Commonwealth v. Cole C., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-008-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1645 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. COLE C., a juvenile.[1] No. 16-P-1645. Suffolk. November 8, 2017. – January 19, 2018. Present: Milkey, Blake, & Singh, JJ. Juvenile Court, Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, Juvenile Court. Youthful Offender Act. Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Transfer hearing. Statute, Construction. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 5, 2016. After transfer to the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, a motion to dismiss was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J. Colby M. Tilley, Assistant District Attorney (Michael V. Glennon, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Melissa Allen Celli for the defendant. MILKEY, J. A grand jury indicted the defendant as a youthful offender after he had turned eighteen years old. Relying on Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627 (2013) (Mogelinski I), a Juvenile Court judge dismissed the indictments for want of jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and order that the indictments be reinstated. Background. The relevant facts are undisputed. On April 20, 2016, Boston police arrested the defendant on a variety of charges related to an armed home invasion that occurred that day. He was seventeen years old at that time. After his arrest, the police took him to a Department of Youth Services (DYS) facility. The following day, a twelve-count delinquency complaint was issued, and a second delinquency complaint that included two additional charges was issued a day later. The defendant was arraigned on April 25, 2016, and two days after that (one week after the alleged incident), he turned eighteen. On July 5, 2016, a grand jury indicted the defendant as a youthful offender on five charges: armed home invasion, armed robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and intimidation of a witness. The indictments were filed with the Juvenile Court on July 11, 2016, and the case was continued to July 26, 2016, for arraignment. However, a Juvenile Court judge refused to arraign the defendant on the youthful offender indictments on the grounds that — because the defendant had turned eighteen prior to the issuance of the indictments — the court lacked jurisdiction over them. The judge also denied alternative relief that the Commonwealth requested, the holding of a transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A, in […]
Kennedy, et al. v. Commonwealth, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-007-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1464 Appeals Court RUTH KENNEDY & others[1] vs. COMMONWEALTH & others.[2] No. 16-P-1464. Hampshire. September 19, 2017. – January 18, 2018. Present: Vuono, Blake, & Singh, JJ. School and School Committee, Regional school district, Standing to challenge validity of statute. Contract, Regional school district, Promissory estoppel. Constitutional Law, Standing, Home Rule Amendment, Special law. Municipal Corporations, Home rule. Statute, Special law. Practice, Civil, Standing, Declaratory proceeding, Motion to dismiss. Declaratory Relief. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 31, 2014. Motions to dismiss were heard by Bertha D. Josephson, J. James B. Lampke (Russell J. Dupere also present) for the plaintiffs. Layla G. Taylor for town of Worthington. Kerry David Strayer, Assistant Attorney General (Juliana deHaan Rice, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the Commonwealth & another. VUONO, J. This appeal arises from the town of Worthington’s (Worthington’s) withdrawal from the Gateway regional school district (school district) pursuant to special legislation. The school district was established in 1957 and consisted of seven member towns in Hampden and Hampshire Counties until May 7, 2014, when the Legislature adopted “An Act Relative to the Withdrawal of the Town of Worthington From the Gateway Regional School District.” St. 2014, c. 97 (act). The act enabled Worthington to withdraw from the school district without the consent of the other member towns. The school district, the town of Huntington (Huntington), Ruth Kennedy (a resident of the member town of Russell), and Derrick Mason (a resident of the member town of Russell), brought an action in Superior Court against Worthington, the Commonwealth, the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (department), and the town of Russell, challenging the act. The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) & (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), which a judge allowed. Primarily for the reasons set forth in the judge’s well-reasoned memorandum of decision, we affirm. Background. Between 1957 and 1968, the towns of Russell, Worthington, Huntington, Middlefield, Montgomery, Chester, and Blandford entered into an agreement for the creation and the operation of the school district. See G. L. c. 71, §§ 14-14B, 15. Among other things, the agreement provides for the location of schools, the apportionment and payment of costs by member towns, and the employment of teachers. The agreement also outlines the procedures through which […]
Commonwealth v. McGonagle (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-012-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12292 COMMONWEALTH vs. SHAWN A. McGONAGLE. Suffolk. October 5, 2017. – January 18, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual punishment. Due Process of Law, Sentence. Practice, Criminal, Sentence. Complaint received and sworn to in the West Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on April 3, 2015. The case was tried before Paul J. McManus, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Max Bauer for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LOWY, J. General Laws c. 258B, § 3 (p), permits “victims . . . to be heard through an oral and written victim impact statement at sentencing . . . about the effects of the crime on the victim and as to a recommended sentence.”[1] We transferred this case here on our own motion to answer two questions: first, whether the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1 (2016) (per curiam), precludes a sentencing judge from considering victim impact statements “as to a recommended sentence” under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and second, whether the sentencing recommendation provision violates the defendant’s constitutional guarantee of due process. We conclude that a sentencing judge’s consideration of victim impact statements “as to a recommended sentence” is constitutional because the concerns underpinning the Supreme Court’s treatment of victim impact statements before a jury during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial differ from those at issue here. We further conclude that a victim’s right to recommend a sentence pursuant to G. L. c. 258B, § 3 (p), satisfies the requirements of due process. We therefore answer both questions in the negative and affirm. Background and prior proceedings. Following a trial in the District Court, a jury convicted the defendant, Shawn McGonagle, of assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A. At the defendant’s sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth requested that the defendant be sentenced to two and one-half years in a house of correction, the maximum possible sentence under the statute, to be served from and after his release on an unrelated one-year sentence for violating an abuse prevention order. Immediately after the Commonwealth’s recommendation, the […]
Cepeda v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-007-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12387 RONALDO CEPEDA vs. COMMONWEALTH. January 12, 2018. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Dismissal. Youthful Offender Act. The petitioner, Ronaldo Cepeda, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm. Cepeda has been indicted for murder in the second degree, stemming from an incident that occurred on October 22, 2015. Cepeda was sixteen years old at the time. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that “the Commonwealth failed to present material exculpatory and mitigating evidence to the grand jury, and that the grand jury was not properly instructed regarding the impact of a developing brain on threat response and decision making of a juvenile.” A judge in the Superior Court denied the motion. Cepeda then filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court. In his petition, he argued, among other things, that, following this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012), when the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile the grand jury must be instructed on the basic differences between juvenile and adult brains. In the Walczak case, the court concluded that “where the Commonwealth seeks to indict a juvenile for murder and where there is substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances or defenses (other than lack of criminal responsibility) presented to the grand jury, the prosecutor shall instruct the grand jury on the elements of murder and on the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses.” Id. at 810. In Cepeda’s view, the required instructions will only be effective if the grand jury are also instructed on juvenile brain development. Essentially, his concern lies with the difference between an indictment for murder, pursuant to which the Commonwealth would proceed against him as an adult in the Superior Court, and an indictment for manslaughter, pursuant to which the Commonwealth would proceed against him in the Juvenile Court. In other words, if the grand jury were presented with information related to juvenile brain development, they would be better able to assess whether to indict the defendant as an adult (for murder) or as a juvenile (for manslaughter). The single justice denied the petition without a hearing, and the case is now before us pursuant […]
Elliot v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-008-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11947 RONNY ELLIOT vs. COMMONWEALTH. January 12, 2018. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Jurisdiction, Juvenile Court, Transfer hearing. Practice, Criminal, Transfer hearing. Department of Youth Services. The petitioner, Ronny Elliot, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm. In 1995, Elliot was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and possession of a firearm without a license. He was seventeen years old at the time. He was convicted by a Superior Court jury, in 1997, of the lesser offense of murder in the second degree as well as of the other offenses. This court affirmed the convictions. See Commonwealth v. Elliot, 430 Mass. 498 (1999). Elliot subsequently filed a motion for a new trial in 2000, and an amended motion for a new trial in 2003. After a hearing, the amended motion was denied, in 2008.[1] The Appeals Court affirmed the order denying the motion for a new trial, and this court denied Elliot’s application for further appellate review. See Commonwealth v. Elliot, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (memorandum and order pursuant to rule 1:28), S.C., 460 Mass. 1115 (2011). Then, in 2015, Elliot filed his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, in the county court. In the petition, he argued that because he had been “lawfully committed to the Department of Youth Services” at the time of the murder, he was entitled to a transfer hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 61, which was then in effect.[2] Because no transfer hearing was held, the Superior Court, in Elliot’s view, did not have jurisdiction to try him for murder.[3] The single justice denied the petition, noting that at the relevant time — when the murder occurred in 1995 — a seventeen year old was an adult in the eyes of the juvenile and criminal law. On that basis, Elliot was not entitled to a transfer hearing. In his appeal to this court, Elliot continues to press the argument that he was entitled to a transfer hearing in the Juvenile Court and that because he did not receive one, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over his case. General Laws c. 119, § 61, provided at the time that “[t]he [C]ommonwealth […]
Commonwealth v. Curran (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-006-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12293 COMMONWEALTH vs. EDWARD CURRAN. Worcester. September 6, 2017. – January 12, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Sex Offender. Practice, Civil, Sex offender. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion, Competency, Insanity. Incompetent Person, Commitment. Witness, Expert. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 3, 2015. A pretrial motion to admit expert testimony with regard to criminal responsibility was heard by Richard T. Tucker, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Judd J. Carhart, J., in the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Marcia T. Kovner for the defendant. Ellyn H. Lazar-Moore, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GAZIANO, J. General Laws c. 123A, § 15, allows incompetent persons who are unable to stand trial for qualifying sex offenses to be deemed sexually dangerous based on the commission of those offenses. In 2008, we held that this proceeding did not violate due process or equal protection because of the rights the Legislature explicitly included in the statute to “protect an incompetent defendant’s ability to defend himself against the allegations of crime and, thus, minimize the likelihood of a mistake.” Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 375 (2008). Those protections encompass “all rights available to criminal defendants at criminal trials, other than the right not to be tried while incompetent,” G. L. c. 123A, § 15, including the retention of experts, the right to present evidence in defense of the charges, and “the right to a determination of the commission of the criminal acts made beyond a reasonable doubt.” Burgess, supra. Here, the defendant sought to introduce at a hearing on the Commonwealth’s G. L. c. 123A, § 15, petition expert testimony that he was not criminally responsible. Interpreting the statutory language “whether the person did commit the act or acts charged” to mean that he should determine only whether the acts were committed, not whether the defendant was guilty of the acts, the judge denied the motion and allowed the Commonwealth’s motion to preclude the testimony. We conclude that the right of an incompetent defendant to raise defenses in a proceeding pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 15, includes that of a lack of criminal responsibility. Therefore, the denial of the motion […]
Commonwealth v. Cousin (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-004-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12252 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSEPH COUSIN. Suffolk. September 5, 2017. – January 11, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Conflict of Interest. Attorney at Law, Conflict of interest. Practice, Criminal, Assistance of counsel. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 4, 2002. The cases were tried before Nancy Holtz, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on March 1, 2013, was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Amanda Teo, Assistant District Attorney (David J. Fredette, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. LOWY, J. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant, Joseph Cousin (Cousin), was convicted of murder in the second degree. Cousin filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective because he was burdened by an actual conflict of interest. A Superior Court judge granted Cousin’s motion for a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed, and we allowed its application for direct appellate review.[1] The issue before this court is whether Cousin presented sufficient evidence to establish that his trial counsel was burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Although Cousin has set forth the basis for what may well constitute a potential conflict of interest, we conclude that he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel was operating under an actual conflict of interest. Therefore, we vacate the allowance of Cousin’s motion for a new trial and remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings to determine whether there was a potential conflict causing prejudice that would warrant a new trial. Prior proceedings and background. We briefly indicate the nature of Cousin’s criminal case, followed by a summary of the facts pertinent to Cousin’s conflict claim, as they were found by the judge. We also reserve certain facts for later discussion. Following an investigation by the Boston police department (BPD) homicide division, Cousin and another man were charged with murder for the shooting death of a young girl. In 2004, Cousin and his codefendant were tried jointly for the murder, and the jury acquitted the codefendant. The jury were deadlocked concerning […]
Commonwealth v. Lopes (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-003-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11587 COMMONWEALTH vs. CRISOSTOMO LOPES. Suffolk. September 8, 2017. – January 10, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Budd, & Kafker, JJ. Homicide. Jury and Jurors. Evidence, Relevancy and materiality, Prior misconduct, Cross-examination. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Challenge to jurors, Argument by prosecutor. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 1, 2010. The case was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J. Alan Jay Black for the defendant. Janis DiLoreto Smith, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. Haggan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. KAFKER, J. The defendant, Crisostomo Lopes, pulled the fourteen year old victim off a motorized scooter and held him, while the codefendant, a juvenile, shot him multiple times at close range. The victim succumbed to a gunshot wound to his chest shortly thereafter. After a jury trial, both the defendant and his codefendant were convicted of murder in the first degree on the theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.[1] In his appeal, the defendant claims that reversal of his conviction is required because the judge erred by: (1) failing to find that the Commonwealth’s peremptory challenges of prospective jurors were improper; (2) allowing evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation and the victim’s brother’s knowledge of neighborhood gang activity; (3) precluding the defendant from cross-examining a police officer witness on prior misconduct; and (4) allowing the prosecutor to make improper and prejudicial statements during the Commonwealth’s closing argument. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that there has been no reversible error, and after a thorough review of the record, we decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce or set aside the verdict of murder in the first degree. Therefore, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. Background. We summarize the facts that the jury could have found, reserving certain details for discussion of the legal issues. The victim was fourteen years old and lived on Norton Street in the Dorchester section of Boston. On May 30, 2010, the victim had been riding a scooter around Dorchester that was being driven by his fifteen year old brother. Each was wearing a helmet, but different styles. They were riding the scooter on Inwood Street, approaching Olney Street, when the brother almost hit the defendant, who […]
Commonwealth v. Knowles (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-004-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1409 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LAWRENCE KNOWLES. No. 16-P-1409. Suffolk. November 3, 2017. – January 10, 2018. Present: Wolohojian, Massing, & Wendlandt, JJ. Witness, Cross-examination. Practice, Criminal, Cross-examination by prosecutor, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional rights. Waiver. Evidence, Cross-examination, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on January 15, 2014. The case was tried before Tracy-Lee Lyons, J. A motion to stay execution of sentence, filed in the Appeals Court on June 24, 2016, was heard by Carhart, J. Lauren A. Montana for the defendant. Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney (Amanda Read Cascione, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. MASSING, J. This appeal requires us to apply the rule prohibiting cross-examination by innuendo, most recently enunciated in Commonwealth v. Peck, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 34 (2014) (Peck), to the cross-examination of three defense witnesses: an expert witness, a lay witness, and the defendant himself. A jury in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department found the defendant guilty of two counts of unlawful possession of a loaded firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), (n). The primary issues at trial were whether the defendant knowingly possessed the two firearms found near his truck and, in this regard, whether his threatening statements to police officers and subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights were voluntary. We conclude that the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant was proper and that the cross-examination of the defendant’s lay witness was improper but not prejudicial. We further hold that Peck does not apply to the cross-examination of expert witnesses and that the defendant’s statements and Miranda waiver were voluntary.[1] Accordingly, we affirm. Background. 1. Commonwealth’s case. At 2:45 A.M. on January 12, 2014, Boston police Officers Mario Santillana and Jose Acosta were dispatched to the parking lot behind a building on Centre Street in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston. The defendant was seated in the driver’s seat of a parked red truck, alone, crouched down with his hands folded under his arms, staring straight ahead. Santillana knocked on the closed window to get the defendant’s attention. The defendant muttered […]
Commonwealth v. Lastowski (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-001-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12280 COMMONWEALTH vs. AARON A. LASTOWSKI. Franklin. October 3, 2017. – January 4, 2018. Present (Sitting at Greenfield): Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Complaint received and sworn to in the Greenfield Division of the District Court Department on May 13, 2013. A motion to withdraw pleas of guilty, filed on May 14, 2015, was heard by William F. Mazanec, III, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Edward Gauthier for the defendant. Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KAFKER, J. In 2014, the defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older. One year later, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, contending that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective because plea counsel failed to advise him of the duty to register as a sex offender, and its consequences, or explain that he might have sought a continuance without a finding. A judge in the District Court, who had also been the plea judge, denied the defendant’s motion, finding the defendant’s affidavit and assertions not credible. The defendant appealed from the denial of his motion, and we granted his motion for direct appellate review. We conclude that the motion judge correctly determined that the defendant did not satisfy the prejudice requirement of the Saferian test. See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974). We therefore affirm the decision of the judge in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Background. We summarize the following facts from findings made by the judge and other undisputed record materials, reserving certain details for discussion of the legal issues. Plea hearing. On May 7, 2014, the defendant, Aaron Lastowski, tendered guilty pleas on three counts of indecent assault and battery on a person age fourteen or older in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H. As part of his pleas, the defendant was required to submit a tender of plea or admission and waiver of rights form. The plea judge first had the defendant acknowledge that the form had the defendant’s signature and that the signature manifested his […]