Commonwealth v. Figueroa (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-099-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11755 COMMONWEALTH vs. VICTOR FIGUEROA. June 17, 2015. Mayhem. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Practice, Criminal, Duplicative convictions, Lesser included offense. Following a jury trial, the defendant, Victor Figueroa, was convicted of mayhem, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 14, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).[1] The Appeals Court affirmed the convictions, rejecting, among other things, the defendant’s argument that the convictions are duplicative. See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 (2014). The case is now before this court on further appellate review of that limited issue. See 469 Mass. 1110 (2014). Background. We limit our discussion of the facts to those relevant to the duplicative convictions issue, which are as follows. Prior to the attack that led to the convictions, the defendant had been, essentially, stalking the victim. On the morning of March 17, 2005, the victim was riding a bus to work. The defendant was also on the bus, as was the victim’s coworker Silvia Gomez. At their usual stop, the victim and Gomez got off the bus by the front door. The defendant called to the victim and she told him that she had nothing to say to him. The defendant then pulled the victim by her jacket and punched her in the mouth with his hand, striking her twice. The victim became dizzy, felt her face and neck burning, and saw a knife in the defendant’s hand. While the defendant was striking the victim, she tried to run, but the defendant was holding her jacket and arm. Gomez pulled the victim away and they ran toward their office. The victim was subsequently placed in an ambulance and taken to the hospital. As a result of the attack, the victim sustained injuries to her face, neck, ear, and right arm, and has scarring on her face and neck. A police officer who arrived shortly after the attack testified that the victim had at least three lacerations on her face and neck area. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the mayhem charge related to the injuries to the victim’s face and the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury charge related to the […]
Commonwealth v. Figueroa (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-085-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11189 COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD FIGUEROA. Essex. January 10, 2014. ‑ May 19, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Duffly, JJ. Homicide. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Search incident to lawful arrest, Exigent circumstances, Standing to object. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, Presumptions and burden of proof, Deliberation of jury, Question by jury, Verdict, Lesser included offense, Capital case. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Identification, Burden of proof. Due Process of Law, Identification, Burden of proof. Evidence, Identification, Presumptions and burden of proof, Intent, Intoxication. Identification. Jury and Jurors. Intent. Intoxication. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 25, 2008. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Howard J. Whitehead, J.; a second pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J., and the case was tried before him. Donald A. Harwood for the defendant. Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. On the evening of January 31, 2008, the defendant walked into a Lawrence restaurant and shot and killed Luis Alex Alcantara (victim), with whom he had been feuding. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1. On appeal, the defendant raises five claims: (1) that a motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during warrantless entries into two apartments; (2) that a different motion judge erred in denying a motion to suppress a showup identification of the defendant; (3) that the trial judge’s instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires reversal of his conviction; (4) that the judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication; and (5) that the judge erred in furnishing the jury with an instruction in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1, 2-3 (1851) (Tuey–Rodriquez instruction), limited to their consideration of murder in the first degree, in response to a note from the jury asking whether they were a “hung jury” because some jurors “feel it is first degree, some feel it is second degree.” The defendant also contends that we should exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce […]
Commonwealth v. Figueroa (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-023-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11099 COMMONWEALTH vs. LUIS FIGUEROA. Middlesex. October 2, 2012. ‑ February 8, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Parole. Habitual offender. Practice, Criminal, Parole, Required finding. Words, “Criminal proceeding.” Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 1, 2008. The cases were heard by Raymond J. Brassard, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Andrew S. Crouch for the defendant. Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney (David Marc Solet, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. The issue presented on appeal is whether it is a crime under G. L. c. 268, § 13B, as appearing in St. 2006, c. 48, § 3, for a parolee to mislead a parole officer who is investigating the parolee’s possible failure to comply with parole conditions. We conclude that it is, and therefore affirm the defendant’s convictions. Background. In October, 2007, the defendant was on parole from his State prison sentence for armed robbery, and on probation for his conviction of rape of a child. Among the conditions of the defendant’s parole were that he not go to areas where children under eighteen years of age would congregate, that he not enter into a relationship with someone who had children without informing his parole officer, that he wear a global positioning system (GPS) monitoring unit that recorded his whereabouts at all times, and that he keep a calendar recording where he went each day. On October 29, 2007, the defendant’s parole officer, Kathryn Kozak, informed the defendant that he was not to leave his home in Marlborough after 6 P.M. on Halloween night, October 31, 2007, and was not to participate in any Halloween activities. On November 1, 2007, Kozak checked the defendant’s GPS location from the previous night and determined that he had been to Framingham after 6 P.M. When she called him to ask why he had gone to Framingham, the defendant stated that he had taken a bus there to attend a meeting of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). Kozak determined from GPS records that, while in Framingham, the defendant had been at an apartment complex two to three miles away from the location where he claimed he had attended the AA […]
Commonwealth v. Figueroa (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-021-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11‑P‑833 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CARMEN FIGUEROA. No. 11‑P‑833. Hampden. July 13, 2012. ‑ February 6, 2013. Present: Grainger, Brown, & Sullivan, JJ. Reckless endangerment of a child. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury. Evidence, Medical record, Prior misconduct. Constitutional Law, Vagueness of statute. Due Process of Law, Vagueness of statute. Witness, Bias. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 30, 2008. The case was tried before C. Brian McDonald, J. Mary H. Patryn for the defendant. Dianne M. Dillon, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BROWN, J. After a joint trial in Superior Court, a jury convicted the defendant of reckless endangerment of a child in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13L, and sentenced her to a two-year term of probation.[1] On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction; (2) the jury instructions were flawed; (3) medical records admitted at trial improperly included prior bad act evidence; and (4) the statute under which she was convicted is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the circumstances of her case. At trial there was no dispute that the six month old victim suffered a complex skull fracture and multiple other injuries to his head and eyes as the result of physical abuse. The charges against the defendant stem from her failure to obtain medical care for the victim (her grandson) after he was dropped on a tile floor and struck his head. We summarize the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, focusing on evidence relevant to the defendant’s attack on the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s case and reserving certain details for our discussion. 1. Background. The victim and his twin brother were born on August 28, 2007, to the defendant’s daughter, Mary.[2] Mary was fourteen years old when she became pregnant. About six months before Mary gave birth, she returned to Chicopee from out-of-State to live with the defendant. Also living in the home were the defendant’s boyfriend, the codefendant, Raphael Cruz; Mary’s younger brother; and Mary’s five year old niece. When the twins were born, the defendant named one child Thad, and the codefendant named the other David.[3],[4] The defendant made almost all of Mary’s decisions involving her life, including […]