In the Matter of an Application for a Criminal Complaint (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-088-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReportersjc.state.ma.us SJC-12062 IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. May 25, 2017. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Complaint, Standing. Police Officer. The petitioner appeals from a judgment of the county court denying her petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm the judgment. The petitioner, who was a Boston police officer, filed an application for a criminal complaint in the West Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court (BMC), alleging that the respondent, her supervisor, committed an assault and battery against her. The respondent was the commander of the police station falling within that court’s jurisdiction. After a hearing, a clerk-magistrate denied the application for lack of probable cause. G. L. c. 218, § 35A. The petitioner moved for reconsideration and change of venue. The application was transferred to the Charlestown Division of the BMC for rehearing by a clerk-magistrate, although it appears that the application was not docketed until almost one year later. The petitioner requested that the matter be transferred out of Suffolk County to Bristol County. That request was denied. The respondent also requested a new hearing and change of venue on the ground that he had a business relationship with all the divisions of the BMC. As a result, the application was transferred to the Dedham Division of the District Court Department, nearly three years after the application was transferred to the Charlestown Division of the BMC.[1] A clerk-magistrate of that court denied the application, finding no probable cause. The petitioner then filed her G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, seeking both a rehearing on her application and a broader ruling requiring that applications for criminal complaints made against police officers be automatically transferred to a judge outside the police officer’s jurisdiction, rather than being heard by a clerk-magistrate in the first instance. The single justice denied relief without a hearing. We review the single justice’s denial of relief only to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Marides v. Rossi, 446 Mass. 1007, 1007 (2006), citing Restucci v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 1031, 1032 (2004). The petitioner has not demonstrated any error or abuse of discretion as to either of her claims. First, the single justice properly denied the petitioner’s request for a rehearing of her application […]
McCants v. Clerk of Suffolk Superior Court for Criminal Business (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-082-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11263 OWEN McCANTS vs. CLERK OF SUFFOLK SUPERIOR COURT FOR CRIMINAL BUSINESS. May 14, 2013. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Moot Question. Practice, Civil, Moot case. Owen McCants appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court dismissing as moot his petition for a writ of mandamus and for a declaratory judgment. We affirm. A Superior Court jury convicted McCants of several crimes, and the Appeals Court affirmed the convictions. See Commonwealth v. McCants, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2006). McCants thereafter filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. He then filed a notice of appeal, the record was assembled, and the appeal was entered in the Appeals Court, where it remains pending. Then, in April, 2012, he filed a petition in the county court, asserting that the trial court clerk’s office had failed to docket several pleadings that he had filed in that court in connection with the motion for a new trial. In response, the respondent submitted a letter to the county court indicating that the clerk’s office had updated the docket to include the pleadings in question and that the entire record, including those pleadings, had been assembled and forwarded to the Appeals Court. On the basis that McCants had received the relief that he was seeking — the docketing of his pleadings in the trial court — the single justice dismissed the petition as moot. In his appeal from the dismissal of his petition McCants argues that the matter is not moot because the respondent failed to file a timely response to his petition and that she therefore “waived” her right to respond. Regardless whether the respondent’s letter was timely, it was within the court’s discretion to accept it for filing on the date that it was received. As indicated in the letter and reflected in the trial court docket, the pleadings that McCants sought to have docketed had by that time been docketed, apparently in response to McCants’s petition in the county court. Nowhere in the record or in McCants’s appeal to this court does McCants dispute that the pleadings in question have been docketed and included in the record assembled for his appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial. To the extent that McCants […]
Read the Criminal Complaint Against Bombing Suspect Tsarnaev
[Editor’s note: The following is the affadavit of Special Agent Daniel R. Genck, submitted as part of the criminal complaint filed against Boston Marathon bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The document was converted from a PDF and edited only to remove formatting errors.] AFFIDAVIT OF SPECIAL AGENT I, Daniel R. Genck, being duly sworn, depose and state: 1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and have been so employed since 2009. I am currently assigned to one of the Boston Field Office’s Counter-terrorism Squads. Among other things, I am responsible for conducting national security investigations of potential violations of federal criminal laws as a member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”). During my tenure as an agent, I have participated in numerous national security investigations. I have received extensive training and experience in the conduct of national security investigations, and those matters involving domestic and international terrorism. 2. During my employment with the FBI, I have conducted and participated in many investigations involving violations of United States laws relating to the provision of material support to terrorism. I have participated in the execution of numerous federal search and arrest warrants in such investigations. I have had extensive training in many methods used to commit acts of terrorism contrary to United States law. 3. This affidavit is submitted in support of an application for a complaint charging DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV of Cambridge, Massachusetts (“DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV”) with using a weapon of mass destruction against persons and property at the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, resulting in death. More specifically, I submit this affidavit in support of an application for a complaint charging DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV with (1) unlawfully using and conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction (namely, an improvised explosive device) against persons and property within the United States used in interstate and foreign commerce and in an activity that affects interstate and foreign commerce, which offense and its results affected interstate and foreign commerce (including, but not limited to, the Boston Marathon, private businesses in Eastern Massachusetts, and the City of Boston itself), resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2332a; and (2) maliciously damaging and destroying, by means of an explosive, real and personal property used in interstate and foreign commerce and in an activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce, resulting in personal injury and death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(i). 4. This affidavit is based upon my personal involvement in this investigation, my training and experience, my review of relevant evidence, and information supplied to me by other law enforcement officers. It does […]
