Commonwealth v. Ramirez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-017-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1580 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. WILLIAM J. RAMIREZ. No. 16-P-1580. Essex. October 6, 2017. – February 9, 2018. Present: Wolohojian, Maldonado, & Wendlandt, JJ. Firearms. Search and Seizure, Protective frisk, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion, Arrest. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Stop and frisk, Reasonable suspicion, Arrest. Threshold Police Inquiry. Arrest. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Complaints received and sworn to in the Haverhill Division of the District Court Department on April 2 and 7, 2015. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Patricia A. Dowling, J., and the case was heard by Stephen S. Albany, J. Suzanne Lynn Renaud for the defendant. Philip A. Mallard, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MALDONADO, J. After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of carrying a loaded firearm without a license and defacing a firearm serial number.[1] The defendant appeals only from the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm. The issue before us is whether a police officer was justified in stopping the defendant, who was walking with a man for whom the officer had an active arrest warrant involving the use of a firearm in the commission of a violent felony. Concluding that under these narrow circumstances police and public safety concerns outweighed the minimal intrusion on the defendant’s liberty for the time it took for police to take control of the scene and effectuate the other individual’s arrest, we affirm. Background. The judge made the following factual findings. In the afternoon of March 25, 2015, shots were fired down Winter Street in Haverhill and struck and wounded a passerby. Haverhill police officers received reports that a man named Joshua Perez had fired the shots, and they obtained a warrant for his arrest.[2] A few days later, on April 1, at approximately 5 P.M., local, State, and Federal law enforcement officers converged on Brook Street and Hilldale Avenue in Haverhill believing that Perez was in that area. Detective Glen Fogarty, who was alone in an unmarked police cruiser, heard a radio transmission that indicated that Perez was walking toward his position. Fogarty then saw Perez, who was walking down the street with another man — later identified as the defendant, William Ramirez. Fogarty drove his cruiser to the side of […]
Commonwealth v. Dinardo (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-014-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-816 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CHARLES DINARDO. No. 16-P-816. Middlesex. November 3, 2017. – February 7, 2018. Present: Hanlon, Massing, & Wendlandt, JJ. Sex Offender. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion, Medical report. Witness, Expert, Psychologist. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Instructions to jury. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 5, 2012. The case was tried before Kenneth W. Salinger, J. David H. Erickson for the defendant. Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. WENDLANDT, J. This appeal presents the question whether, in connection with a trial to civilly commit an individual as a sexually dangerous person,[1] the written report of a qualified forensic psychologist (who is neither a designated qualified examiner nor the defendant’s treating psychologist) is admissible as a “psychiatric and psychological record[] and report[] of the person named in the petition.” G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), inserted by St. 1999, c. 74, § 8. Concluding that it is and that the defendant’s other arguments lack merit, we affirm. Background. We briefly summarize the relevant facts as found by the trial judge. In 1989, the defendant, Charles Dinardo, was convicted in Connecticut of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, and risk of injury to a minor. The victim was the defendant’s daughter, whom he sexually abused continuously from when she was six years old until she was eighteen, with the exception of a one year hiatus when the victim’s mother took her abroad. The abuse began when she was six or seven years old. He would place a wire in his own and then the victim’s anus while he masturbated. When she was eight or nine years old and continuing until she was twelve, he engaged in weekly oral and anal sex with her. Over the next six years, he engaged in weekly sexual contact with the victim. On one occasion, the defendant told an adult male friend that he could have sex with the victim; the friend proceeded to have oral sex with her. The defendant expressed disappointment that he was not afforded the opportunity to watch. The victim was afraid to tell anyone about the abuse, but when she was eighteen, she began to resist the defendant and ultimately reported the sexual abuse to her therapist. The defendant was arrested, […]
Commonwealth v. Carlson (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-013-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-35 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JASON C. CARLSON. No. 17-P-35. Worcester. November 15, 2017. – February 6, 2018. Present: Wolohojian, Massing, & Wendlandt, JJ. Larceny. Identification. Constitutional Law, Identification. Due Process of Law, Identification. Evidence, Identification. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on January 21, 2014. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Daniel M. Wrenn, J., and the case was tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. Geraldine C. Griffin for the defendant. Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. WOLOHOJIAN, J. A pawnbroker, after a single-photograph identification procedure, identified the defendant as the man who had some days earlier pawned certain items of stolen jewelry. The pawnbroker’s identification was an important part of the evidence at the defendant’s jury trial, which resulted in his conviction of larceny over $ 250.[1] The central issue on appeal is whether the defendant’s motion to suppress the pawnbroker’s identification should have been allowed because the single-photograph identification procedure violated the defendant’s rights under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Concluding that the motion should have been allowed, we reverse the judgment. We summarize the facts found by the motion judge, supplemented by undisputed evidence introduced at the evidentiary motion hearing. See Commonwealth v. Dew, 478 Mass. 304, 305 (2017). Pauline and Emile Daigle, a couple in their seventies, hired a professional moving company to move from their single-family home in Templeton to a condominium unit in Hubbardston on August 31, 2013. The next day, Pauline Daigle reported to police that seventeen pieces of jewelry valued at approximately $ 30,000 were missing; only empty boxes remained in the dresser drawers where she had stored the jewelry. Templeton police Detective Derek Hall opened an investigation into the theft. He learned that two moving men had handled the move: Ronny Norton and the defendant. Norton was a long-time employee of the moving company; the defendant, by contrast, had been employed for the day. Norton told Hall that the defendant had been alone in the Templeton bedroom where the jewelry had been stored and also when he (the defendant) had unpacked the bedroom dresser drawers at the end of the move in Hubbardston. Norton also said that when he […]
Commonwealth v. Newton N., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-019-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12354 COMMONWEALTH vs. NEWTON N., a juvenile. Berkshire. November 7, 2017. – February 5, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Delinquent Child. Probable Cause. Insanity. Mental Impairment. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Arraignment, Dismissal. Complaint received and sworn to in the Berkshire County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on June 2, 2016. A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith A. Locke, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Kyle G. Christensen, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Laura Chrismer Edmonds for the juvenile. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Jennifer Honig, & Phillip Kassel for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Joseph N. Schneiderman for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney for the Suffolk District, & John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. GANTS, C.J. This case presents two important issues relevant to a Juvenile Court judge’s consideration of a prearraignment motion to dismiss a delinquency complaint. First, we hold that a judge, in weighing whether the information contained within the “four corners” of the complaint application and related exhibits constitutes probable cause, may not consider whether a juvenile was criminally responsible for the charged offenses or whether the juvenile’s mental impairment rendered the juvenile incapable of having the requisite criminal intent. Second, we hold that, where a prosecutor exercises his or her discretion to proceed to arraignment on a delinquency complaint supported by probable cause, the judge may not dismiss the complaint before arraignment on the grounds that dismissal of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice. Because the judge in this case dismissed the delinquency complaint before arraignment where the complaint was supported by probable cause and where the prosecutor wished to proceed to arraignment, we vacate the dismissal and remand the case to the Juvenile Court.[1] Background. On May 25, 2016, a police officer applied for and obtained a delinquency complaint from a clerk-magistrate, charging the […]
Commonwealth v. Orbin O., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-020-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12314 COMMONWEALTH vs. ORBIN O., a juvenile. Berkshire. November 7, 2017. – February 5, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Delinquent Child. Probable Cause. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint, Show cause hearing, Dismissal. Complaint received and sworn to in the Berkshire County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on April 14, 2016. A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith A. Locke, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Kyle G. Christensen, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Afton M. Templin for the juvenile. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Jennifer Honig, & Phillip Kassel for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & Joseph N. Schneiderman for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services. Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney for the Suffolk District, & John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. GANTS, C.J. In Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. , (2018), also decided today, in which a police officer applied for and obtained a delinquency complaint, we held that, “where a prosecutor exercises his or her discretion to proceed to arraignment on a delinquency complaint supported by probable cause, the judge may not dismiss the complaint before arraignment on the grounds that dismissal of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice.” We consider here whether that same limitation on judicial authority in deciding a motion to dismiss applies to a delinquency complaint brought by a private party under G. L. c. 218, § 35A, where a clerk-magistrate issued the complaint after finding probable cause. We conclude that this same limitation applies only where the prosecutor has affirmatively adopted the private party’s complaint by moving for arraignment. In cases where the prosecutor has not so moved, a judge considering a juvenile’s motion to dismiss prior to arraignment may consider whether the clerk-magistrate abused his or her discretion in issuing the complaint and, in doing so, may consider whether dismissal is in the best interests of the child and in the interests of justice.[1] Background. On […]
Tavares v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-021-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12211 PAULO TAVARES vs. COMMONWEALTH. February 5, 2018. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Discovery, Postconviction relief, Capital case. Paulo Tavares appeals from a judgment of the county court denying his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm the judgment. Tavares has been convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree and other offenses. Before trial, Tavares successfully moved to suppress evidence of surreptitiously recorded conversations between him and a confidential informant. We affirmed the suppression order on the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal. Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289, 303 (2011). After he was convicted, Tavares moved for a new trial and for postconviction discovery of copies or transcripts of the recorded conversations.[1] The trial judge denied both motions. Tavares’s appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his posttrial motions is pending in this court and has not yet been briefed. In his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, Tavares sought relief from the denial of his motion for postconviction discovery. A single justice of this court denied the petition as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration. “[R]elief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is properly denied where the petitioning party has or had an adequate and effective avenue to seek and obtain the requested relief other than G. L. c. 211, § 3.” Donald v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1007, 1007 (2002), quoting Hunt v. McKendry, 434 Mass. 1025, 1026 (2001). “An established route for the petitioner to obtain appellate review of the denial of his motion for postconviction discovery would be in connection with an appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial . . . .” Donald, supra. We regularly address postconviction discovery issues in connection with such appeals. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morgan, 453 Mass. 54, 61-64 (2009); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 97-98 (2002); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 261 (1981). Tavares has not carried his burden of “demonstrat[ing] the absence or inadequacy of other remedies.” Callahan v. Superior Court Dep’t of the Trial Court, 432 Mass. 1023, 1023 (2000). The single justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. Judgment affirmed. Janet Hetherwick Pumphrey for the petitioner. Carolyn A. Burbine, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. […]
Commonwealth v. Gomes (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-022-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12290 COMMONWEALTH vs. JEREMY D. GOMES. February 5, 2018. Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel, Request for jury instructions. Identification. Evidence, Identification. In 2015, we affirmed Jeremy D. Gomes’s convictions of mayhem and breaking and entering a vehicle in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 378 (2015). At trial, “[t]he defendant requested that the judge provide a jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification that essentially mirrored a model instruction that had become effective in New Jersey approximately one week before the defendant’s trial commenced.” Id. at 357 & n.10, citing State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 219, 228-229 (2011). The judge instead gave the model jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification that we adopted in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 Mass. 296, 310-311 (1979) (Appendix). Gomes, supra at 353. We concluded that the judge did not abuse his discretion in doing so where the defendant failed to furnish “any expert testimony, scholarly articles, or treatises that would reasonably have enabled the judge to determine whether the principles in the defendant’s proposed instruction were ‘so generally accepted’ that it would be appropriate to instruct the jury regarding them . . . and where there was an instruction approved by this court that was not erroneous but, at worst, inadequate and incomplete.” Id. at 359-360. In that opinion, however, “[a]fter reviewing the scholarly research, analyses by other courts, amici submissions, and the [Report and Recommendations of the Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence], we conclude[d] that there are various principles regarding eyewitness identification for which there is a near consensus in the relevant scientific community and that it is appropriate to revise the Rodriguez instruction to include them.” Id. at 367. We therefore proposed a provisional model eyewitness identification instruction to be given in trials commencing after the date of the Gomes opinion. Id. at 376 (new instruction intended to have no retroactive application). The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to furnish the judge with the expert testimony, scholarly articles, or treatises that would reasonably have enabled the judge to determine that the principles in the defendant’s proposed instruction were generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The motion […]
Commonwealth v. Fernandes (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-018-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-10610 COMMONWEALTH vs. ODAIR FERNANDES. Suffolk. October 6, 2017. – February 2, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Homicide. Joint Enterprise. Constitutional Law, Fair trial. Due Process of Law, Fair trial. Fair Trial. Evidence, Joint venturer. Practice, Criminal, Fair trial, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Capital case. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 24, 2003. The cases were tried before Margaret R. Hinkle, J.; and a motion for postconviction relief, filed on October 1, 2014, was considered by Garry V. Inge, J. Deirdre L. Thurber for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. KAFKER, J. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant, Odair Fernandes, of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation, for the killing of Jose DaVeiga, and armed assault with intent to murder, for the shooting of Christopher Carvalho.[1] The defendant’s direct appeal was consolidated with his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The defendant raises four issues. First, he argues that his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated by the trial judge’s order limiting court room entry only to attendees whose names were submitted and approved. Second, he claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of joint venture. Third, he contends that the prosecutor in his closing argument used rhetorical questions to improperly shift the burden of proof and to address witness credibility. Fourth, he argues that the trial judge erred in her instruction to the jury about how to evaluate the credibility of cooperating witnesses. We conclude that there has been no reversible error, and after a thorough review of the record, we decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. Therefore, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. We also affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion for postconviction relief. Background. We summarize the facts that the jury could have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the legal issues. On April 17, 2003, the defendant was driving his Volkswagen automobile with passengers […]
Commonwealth v. Ballard (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-011-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-411 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. RONALD A. BALLARD. No. 17-P-411. Worcester. December 8, 2017. – February 2, 2018. Present: Sacks, Ditkoff, & Singh, JJ. Sex Offender. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Practice, Criminal, Plea. Statute, Construction. Words, “Prisoner.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 4, 2014. A motion to dismiss was heard by Daniel M. Wrenn, J. Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. John S. Day for the defendant. SACKS, J. The Commonwealth appeals from a judgment dismissing its petition to commit the defendant as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12. On the date the petition was filed, the defendant was serving a criminal sentence; some two and one-half years later, the defendant was allowed to withdraw the guilty pleas to the offenses for which he had been sentenced. This led a Superior Court judge to rule, based on his interpretation of Coffin v. Superintendent, Mass. Treatment Center, 458 Mass. 186 (2010), that the defendant was not a prisoner under G. L. c. 123A, § 12(b), at the time the petition was filed, and thus was not subject to being committed as an SDP. Concluding that the judge applied Coffin too broadly, we reverse. Background. In the 1980s, the defendant was convicted of a number of sexual offenses against women in both the Commonwealth and California. He received State prison sentences in both jurisdictions, completing his sentence in the Commonwealth in 2003, at which time the Commonwealth successfully petitioned to commit him to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) as an SDP. Following a trial in which the defendant was found no longer sexually dangerous, he was discharged in 2007. In 2013, based on an incident in which the defendant approached a seventeen year old female working at a farm stand, criminal complaints issued from the District Court charging him with accosting or annoying a person of the opposite sex in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 53,[1] threatening to commit a crime in violation of G. L. c. 275, § 2, and intimidation of a witness in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B. In January, 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to concurrent sentences amounting to nine months in the house of correction, with credit for time served.[2] […]
Josh J., a juvenile v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-017-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12286 JOSH J., a juvenile vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. October 5, 2017. – January 31, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Bail. Delinquent Child. Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees. Moot Question. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 11, 2017. The case was reported by Lowy, J. Eliza Lockhart-Jenks, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the juvenile. Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LOWY, J. This case, here on a reservation and report by a single justice of the county court in response to the juvenile’s petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, requires us to consider the proper application of G. L. c. 276, § 58, and G. L. c. 276, § 58B, specifically with regard to the number of days an individual may be held without bail after a bail revocation hearing. We conclude that where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either § 58 or § 58B. The judge must then determine whether the Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of the particular statute, either § 58 or § 58B, under which it sought to revoke bail. Background and prior proceedings. On May 6, 2016, a delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a felony and larceny over $ 250. A judge in the Juvenile Court set the juvenile’s bail at $ 1,000. The judge also advised the juvenile, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, that the juvenile’s bail could be revoked if he committed a new crime while on release. The juvenile posted bail and was released. In August, 2016, two delinquency complaints issued against the juvenile for several new crimes he allegedly committed while on release on the pending charges, including two counts of assault and battery on a pregnant victim and one count of malicious destruction of property valued over $ 250. In November, 2016, based on the new charges, the Commonwealth sought to revoke the juvenile’s bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth’s motion, revoked the juvenile’s bail, and set a date for a […]