning firm to help develop a long-term comprehensive campus plan. Among BC’s main institutional objectives were to develop more “academic, residential and co-curricular facilities.” The plan was projected to cost $ 1.6 billion and span ten years. Under art. 80D of the Boston zoning code (art. 80D), when educational or health care institutions with more than 150,000 square feet seek to expand by more than 20,000 gross square feet, they must file for review an Institutional Master Plan (IMP) with the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA). See Bobrowski, Massachusetts […]
Attention Artists: Grants Available from Boston Cultural Council
Grants support a variety of artistic programs and activities such as exhibits, festivals, field trips, short-term artist residencies or performances in schools, workshops and lectures. South End Patch News
Group Wants Marathon Route to Bloom Boston Strong
Gardening groups and others will plant daffodils along the entire Boston Marathon route. South End Patch News
Boston GreenFest Kicks Off on Thursday
Find out what's happening in the South End and nearby today, Wednesday, August 14, 2013. South End Patch News
What to Do in Case a Hurricane Hits Boston This Year
Hurricane season peaks in Boston in late August to mid-October, and officials say 2013 could be an above-average year. Here's what you can do to prepare now instead of at the last minute. South End Patch News
Boston Public Library: There’s an App for That
You can download the new app on both Android and iOS devices. South End Patch News
City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Federation (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-155-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11238 CITY OF BOSTON vs. BOSTON POLICE SUPERIOR OFFICERS FEDERATION. Suffolk. April 2, 2013. ‑ August 9, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Boston. Police, Assignment of duties, Collective bargaining. Public Employment, Police, Transfer, Collective bargaining. Municipal Corporations, Police, Collective bargaining. Labor, Police, Collective bargaining. Civil Service, Police, Collective bargaining. Arbitration, Collective bargaining, Confirmation of award, Authority of arbitrator. Contract, Collective bargaining contract. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 18, 2009. The case was heard by Bonnie H. MacLeod, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. David M. Connelly (Robert J. Boyle, Jr., with him) for the plaintiff. Alfred Gordon for the defendant. DUFFLY, J. After the city of Boston (city) transferred a Boston police sergeant who served as a union representative, the Boston Police Superior Officers Federation (union) sought to enforce a provision of its collective bargaining agreement with the city, prohibiting the involuntary transfer of certain union representatives between stations or assignments. Following binding arbitration mandated under the collective bargaining agreement, an arbitrator found that the city had violated the collective bargaining agreement and awarded the officer damages and reinstatement to his original position. The city filed a motion in the Superior Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 150C, § 11, to vacate the award. A Superior Court judge denied the city’s motion and allowed the union’s cross motion to confirm the award. The city appealed, and we transferred the case to this Court on our own motion. The city argues, and we agree, that assignment and transfer of officers within the Boston police department (department) are nondelegable statutory powers of the Boston police commissioner (commissioner), see St. 1906, c. 291, § 10, as appearing in St. 1962, c. 322, § 1, and, accordingly, that the grievance arbitrator exceeded his authority in reversing the officer’s transfer. Background and prior proceedings. In 1989, the city and the union underwent interest arbitration[1] as part of a collective bargaining process. The city had proposed a provision that would have prohibited the involuntary transfer of union representatives, but the parties were unable to reach agreement on how many officers would be covered by that provision. The proposal followed several years of […]