Posts tagged "Fargo"

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Comeau (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-143-17)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   16-P-335                                        Appeals Court   WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., trustee,[1]  vs.  NANCY P. COMEAU.     No. 16-P-335.   Essex.     November 3, 2016. – November 15, 2017.   Present:  Agnes, Blake, & Desmond, JJ.     Subrogation.  Mortgage, Priority.  Real Property, Mortgage.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 17, 2013.   The case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Andrew S. Lee for the plaintiff. Gregory N. Eaton for the defendant.     AGNES, J.  Where, as in this case, the doctrine of equitable subrogation is invoked by a mortgagee, it usually refers to a situation in which that party claims that because it has paid the obligation of another person or entity, it is entitled to be put into the shoes of the party it has paid in order to recover from the person or entity that had the obligation.[2]  In the present case, on the other hand, the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustee for WAMU Mortgage Pass Through Certificates Series 2005-PR2 Trust (Wells Fargo), asks us to employ the doctrine of equitable subrogation to impose on a surviving spouse an obligation to pay the balance of a note that her deceased husband was obligated to pay when he refinanced their home in circumstances in which the surviving spouse was a party to neither the note nor the accompanying mortgage.  For the reasons that follow, we reject this novel argument as fundamentally at odds with the framework established by the Supreme Judicial Court in East Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 428 Mass. 327 (1998). Background.  Nancy P. Comeau (Nancy) and her husband, William L. Comeau (William),[3] owned a residence as tenants by the entirety in Groveland (locus), which, as of September 22, 2003, was encumbered by a mortgage to the Haverhill Co-Operative Bank (Haverhill) in the amount of $ 150,000.  Both William and Nancy were mortgagors-grantors on that mortgage to Haverhill, but Nancy was not a signatory to the note.  There is no evidence that Nancy represented, directly or indirectly, that she was bound by the terms of the note.  Two years later, in 2005, William refinanced the 2003 loan by executing a note in his name only to Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (Washington Mutual), in the amount of $ 300,000 secured […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - November 15, 2017 at 4:26 pm

Categories: News   Tags: , , , , , , ,

Jose v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-089-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   15-P-835                                        Appeals Court   TOMAS JOSE  vs.  WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.     No. 15-P-835.   Essex.     May 6, 2016. – July 22, 2016.   Present:  Cohen, Green, & Hanlon, JJ.     Mortgage, Foreclosure.  Real Property, Mortgage.  Administrative Law, Agency’s interpretation of regulation.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 5, 2012.   The case was heard by Thomas Drechsler, J., on a motion for summary judgment.     Thomas J. Gleason for the plaintiff. David Fialkow for the defendant.     GREEN, J.  Regulations promulgated by the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) require a mortgage lender to conduct a face-to-face meeting with defaulting borrowers before foreclosing on certain federally insured mortgages.  The defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (Wells Fargo), acknowledges that failure to comply with those regulations may serve as a basis to invalidate its foreclosure of the mortgage it held on the plaintiff’s property, but asserts that it qualifies for an exemption.  We conclude that Wells Fargo does not qualify for the exemption from the face-to-face meeting requirement, and reverse so much of the judgment as dismissed that part of the plaintiff’s complaint. Background.  On March 28, 2005, the plaintiff, Tomas Jose, executed a promissory note in the amount of $ 440,002 to refinance a prior mortgage loan on 499 Boston Street in Lynn (property).  To secure the note, Jose granted a mortgage (mortgage) to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), solely as nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns.  The mortgage was insured by the Federal Housing Administration, and incorporated applicable HUD regulations by reference.  More specifically, under par. 9(d) of the mortgage, acceleration or foreclosure of the mortgage is not authorized “if not permitted by regulations of the [HUD] Secretary.”  On February 4, 2009, MERS assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo.  At all relevant times, Wells Fargo serviced Jose’s mortgage loan.  Wells Fargo does not maintain a servicing branch within 200 miles of the property.  However, Wells Fargo does maintain deposit and home loan origination branch offices within 200 miles of the property.  Wells Fargo never scheduled or conducted a face-to-face meeting with Jose to discuss an alternative to foreclosure. Despite the absence of a face-to-face meeting, however, Wells Fargo and Jose entered into several forbearance agreements and three permanent modifications.  Jose breached each […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - July 22, 2016 at 2:56 pm

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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Anderson (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-050-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   14-P-1156                                       Appeals Court   WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., trustee,[1]  vs.  IAN B. ANDERSON. No. 14-P-1156. Bristol.     September 8, 2015. – May 11, 2016.   Present:  Kafker, C.J., Trainor, & Massing, JJ. Mortgage, Assignment, Foreclosure.  Real Property, Mortgage.  Assignment.  Practice, Civil, Standing, Summary judgment, Summary process.  Summary Process.       Summary process.  Complaint filed in the Attleboro Division of the District Court Department on September 1, 2011.   After transfer to the Southeastern Division of the Housing Court Department, the case was heard by Anne Kenney Chaplin, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Thomas B. Vawter for the defendant. David A. Marsocci for the plaintiff.      TRAINOR, J.  The defendant, Ian B. Anderson, former homeowner of property located in Norton and holdover in possession after the bank foreclosed, appeals from a Housing Court judgment granting possession of his former home to plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (bank).  Anderson argues that the judge erroneously granted summary judgment to the bank.  He argues that the judge incorrectly interpreted G. L. c. 183, § 54B, by allowing the bank to rely on certain documents without the need to further substantiate their validity, and that the judge’s interpretation of G. L. c. 183, § 54B, violated his due process rights. Facts.  The following facts are undisputed and are taken from the judge’s memorandum of decision on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment and the summary judgment record. On June 20, 2005, Anderson executed a promissory note and a mortgage in favor of Option One Mortgage Corporation (Option One) using the property as collateral.  The mortgage was recorded in the Bristol County registry of deeds, northern district (Bristol registry). On January 2, 2009, Option One assigned Anderson’s mortgage to the bank.  The assignment of mortgage was recorded in the Bristol registry and included an effective date of August 14, 2007. On October 15, 2010, Sand Canyon Corporation (Sand Canyon), formerly known as Option One, assigned Anderson’s mortgage to the bank.  The assignment of mortgage was recorded in the Bristol registry. After a default by Anderson, the bank through its loan servicer, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., initiated an action in the Land Court on October 25, 2010 under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.  Judgment entered in favor of the bank and it proceeded with the sale of the property in accordance with the mortgage.  On May 5, 2011, the […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - May 11, 2016 at 10:01 pm

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Mack v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-180-15)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   14-P-1963                                       Appeals Court   DEVENIA MACK  vs.  WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., & others.[1] No. 14-P-1963. Worcester.     October 5, 2015. – December 1, 2015.   Present:  Vuono, Carhart, & Sullivan, JJ. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment.  Real Property, Mortgage.  Mortgage, Foreclosure.  Consumer Protection Act, Mortgage of real estate.  Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.  Immunity from suit.  Rules of Professional Conduct.     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 15, 2010.   The case was heard by Brian A. Davis, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Robert M. Mendillo for Harmon Law Offices, P.C., & another. James L. O’Connor, Jr. (Barry M. Altman with him) for the plaintiff.      CARHART, J.  In this mortgage foreclosure action, the plaintiff alleges that Harmon Law Offices, P.C. (Harmon), as counsel for mortgagor Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), and Commonwealth Auction Associates, Inc. (Commonwealth), violated G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2 and 9, and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I (MCRA), by continuing to advertise and schedule foreclosure auctions of her property in violation of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting them from doing so.[2]  Harmon and Commonwealth (together, the defendants) moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the “litigation privilege” immunizes them from civil liability for their actions.  Summary judgment was denied, and the defendants seek interlocutory review.  See Visnick v. Caulfield, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 811 n.4 (2009). We agree that Commonwealth’s actions are not privileged as a matter of law and affirm the order denying Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment.  However, because we conclude that Harmon’s actions are protected by the litigation privilege, we reverse the denial of Harmon’s motion for summary judgment and remand for the entry of summary judgment in Harmon’s favor. Background.  The following material facts are undisputed.  On May 28, 2010, Harmon notified the plaintiff that it had been retained by Wells Fargo to foreclose on her mortgage.  On September 10, 2010, Harmon sent the plaintiff notice pursuant to G. L. c. 244, §§ 14 and 17B, of Wells Fargo’s intent to foreclose on the mortgage and to collect from her any deficiency.  The notice also advised the plaintiff that a mortgage foreclosure sale of her property would take place on October 18, 2010.  On October 13, 2010, the plaintiff’s attorney wrote to Harmon and […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - December 1, 2015 at 8:59 pm

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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cook, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-051-15)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   14-P-381                                        Appeals Court   WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.  vs.  NANCY B. COOK & another.[1] No. 14-P-381. Suffolk.     January 7, 2015. – May 19, 2015.   Present:  Kafker, Meade, & Maldonado, JJ.     Summary Process.  Mortgage, Foreclosure, Acceleration clause.  Real Property, Mortgage.  Regulation.  Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Summary process.       Summary Process.  Complaint filed in the Boston Division of the Housing Court Department on August 6, 2012.   The case was heard by MaryLou Muirhead, J., on motions for summary judgment.     Julia E. Devanthery for the defendants. David E. Fialkow for the plaintiff.     KAFKER, J.  Nancy and Abena Cook appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), in its postforeclosure summary process action against them in the Boston Housing Court.  The Cooks contend that the judge erred in granting summary judgment for Wells Fargo on its claim for possession because (1) the judge should have considered the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Handbook No. 4330.1 REV-5, Administration of Insured Home Mortgages (1994) (HUD Handbook), as interpretive guidance to discern the meaning of the HUD regulations incorporated into the mortgage, and (2) the August 12, 2008, meeting Wells Fargo held at Gillette Stadium for defaulting mortgagors did not satisfy the procedural or substantive requirements set out in the HUD regulations at 24 C.F.R. § 203.604(b) (2008), as the Gillette Stadium event was untimely and did not provide for a face-to-face meeting with a representative of the lender authorized to negotiate modification of payment provisions.  We conclude that the HUD Handbook should have been considered, that the meeting was untimely, and most importantly, that there are material disputed facts regarding whether the meeting satisfied the substantive face-to-face meeting requirements of the HUD regulations.  Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the Boston Housing Court in favor of Wells Fargo.[2] 1.  Background.  The facts, construed in the light most favorable to the Cooks, are as follows.  See DiPietro v. Sipex Corp., 69 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 30 (2007).  In 1971, Nancy Cook purchased property at 38-40 Rosewood Street in Mattapan, and in 2006 became co-owner of the property with her daughter Abena Cook.  In March, 2008, the Cooks refinanced the property with a loan from Fairfield Financial Mortgage Group, Inc.  To secure the loan, the Cooks granted a mortgage, including […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - May 19, 2015 at 4:37 pm

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