Great Divide Insurance Company v. Lexington Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-172-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12164 GREAT DIVIDE INSURANCE COMPANY vs. LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY. Suffolk. March 6, 2017. – November 1, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ.[1] Motor Vehicle, Insurance. Insurance, Motor vehicle insurance, Excess liability insurance. Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Adam R. Doherty (Thomas M. Elcock also present) for the plaintiff. Kimberly A. Hartman, of Illinois, for the defendant. GAZIANO, J. In this case we answer a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts concerning the priority of coverage of two automobile insurance policies that both covered a single motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred when an employee of a refuse company, driving a garbage truck owned by another company, struck and killed a bicyclist. The policies were issued respectively by the plaintiff and defendant insurers to the employer of the driver and the company that owned the truck.[2] A portion of the loss was covered by a primary insurance policy from a third insurance company, not a party here. The two policies at issue were triggered, according to the language in each policy, after the exhaustion of the primary policy. Although the relevant language of the policies differs, each policy states that it provides “excess” coverage[3] (in the circumstances here) and each policy also contains an “other insurance” clause.[4] As the Federal District Court judge noted in his certification order, the circumstances here involve a question of first impression, because one of the two policies is a “hybrid” policy that provides primary coverage for an incident where its insured is driving a vehicle owned by the insured, and excess coverage for an accident where its insured is the driver but is driving a vehicle owned by someone else. The other policy is a “true . . . umbrella” policy that provides only excess coverage where other coverage has been exhausted. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that both excess policies cover the accident equally, after exhaustion of the underlying primary policy, to the extent of their respective policy limits. Background and procedural history. The undisputed facts are drawn from the decision of the Federal District Court judge certifying the question to this […]
OneBeacon America Insurance Company v. Celanese Corporation (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-134-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-203 Appeals Court ONEBEACON AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY vs. CELANESE CORPORATION. No. 16-P-203. Suffolk. November 18, 2016. – October 16, 2017. Present: Trainor, Meade, & Hanlon, JJ. Insurance, Defense of proceedings against insured, Insurer’s obligation to defend. Contract, Insurance. Conflict of Interest. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 2, 2010. The case was heard by Christine M. Roach, J., on motions for summary judgment, and an award of attorney’s fees was entered by her. Kevin J. O’Connor (Kara A. Loridas also present) for the plaintiff. Michael John Miguel for the defendant. TRAINOR, J. This appeal arises from a series of cross motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff, OneBeacon America Insurance Company (OneBeacon), appeals from so much of the final judgment as awarded reasonable and necessary defense costs to its insured, Celanese Corporation (Celanese), that Celanese incurred from April 13, 2009, through May 27, 2011.[1] On May 27, 2011, a judge of the Superior Court determined that OneBeacon was entitled to take control of Celanese’s defense as of April 13, 2009 (see note 1, supra). The issue on appeal is whether that determination precludes Celanese from receiving any reimbursement for defense of the underlying claims during the period of time when the question of control over the defense was being litigated. OneBeacon argues that it is not liable for any defense costs incurred by Celanese during that period of time because OneBeacon offered to defend Celanese without a reservation of rights. Celanese, on cross appeal, contends that the judge committed an abuse of discretion by not awarding the full amount of defense costs that Celanese requested. We vacate so much of the judgment that held OneBeacon liable for Celanese’s defense costs for the period of time at issue, and therefore do not reach the issues raised in Celanese’s cross appeal. Background. The following undisputed facts are taken from the summary judgment record. See Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991) (“The standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”). […]
Kiribati Seafood Company, LLC, et al. v. Dechert LLP (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-161-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12287 KIRIBATI SEAFOOD COMPANY, LLC, & another[1] vs. DECHERT LLP. Suffolk. April 6, 2017. – October 11, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ.[2] Attorney at Law, Malpractice, Negligence. Negligence, Attorney at law, Proximate cause. Proximate Cause. Damages, Mitigation. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 1, 2013. The case was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J., on motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Megan C. Deluhery (John R. Neeleman, of Washington, also present) for Kiribati Seafood Company, LLC. Denis M. King (Richard M. Zielinski also present) for the defendant. GANTS, C.J. The issue on appeal is whether, in a legal malpractice action, a court’s error of law constitutes a superseding cause that bars recovery to the plaintiff client even where the defendant attorney was negligent for failing to prevent or mitigate the legal error. The plaintiff, Kiribati Seafood Company, LLC (Kiribati), brought a legal malpractice claim against its former law firm, Dechert LLP (Dechert). Kiribati alleged that Dechert negligently failed to provide a French appellate court with the evidence the court deemed necessary for Kiribati to prevail on a claim, which resulted in the court’s denial of the claim. A judge of the Superior Court granted summary judgment to Dechert and denied partial summary judgment to Kiribati. The judge determined that the French appellate court committed an error of law in requiring this evidence and that, even if Dechert were negligent in failing to provide the evidence to the court, Kiribati could not recover damages for Dechert’s negligence because the court’s legal error was a superseding cause of the adverse decision. We conclude that an error of law under these circumstances is a concurrent, not a superseding, proximate cause and that the judge therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Dechert and denying partial summary judgment to Kiribati. Background. Because this is an appeal from an allowance of summary judgment, we set forth the undisputed material facts. Kiribati purchased a fishing vessel known as the Madee (ship), and chartered it to Olympic Packer, LLC, and Dojin Co., Ltd., for the purpose of fishing for tuna in the Pacific Ocean.[3] After sustaining damage to its […]
DeOliveira v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-016-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 17-00218-BLS1 MONICA DEOLIVEIRA1 vs. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS Plaintiff, Monica DeOliveira, seeks to recover from her automobile insurer, defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty), under a Massachusetts Automobile Insurance Policy (Policy). DeOliveira alleges that Liberty improperly failed to pay benefits under the Medical Payments (MedPay) provision of the Policy. DeOliveira’s Second Amended Complaint (Complaint) asserts three claims against Liberty: breach of contract (Count I), declaratory judgment (Count II), and violation of G.L. c. 93A (Count III).2 Liberty moves to dismiss all three claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).3 For the reasons stated below, Liberty’s motion to dismiss is denied. 1 On behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 2 DeOliveira filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File a Second Amended Complaint on August 16, 2017, after the parties filed their memoranda on Liberty’s motion to dismiss. On August 18, 2017, this court allowed DeOliveira to file the Second Amended Complaint and noted that if new allegations in that version of the Complaint required supplemental briefing, the parties could file written memoranda on the date of the oral argument on the motion to dismiss. The parties declined to file supplemental memoranda. 3 Liberty also moves to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of service of process. The motion to dismiss on that ground is denied. On April 18, 2017, DeOliveira filed a motion to BACKGROUND The facts as revealed by DeOliveira’s Complaint are as follows. DeOliveira is a resident of Worcester, Massachusetts. Liberty is a Massachusetts corporation with a principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. On October 28, 2010, DeOliveira purchased the Policy from Liberty. The Policy is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A. The Policy includes up to $ 8,000 in personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. It also includes an optional coverage for up to $ 5,000 in MedPay benefits. DeOliveira paid an additional premium of $ 10 per vehicle for two vehicles for the MedPay coverage. The Policy’s MedPay provision (Part 6) states, in part: “Under this Part, we will pay reasonable expenses for necessary medical and funeral services incurred as a result of an accident. We will pay for expenses resulting from bodily injuries to anyone occupying your auto at the time of the accident.” In addition, the MedPay provision states that: “We will not pay under this Part for any expenses that are payable, or would have been payable except for the deductible, under the PIP coverage of this policy or any other Massachusetts auto policy.” The Policy’s PIP […]
Safety Insurance Company v. Chau, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-005-17)
1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT SUCV2015-02554-BLS2 SAFETY INSURANCE COMPANY vs. LAURA CHAU & NAKOUZI ENTERPRISES, INC. d/b/a UNION AUTOMOTIVE MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff Safety Insurance Company (Safety) filed this action to determine its coverage obligations with respect to a motor vehicle accident which is the subject of separate litigation. The defendant Laura Chau was allegedly injured in that accident and in that separate lawsuit, seeks to recover against Nakouzi Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Union Automotive (Nakouzi), which is Safety’s insured. The Complaint seeks a declaration both as to Safety’s duty to defend Nakouzi and its duty to indemnify. The matter is now before this Court on Safety’s Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court concludes that Safety does have a duty to defend, but that the obligation to indemnify cannot be decided at this juncture because of fact disputes as to what caused the accident. BACKGROUND The summary judgment record contains the following relevant facts. In June 2015, Chau filed a lawsuit against David Lam and Nakouzi in Plymouth Superior Court seeking to recover for injuries she suffered in an accident that occurred while she was driving Lam’s car. See Chau v. Lam et al., Civ. No. 2015-00589 (the Plymouth Action). The complaint filed in the 2 Plymouth Action alleges that, prior to the accident, Nakouzi had issued a Certificate of Inspection for the vehicle despite the fact that its tires had heavily worn treads that did not comply with the state’s safety requirements for tire tread depth. As a result of Nakouzi’s negligence, Chau mistakenly believed that Lam’s vehicle was safe to drive and that the accident occurred because the worn tire treads led her to lose control of the car and collide with oncoming traffic. The Plymouth Action is still pending. At the time of the accident, Nakouzi was the named insured on a Massachusetts garage insurance policy issued by Safety (the Policy). The Policy provided two types of liability coverage for injuries resulting from “garage operations” — specifically, a) coverage for injuries from garage operations involving the ownership, maintenance and use of covered “autos,” and b) coverage for injuries from garage operations other than the ownership, maintenance, and use of covered “autos.” The parties agree that Lam’s car was not a covered auto, so it is the second type of liability coverage that is relevant here. As to both types of liability coverage, Safety was required to pay all sums its insured was legally required to pay as damages for bodily injury or property damage provided that such injury or damage was “caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from ‘garage operations.’” Garage Operations was defined to include “all […]
Casella Waste Systems, Inc., et al. v. Steadfast Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-008-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 2016-2521 BLS 1 CASELLA WASTE SYSTEMS, INC. et al1 vs. STEADFAST INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON STEADFAST INSURANCE COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT This is an insurance coverage dispute between a company engaged in the landfill business and its insurer. The insurer, defendant Steadfast Insurance Company, issued a policy called Z Choice Pollution Liability (the “Policy”) to plaintiff, Casella Waste Systems, Inc., naming Casella and its subsidiary, Southbridge Recycling & Disposal Park, Inc. (“SRDP”), as insureds. The Policy covers claims made against the insureds during the Policy period of April 30, 2015 to June 15, 2016. Following notification by Casella in October 2015 to the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) of the detection of pollution flowing from Casella’s property to neighboring property, a claim by DEP, as defined in the Policy, arose. Casella sought insurance coverage for the claim. Steadfast denied coverage. Casella sued for breach of contract, violation of G.L. c. 93A and for a declaration of coverage. Steadfast now moves for a summary judgment declaring there is no coverage under the Policy. For the reasons described below, summary judgment must be denied because there are material issues of fact that 1 Southbridge Recycling & Disposal Park, Inc. 1 are genuinely in dispute. BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the parties’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Responses Thereto (“SUMF”), supplemented by documents and affidavits in the summary judgment record. The coverage at issue under the Policy is what was provided under Coverage C: Cleanup Costs – New Pollution Event. Under Coverage C, Steadfast is obligated to pay “cleanup costs” to the extent resulting from a “new pollution event” that migrates beyond the boundaries of a “covered location” if that “new pollution event” is first “discovered” during the policy period. The obligation to pay includes “cleanup costs” that the insured is legally obligated to pay resulting from a third-party “claim.” The Policy also contains an exclusion from coverage for a “known pollution event.” The words in quotes are defined terms in the Policy. Casella seeks to be reimbursed and indemnified by Steadfast for all past and future cleanup costs incurred on account of a claim by DEP. There is no dispute that (i) Casella incurred cleanup costs, as defined, (ii) arising from migration of pollution from a covered property, as defined, and (iii) Casella received and reported to Steadfast a claim, as defined, coming from DEP. The dispute between the parties that is the crux of this lawsuit is whether the DEP claim resulted from a “new pollution event” that first commenced in the Policy period and was not known by Casella prior to the commencement […]
Buffalo Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Company, LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-103-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT SUCV2017-1584-BLS 2 BUFFALO WATER 1, LLC Plaintiff vs. FIDELITY REAL ESTATE COMPANY, LLC Defendant MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS This is an action challenging an independent appraisal of property as provided by an agreement between the parties, two sophisticated entities with experience in owning and leasing real estate. The plaintiff, Buffalo Water 1, LLC (Buffalo) is the owner of the property, located at 7 Water Street in downtown Boston (the Property). The defendant Fidelity Real Estate Company LLC (Fidelity) occupied the Property under a long term lease with an option to purchase the Property in the final year of the lease as set forth in an Option Agreement. The Option Agreement sets the purchase price at 95 percent of the “fair market value” (FMV) or $ 16,275,000, whichever is greater. If the parties could not agree upon the FMV, the Option Agreement set forth the specific appraisal process that the parties were to follow. Fidelity timely exercised its option to purchase and, with the parties unable to agree to the FMV, complied with the appraisal process, which included an independent appraisal. The Verified Complaint attacks the validity of the independent appraisal, contending among other things that the entity that employed the individual appraiser did not disclose a prior business relationship that it had with Fidelity. The case is now before the Court on Fidelity’s Motion to Dismiss. In support, it relies on the Massachusetts common law rule that severely limits the scope of judicial review regarding appraisals contractually authorized by the parties. Pursuant to that rule, the Court may invalidate an appraisal only where the appraiser plainly exceeded the scope of his authority or where the appraisal was the result of “fraud, corruption, dishonesty or bad faith.” Nelson v. Maiorana, 395 Mass. 87, 89 (1985), citing Eliot v. Coulter, 322 Mass. 86, 91 (1947). “The premise of the rule of restricted reviewability is that the contracting parties’ assignment of a valuation to an appraisal embodies their shared desire for finality.” State Room, Inc. v. MA-60 State Assoc., LCC, 84 Mass.App.Ct. 244 249 (2013). Applying that rule to the allegations in the Verified Complaint, this Court agrees with the defendant that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Mass.R.Civ. P. The independent appraisal was performed by Robert Skinner. Skinner worked for Cushman & Wakefield (Cushman), which was selected in compliance with the terms of the Option Agreement. The Engagement Letter pursuant to which Cushman was hired stated that the appraisal would be performed in accordance with certain standards, including the Code […]
D & H Distributing Company v. Commissioner of Revenue (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-124-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12260 D & H DISTRIBUTING COMPANY vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE. Suffolk. April 3, 2017. – July 31, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. Taxation, Sales and use tax. Internet. Constitutional Law, Commerce clause, Interstate commerce, Taxation. Interstate Commerce. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Philip S. Olsen (Jonathan A. Block also present) for the taxpayer. Julie E. Green, Assistant Attorney General, for Commissioner of Revenue. CYPHER, J. If a consumer enters his or her neighborhood sporting goods store in Massachusetts and purchases a baseball glove, the store, as the “vendor,” collects the Massachusetts sales tax owed from the consumer and remits it to the Department of Revenue (department). See G. L. c. 64H, §§ 1, 2. This case evaluates a more complex transaction in which a Massachusetts consumer instead finds a hypothetical baseball glove online, and purchases it from an out-of-State retailer who then orders the glove from a Massachusetts wholesaler and directs the wholesaler to deliver the glove directly to the doorstep of the Massachusetts consumer. In that more complicated transaction, known as a “drop shipment sale,” the wholesaler is considered to be the vendor, and is obligated to collect sales tax and remit it to the department. The taxpayer, D & H Distributing Company (D & H), is a company in the position of the hypothetical wholesaler just described. It appeals from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board) in which the board concluded that under a provision of the Massachusetts sales tax statute known as the “drop shipment rule,” D & H was responsible for collecting and remitting the sales tax due on products it sold to the out-of-State retailers and then delivered to consumers. G. L. c. 64H, § 1. We agree with the board’s conclusion, and also reject D & H’s argument that the statutory drop shipment rule violates the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the board. Statutory framework. a. Sales tax. General Laws c. 64H distinguishes between retail sales transactions and sales-for-resale transactions. Retail sales of goods and services are subject to tax in Massachusetts. G. L. c. 64H, § 2. […]
Categories: News Tags: 1012417, Commissioner, Company, Distributing, Lawyers, Revenue, Weekly
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-083-17)
1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 2016-00045 BLS1 PHILADELPHIA INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY vs. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (PIIC) and defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company (National Union) each issued insurance policies to North Suffolk Mental Health Associated, Inc. (North Suffolk). PIIC issued a Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy; and National Union issued a Workers’ Compensation and General Liability (Workers’ Comp.) policy. In a case filed in the Middlesex Superior Court in 2011, captioned Estate of Stephanie Moulton v. Nicholas Puopolo, et al. (the Underlying Action), the plaintiff estate brought suit against eighteen directors of North Suffolk (the Director Defendants) asserting claims arising out of the work related death of Ms. Moulton, a North Suffolk employee. The Director Defendants tendered the claim to both PIIC and National Union. PIIC defended the claim (under a reservation of right) and National Union declined coverage. The Director Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Underlying Action was eventually allowed, after appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). See Estate of Moulton v. Puopolo, 467 Mass. 478 (2014) (Moulton). In this action, PIIC has filed suit against National Union asserting claims for 2 declaratory judgment and equitable subordination and seeking to recover the cost of its successful defense of the Underlying Action. The case is now before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, National Union’s motion is ALLOWED, and PIIC’s motion is DENIED. ADDITIONAL FACTS The following additional facts are undisputed. Ms. Moulton was an employee of North Suffolk, a charitable corporation that provides mental health and rehabilitation services. She was assaulted and killed by a patient while performing her job. As explained in Moulton, her estate (the Estate) filed the Underlying Action against the directors of North Suffolk and others. It alleged claims for willful, wanton, reckless, malicious and grossly negligent conduct and, also, as to the Director Defendants, breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint alleged that the Director Defendants “effectuated” policies and failed to “effectuate” other policies that caused Ms. Moulton’s death. Id. at 480. They “moved to dismiss the complaint chiefly on the grounds that, with respect to the wrongful death action, they are immune from suit, as Ms. Moulton’s employer, under the exclusive remedy provision, G.L.c. 152, § 24 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), and, with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, they owed Moulton no such duty.” Id. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss; the director defendants sought interlocutory review under the doctrine of present execution; and the case was transferred to the SJC. As […]
George, et al. v. National Water Main Cleaning Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-110-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12191 ROBERT GEORGE & others[1] vs. NATIONAL WATER MAIN CLEANING COMPANY & others.[2] Suffolk. February 14, 2017. – June 26, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Supreme Judicial Court, Certification of questions of law. Massachusetts Wage Act. Labor, Wages, Failure to pay wages, Damages. Damages, Interest. Interest. Judgment, Interest. Practice, Civil, Interest, Judgment, Damages. Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial Court by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Adam J. Shafran (Jonathon D. Friedmann also present) for the plaintiffs. Richard L. Alfred (Dawn Reddy Solowey & Anne S. Bider also present) for the defendants. John Pagliaro & Martin J. Newhouse, for New England Legal Foundation, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Annette Gonthier Kiely, Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, & Timothy J. Wilton, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. Several employees of National Water Main Cleaning Company filed a class action suit against the company and its parent company, Carylon Corporation, in the Superior Court, alleging, among other claims, nonpayment of wages in violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act). After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the judge granted final approval of a class settlement agreement that resolved all outstanding issues except one question of law. To resolve that question, the judge certified to this court the following question pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981): “Is statutory interest pursuant to [G. L. c. 231, § 6B or 6C,] available under Massachusetts law when liquidated (treble) damages are awarded pursuant to [G. L. c. 149, § 150]?” In answer to the question, we declare that, under Massachusetts law, statutory prejudgment interest pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 6H, shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of lost wages and other benefits awarded as damages pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 150, but shall not be added to the additional amount of the award arising from the trebling of those damages as liquidated damages.[3] Interpretation of the certified question. Before we answer the certified question, which the judge issued at the joint request of the parties, we must first ascertain its […]