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Vinnie v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Facility, Norfolk (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-044-18)

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12299 RAYMOND P. VINNIE vs. SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE, NORFOLK. March 21, 2018. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. In 1993, Raymond P. Vinnie was convicted of murder in the first degree. After plenary review, we affirmed the conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1007 (1998), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 438 Mass. 1 (2002). In 2016, Vinnie filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to G. L. c. 248, § 1, in the county court, arguing that he was unlawfully imprisoned pursuant to a void mittimus. A single justice of this court transferred the petition to the Superior Court. A judge in that court denied relief. Vinnie then filed a motion in the county court, seeking to reinstate his petition on the ground that the Superior Court judge made various procedural and substantive errors. The same single justice denied the motion without a hearing. Vinnie appeals from that ruling. The single justice properly denied Vinnie’s motion to reinstate the petition. The Superior Court judge’s decision denying habeas relief was reviewable in the ordinary appellate process. After habeas relief was denied in the Superior Court, Vinnie “could have obtained review by this court only if he was granted leave by a single justice pursuant to the gatekeeper provision of G. L. c. 278, § 33E. He cannot circumvent the gatekeeper provision by filing his petition in the county court in the first instance.” Tyree v. Commonwealth, 449 Mass. 1034, 1034 (2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 926 (2008). There was no basis to “reinstate” the petition in the county court. Judgment affirmed. Raymond P. Vinnie, pro se. Eric A. Haskell, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent. Full-text Opinions

MHM Correctional Services, Inc., et al. v. Darwin Select Insurance Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-008-18)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 2017-01825-BLS2 MHM CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, INC., CENTURION OF MINNESOTA, LLC, CENTURION OF MISSISSIPPI, LLC & MASSACHUSETTS PARTNERSHIP FOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE, LLC, Plaintiffs vs. DARWIN SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY N/K/A ALLIED WORLD SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY & ALLIED WORLD ASSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS This case concerns six separate claims for coverage brought by insureds against their insurers. The plaintiffs are MHM Correctional Services, Inc. (MHM), Centurion of Mississippi, LLC (Centurion-MS), Centurion of Minnesota, LLC (Centurion-MN), and Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare, LLC (MPCH), each of which provides healthcare services to inmates housed in state prison facilities. Plaintiffs have been sued or are the subjects of indemnification demands in connection with six class action lawsuits alleging that the health care rendered to inmates in those facilities is so inadequate as to violate their constitutional rights. In the instant case, plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief as to the coverage obligations of the defendants Darwin Select Insurance Company n/k/a Allied World Surplus Lines Insurance Company (Darwin) and Allied World Assurance Company (Allied World) in relation to these six lawsuits. Defendants now move to dismiss, relying on the language of the underlying policies, all of which are before the Court. In the event that this Court does not 2 dismiss certain counts, the defendants ask this Court to stay the proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Dismiss is Denied. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs have contracts with various Departments of Corrections (DOCs) throughout the United States to provide medical and mental healthcare services to their prisoner populations. MHM provides mental healthcare services for the Alabama DOC (ADOC). Centurion-MS provides medical and mental healthcare services for the Mississippi DOC (MSDOC). Centurion-MN provides medical and mental healthcare services for the Minnesota DOC (MNDOC). MPCH provides medical and mental healthcare services for the Massachusetts DOC (MADOC). These DOCs are currently defendants in six federal class action lawsuits filed between 2010 and 2015 on behalf of incarcerated individuals. Those lawsuits are: Dunn v. Thomas (Dunn), No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM; DePriest v. Walnut Grove Correctional Authority (DePriest), No. 3:10-cv-663 DPJ-FKB; Dockery v. Epps (Dockery), No. 3:13-cv-326-TSL-JMR; Ligons v. Minnesota Department of Corrections (Ligons), No. 15-cv-2210, PJT/BT; Paszko v. O’Brien (Paszko), No. 1:15-cv-12298-NMG; and Briggs v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections (Briggs), No. 1:15-cv-40162-GAO. Each of these lawsuits seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorney’s fees. Both the MNDOC and Centurion-MN are defendants in Ligons. Both the MADOC and MPCH are defendants in Paszko and Briggs. The ADOC is a defendant in Dunn and the MSDOC is a defendant in DePriest and Dockery. MHM and Centurion-MS are not named defendants in Dunn, DePriest, or […]

Dexter v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Concord (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-142-15)

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1844 Appeals Court MICHAEL DEXTER vs. SUPERINTENDENT, MASSACHUSETTS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, CONCORD. No. 13-P-1844. Middlesex. March 9, 2015. – September 11, 2015. Present: Green, Trainor, & Carhart, JJ. Imprisonment, Enforcement of discipline. Administrative Law, Regulations. Regulation. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 10, 2012. The case was heard by Peter B. Krupp, J., on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and a motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment was considered by him. Joan T. Kennedy for the defendant. TRAINOR, J. The plaintiff, Michael Dexter, was a pretrial detainee in custody at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord (MCI-Concord) for at least part of 2012.[1] The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration concerning the property that pretrial detainees are allowed to possess at MCI-Concord. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. A Superior Court judge denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, entering a declaratory judgment stating: “103 C.M.R. 403, et seq., shall apply to inmates awaiting trial at MCI-Concord and no such inmate awaiting trial shall be considered a ‘transient inmate’ within the definition of that phrase in 103 C.M.R. 403.06.” The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, or in the alternative, to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. This appeal followed. On appeal we are asked to determine the proper interpretation and application of the inmate property regulation as it applies to pretrial detainees.[2] Prison administrators are permitted “considerable discretion in the adoption and implementation of prison policies.” Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 425, 427 (1983). “However, the limits of such discretion are established by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction. Once an agency has seen fit to promulgate regulations, it must comply with those regulations. [A]gency regulations have the force of law.” Ibid. (citations omitted). Here, the Department of Correction is bound by its “inmate property” regulation, as promulgated in 103 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 403.00 (2001) (the regulation). The “Applicability” section of the regulation states that it is applicable to “all inmates, whether sentenced or awaiting trial, incarcerated at state correctional institutions.” 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 403.04 (2001) (emphasis supplied). Section 403.04 makes it clear that […]