Quarterman v. City of Springfield, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-035-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-223 Appeals Court WILL QUARTERMAN vs. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD & another.[1] No. 16-P-223. Hampden. November 9, 2016. – March 29, 2017. Present: Kafker, C.J., Kinder, & Lemire, JJ. Alcoholic Liquors, License, Local licensing authority. Anti-Discrimination Law, Race, Damages, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Judgment notwithstanding verdict, Motion to amend, Instructions to jury. Judgment, Amendment. Damages, Loss of profits, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 14, 2008. The case was tried before Daniel A. Ford, J., an award of attorney’s fees was ordered by him, and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and to alter or amend the judgment were heard by him. Leonard H. Kesten for the plaintiff. Edward M. Pikula, City Solicitor, for the defendants. KINDER, J. On April 13, 2006, the board of license commissioners (board) of the city of Springfield (city) denied plaintiff Will Quarterman’s application for a liquor license. Quarterman, an African American, brought this action against board chairman Peter Sygnator and the city, claiming that denial of the application was discriminatory and in retaliation for Quarterman’s earlier filing of a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Ultimately, a Superior Court jury rejected the claim of racial discrimination, but found that the city, through the actions of former Mayor Charles Ryan, had retaliated against Quarterman in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4(4).[2] The jury awarded damages of $ 250,000 in lost profits and $ 100,000 for emotional distress. The city challenged the verdict in posttrial motions for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.), to alter or amend the judgment, and for a new trial. Principally, the city argued that the evidence of retaliation and damages was insufficient. In a comprehensive written decision, the trial judge denied the motions as to liability for retaliation, but allowed them, in part, as to damages. The judge concluded that there was evidentiary support for the award of $ 100,000 for emotional distress. However, he found that the evidence of lost profits was “lacking in substance.” He also reasoned that Quarterman had failed to establish standing to claim lost profits because the profits were not direct and personal to him. Accordingly, the judge reduced the damages from $ 350,000 to $ 100,000. Quarterman challenges that ruling on appeal. On cross-appeal, the city […]
Categories: News Tags: 1103517, City, Lawyers, Quarterman, Springfield, Weekly
City of Revere, et al. v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-042-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12111 SJC-12177 CITY OF REVERE & others[1] vs. MASSACHUSETTS GAMING COMMISSION. Suffolk. December 5, 2016. – March 10, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Gaming. License. Administrative Law, Judicial review, Intervention. Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari, Review of administrative action, Intervention, Interlocutory appeal. Jurisdiction, Judicial review of administrative action. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 16, 2014. A motion to dismiss the intervener’s complaint and a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint were heard by Janet L. Sanders, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review, and following the order by Sanders, J., for entry of final judgment, the Supreme Judicial Court granted a second application for direct appellate review. Kenneth S. Leonetti & Christopher E. Hart (Michael Hoven also present) for the intervener. Patricia L. Davidson for city of Revere. David S. Mackey (Mina S. Makarious & Melissa C. Allison also present) for the defendant. BOTSFORD, J. This case concerns the process by which the Massachusetts Gaming Commission (commission) awarded a gaming license in late 2014 to Wynn MA, LLC (Wynn). The plaintiffs — an unsuccessful applicant for the license, the city that would have hosted the unsuccessful applicant, a labor union, and individual citizens — filed two complaints in the Superior Court that alleged numerous defects in the commission’s process for awarding the license to Wynn. The commission filed motions to dismiss both complaints. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the motions on all but one count of one of the complaints, permitting only the unsuccessful applicant’s claim for certiorari review to survive. The parties now appeal various aspects of the judge’s decision. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings. Background. 1. Gaming in Massachusetts. In November, 2011, the Legislature enacted St. 2011, c. 194, An Act establishing expanded gaming in the Commonwealth (act).[2] Section 16 of the act created the gaming commission and set forth standards under which applicants could obtain a license from the commission to operate a gaming establishment. See G. L. c. 23K, inserted by St. 2011, c. 194, § 16. The act describes two types of licenses. The one […]
Categories: News Tags: 1004217, City, Commission, Gaming, Lawyers, massachusetts, Revere, Weekly
DeGiacomo v. City of Quincy, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-179-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11940 JAMES R. DeGIACOMO, trustee, vs. CITY OF QUINCY & others. Suffolk. September 7, 2016. – November 15, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Res Judicata. Collateral Estoppel. Judgment, Preclusive effect. Trust, Charitable trust. Contract, Lease of real estate, Rescission. Real Property, Lease. Fiduciary. Attorney General. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on February 19, 2014. The case was heard by Spina, J., on motions for summary judgment. James R. DeGiacomo (Susan J. Baronoff with him) for the plaintiff. James S. Timmins, City Solicitor, for city of Quincy. Barry S. Pollack (Phillip Rakhunov with him) for Quincy Historical Society. GANTS, C.J. In 1971, the city of Quincy (Quincy), as trustee of the Adams Temple and School Fund (Adams Fund), filed a “bill of complaint” in equity asking a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to enter a decree authorizing it to execute a proposed fifty-year lease of the building and parking lot of the Adams Academy that it had negotiated with the Quincy Historical Society (Society). The Attorney General was a defendant in that action, but the Woodward School for Girls, Inc. (Woodward School or School), which was the sole income beneficiary of the Adams Fund, was not. In 1972, the single justice decreed that Quincy was authorized to execute the proposed lease. The successor trustee of the Adams Fund now seeks rescission of that lease, as well as money damages and restitution, claiming that Quincy violated its fiduciary duty of loyalty by executing the lease approved by the single justice. The issue presented on appeal is whether the successor trustee of the Adams Fund is precluded by res judicata from obtaining that relief. The successor trustee contends that he should not be precluded because neither he nor the Woodward School was a party to the equity proceeding in 1972, and the School could not reasonably have intervened because it was not given notice of the proposed lease or the filing of the complaint. Quincy and the Society contend that preclusion is appropriate because, where the Adams Fund is a public charitable trust, the only necessary party to the equity proceeding was the Attorney General, who was in privity with the School based on a statutory responsibility under G. L. c. 12, § 8, […]
Smith, et al. v. City of Westfield, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 111-08-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-773 Appeals Court VIRGINIA B. SMITH & others[1] vs. CITY OF WESTFIELD & others.[2] No. 15-P-773. Hampden. April 14, 2016. – August 25, 2016. Present: Green, Trainor, & Milkey, JJ. Municipal Corporations, Parks, Use of municipal property. Parks and Parkways. Constitutional Law, Taking of property. Due Process of Law, Taking of property. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 27, 2012. The case was heard by Daniel A. Ford, J. Thomas A. Kenefick, III (Mary Patryn with him) for the plaintiffs. Anthony I. Wilson (John T. Liebel with him) for the defendants. TRAINOR, J. The plaintiffs, Virginia B. Smith and other Westfield residents (collectively, residents), appeal from a judgment for the defendants, the city of Westfield and others (collectively, Westfield), which vacated a preliminary injunction that, in effect, prohibited a school construction project at the John A. Sullivan Memorial Playground (playground).[3] The residents challenge the judgment for two reasons. First, they argue that the playground was sufficiently dedicated to invoke the protection of art. 97 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that no documents were ever recorded that dedicated the land for art. 97 purposes.[4] Second, the residents contend that the judge erred in concluding that a Statewide comprehensive outdoor recreation plan (SCORP) contradicts Mahajan v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 464 Mass. 604 (2013). We affirm, as we conclude that the playground has not been designated for an art. 97 purpose in a manner sufficient to invoke its protection. Background. This matter came before a Superior Court judge on cross motions for judgment based on an agreed statement of facts. We summarize those facts, reserving some facts for later discussion. On November 13, 1939, Westfield took title to the land in question for the purpose of satisfying a tax debt pursuant to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, §§ 53 and 54. In 1957, Westfield passed an ordinance recognizing the land as a playground and naming it the John A. Sullivan Memorial Playground. In 1979, the Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) awarded Westfield a grant that, in part, was used to upgrade the playground. A SCORP was required for Westfield to be eligible for that grant. See 16 U.S.C. § 460l-8(d) (1976).[5] The SCORP, which the residents assert applies to this matter, states: […]
MacLaurin, et al. v. City of Holyoke, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-130-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11865 SJC-11866 ROBERT MacLAURIN[1] & another[2] vs. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.[3] ROBERT MacLAURIN[4] & another[5] vs. CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.[6] Hampden. September 10, 2015. – August 18, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[7] Fire Prevention. Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari. Administrative Law, Hearing. Civil actions commenced in the Hampden Division of the Superior Court Department on April 26, 2012, and May 14, 2012, respectively. After transfer to the Western Division of the Housing Court Department and consolidation, the case was heard by Robert Fields, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Thomas D. Moore for the plaintiffs. Kara Lamb Cunha for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jason R. Ferenc for Greater Holyoke Rental Housing Association Joseph N. Schneiderman for Fire Chiefs Association of Massachusetts. Maura Healey, Attorney General, Benjamin K. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Steven P. Rourke, Special Assistant Attorney General, & Peter Senopoulos for the State Fire Marshal. LENK, J. We are called upon in these consolidated cases to construe G. L. c. 148, § 26I, the residential sprinkler provision, one of a number of provisions requiring the installation of automatic sprinkler systems contained in G. L. c. 148, the fire prevention act. The residential sprinkler provision mandates the installation of automatic sprinklers in new residential buildings of four or more units, and in such existing buildings when they are “substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new construction.” See G. L. c. 148, § 26I. In 2006, the plaintiff, Robert MacLaurin,[8] purchased the second of two vacant apartment buildings in the city of Holyoke (city), which he intended to rehabilitate and return to occupancy. As existing residential buildings of four or more units, the buildings were subject to the residential sprinkler provision. MacLaurin contends that the renovations he undertook on the buildings do not meet the statutory standard triggering the requirement that sprinklers be installed. Concluding, to the contrary, that the two buildings had been substantially rehabilitated within the meaning of the residential sprinkler provision, the city’s fire chief ordered, without a hearing, that automatic sprinkler systems be installed in each building. The residential […]
Weiss v. City of Cambridge (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-093-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1439 Appeals Court MIKEL WEISS vs. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE. No. 15-P-1439. Middlesex. May 12, 2016. – July 28, 2016. Present: Rubin, Milkey, & Neyman, JJ. Negligence, Motor vehicle, Pedestrian, Contributory, Violation of statute. Statute, Construction. Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury, New trial. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 14, 2013. The case was tried before Peter B. Krupp, J., and a motion for a new trial was considered by him. Keplin K. U. Allwaters, Assistant City Solicitor, for the defendant. Christopher C. Mathers for the plaintiff. MILKEY, J. During the evening rush hour of December 7, 2011, Mikel Weiss was walking across 2nd Street in Cambridge, at its intersection with Binney Street. Before she reached the other side, Weiss was struck by a truck that was making a left-hand turn onto 2nd Street from Binney Street. The driver of the truck (driver) was an employee of the city of Cambridge (city), who was completing a ten-plus hour shift.[1] As a result of the accident, Weiss suffered serious long-term injuries to both knees, incurred significant medical bills, and missed several weeks of work. In the personal injury action that Weiss brought against the city in Superior Court, the main disputed issue was the relative degree of fault between pedestrian and driver. Weiss was in a marked crosswalk when she was struck, but there was evidence that she was not obeying the pedestrian signal at the time. The jury found Weiss thirty-five percent at fault, and therefore her damages award was reduced by that percentage.[2] On appeal, the city challenges the instructions the judge gave to the jury regarding the responsibilities that drivers face pursuant to G. L. c. 89, § 11, to yield to pedestrians in marked crosswalks. The city argues that under its plain language, the statute does not apply to the circumstances of this case. We disagree and therefore affirm. Background. The accident. According to undisputed trial testimony, Binney Street is a “major traffic artery” that is four to five lanes wide at its intersection with 2nd Street. For its part, 2nd Street is “more of a side street” that measures only twenty-four feet across. At the intersection, there is both a crosswalk across 2nd Street and a pedestrian signal (commonly known […]
City of Springfield v. United Public Service Employees Union (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-035-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-742 Appeals Court CITY OF SPRINGFIELD vs. UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION. No. 15-P-742. Hampden. February 11, 2016. – March 25, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Rubin, & Agnes, JJ. Arbitration, Collective bargaining, Authority of arbitrator, Judicial review. Employment, Sexual harassment, Termination. Public Policy. Public Employment, Collective bargaining, Termination, Reinstatement of personnel. Civil Service, Termination of employment, Reinstatement of personnel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 2, 2014. The case was heard by John S. Ferrara, J. Gordon D. Quinn for the plaintiff. Lan T. Kantany for the defendant. KAFKER, C.J. The issue presented is whether an arbitrator exceeded her authority when she ordered a terminated employee reinstated without loss of pay or other rights, even though she found that he had engaged in conduct amounting to sexual harassment. Because the mitigating circumstances the arbitrator identified supported her determination that the employer lacked just cause for termination, and her order does not preclude appropriate remedial action to address the employee’s sexual harassment, we conclude that her award does not offend public policy or require a result prohibited by statute. We therefore affirm the Superior Court judge’s decision confirming the validity of the award. 1. Background. The city of Springfield (city) discharged Gregory Ashe, a long-time employee, following an investigation and hearing after a coworker complained of sexually inappropriate conduct. Ashe, through his union, grieved the city’s decision to terminate his employment. Pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the case was submitted to an arbitrator. The parties presented the following question: ”Was the termination of the Grievant Gregory Ashe supported by just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?” After two days of hearings, the arbitrator issued her award. She determined that much of the alleged harassing conduct did occur, but found that mitigating circumstances meant there was not just cause for termination. She concluded: ”As a remedy, the Grievant is entitled to be reinstated to his position without loss of compensation or other rights.” The city sought to vacate the award in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 150C, § 11. In its appeal, the city argued that the arbitrator exceeded her authority under the CBA by reinstating the employee in direct violation of the public policy and statutory requirements governing sexual harassment. The judge, in […]
Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. City Council of Marlborough (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-162-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1612 Appeals Court CUMBERLAND FARMS, INC. vs. CITY COUNCIL OF MARLBOROUGH. No. 14-P-1612. Middlesex. May 11, 2015. – October 15, 2015. Present: Cypher, Meade, & Massing, JJ. Practice, Civil, Relief in the nature of certiorari. License. Municipal Corporations, City council. Administrative Law, Judicial review. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 12, 2013. The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Carey H. Smith for the plaintiff. Cynthia M. Panagore Griffin for the defendant. CYPHER, J. Cumberland Farms, Inc. (Cumberland Farms), appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court upholding the denial by the city council of Marlborough (council) of Cumberland Farms’s application for a G. L. c. 148, § 13, fuel storage license. Cumberland Farms argues that the judge applied an incorrect standard of review and that he based his decision on improper factors. Background. Pursuing a plan for a gasoline station and a convenience store in the city of Marlborough, Cumberland Farms filed with the council applications for a special permit, see G. L. c. 40A, § 9, and for a fuel storage license, see G. L. c. 148, § 13. Two meetings of the council’s urban affairs committee were held between June, 2012, and March, 2013, on the special permit application; because the council did not consider the final conditions to the special permit, it issued by constructive grant on March 28, 2013. The urban affairs committee then discussed the fuel storage license application on May 21, 2013, and June 19, 2013, but failed to take action at the latter meeting. On August 2, 2013, Cumberland Farms filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking injunctive relief to require the council to take action. Before the complaint was considered in that court, the council voted on September 23, 2013, to deny the application for a fuel storage license, without providing any findings or an explanation of its reasoning. On November 12, 2013, Cumberland Farms filed in Superior Court the within action in the nature of certiorari, see G. L. c. 249, § 4, seeking judicial review of the council’s decision. Following a hearing on Cumberland Farms’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, a judge denied Cumberland Farms’s motion and affirmed the council’s decision. Judgment entered, and this appeal followed. Discussion. Cumberland Farms requests that the judgment be reversed, […]
Categories: News Tags: 1116215, City, Council, Cumberland, Farms, Inc., Lawyers, Marlborough, Weekly
Doe, et al. v. City of Lynn (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-147-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11822 JOHN DOE[1] & others[2] vs. CITY OF LYNN. Essex. April 9, 2015. – August 28, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Sex Offender. Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances, Home rule. Constitutional Law, Home Rule Amendment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 12, 2012. The case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., on a motion for partial summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was ordered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. John A. Kiernan (Robert E. Koosa with him) for the defendant. John Reinstein (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Jessie J. Rossman with him) for the plaintiffs. Amy M. Belger, Andrew S. Crouch, & Jennifer J. Cox, for Jacob Wetterling Resource Center & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. In this appeal, we determine whether an ordinance imposing restrictions on the right of sex offenders to reside in the city of Lynn (city) is prohibited by the Home Rule Amendment, art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, and the Home Rule Procedures Act, G. L. c. 43B, § 13. The plaintiffs, who represent a certified class of sex offenders subject to the ordinance, challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance on various grounds.[3] A judge in the Superior Court invalidated the ordinance under the Home Rule Amendment. The city appealed and we granted the plaintiffs’ application for direct appellate review. We affirm the Superior Court judgment based on our conclusion that the ordinance is inconsistent with the comprehensive statutory scheme governing the oversight of convicted sex offenders, and therefore, it fails to pass muster under the Home Rule Amendment and the Home Rule Procedures Act.[4] Background. We summarize the undisputed facts as drawn from the summary judgment record. 1. The ordinance. The city adopted an “Ordinance Pertaining to Sex Offender Residency Restrictions in the [city]” (ordinance) on January 12, 2011. The stated purpose of the ordinance is to “reduce the potential risk of harm to children of the community by impacting the ability of registered sex offenders to be in contact with unsuspecting children in locations that are primarily designed for use by, or are primarily used by children.” Observing that […]
City of Springfield v. Local Union No. 648, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-107-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1691 Appeals Court CITY OF SPRINGFIELD vs. LOCAL UNION NO. 648, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO. No. 13-P-1691. Hampden. September 11, 2014. – August 13, 2015. Present: Trainor, Rubin, & Sullivan, JJ. Fire Fighter, Appointment. Arbitration, Fire fighters, Authority of arbitrator, Damages. Labor, Fire fighters, Arbitration, Civil service, Damages. Civil Service, Fire fighters, Appointment. Contract, Collective bargaining contract. Damages, Back pay. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 14, 2011. The case was heard by John S. Ferrara, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings; a motion for reconsideration was heard by him; and entry of a final judgment was ordered by him. Albert R. Mason for the plaintiff. Joseph G. Donnellan for the defendant. RUBIN, J. The city of Springfield (city) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court confirming a labor arbitration award issued in favor of a public employee union representing firefighters, Local 648, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO (union). We affirm. Background. Because the arbitration award incorporated by reference certain legal conclusions of the Civil Service Commission (commission), we first summarize the commission proceedings, followed by the arbitration proceedings. Under the civil service law, G. L. c. 31, in order to fill a vacant position, the city may appoint either a “permanent” replacement, or, if the vacancy or the position is temporary, a “temporary” replacement. See G. L. c. 31, §§ 6-8. In either event, the appointment must be made through the detailed procedural steps set out in the civil service law. As the commission ultimately found, for an extended period of time the city’s appointments to vacant positions in the fire department did not comply with the above requirements. Rather, in 2009 and 2010, the city filled certain vacancies in its fire department not by promoting firefighters, but by making extended appointments of firefighters to higher-ranking civil service positions on an “acting” basis. These firefighters were paid additional out-of-grade compensation pursuant to the terms of art. 31 of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and the city. Even with this additional out-of-grade amount, their compensation and other benefits fell short of that set forth in the CBA for the positions in which they were serving. The city’s justification for this discrepancy was that the firefighters were serving only on an “acting” basis. […]
Categories: News Tags: 1110715, AFLCIO, Association, City, Firefighters, International, Lawyers, Local, Springfield, Union, Weekly