Rona v. Greene, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-058-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV03366-BLS2 ____________________ ILYAS J. RONA v. THOMAS M. GREENE, MICHAEL TABB, GREENE LLP, and GREENE & HOFFMAN, P.C. ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ALLOWING MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADGINS ON THE WAGE ACT CLAIMS Ilyas Rona is a lawyer. He worked for and with Thomas Greene and Michael Tabb from 1998 through September 2012, first as an employee of the law firm Greene & Hoffman P.C. and then as a partner at the successor firm Greene LLP. Mr. Rona claims that he is owed a share of a $ 23.25 million fee that Greene LLP collected in 2015. More specifically, Rona claims that he is entitled to 20 percent of that fee because he had a contractual right to 20 percent of all profits of Greene LLP. In the alternative, and to the extent that Defendants assert that a portion of this fee is attributable to the period before 2009 when Rona was employed by Greene & Hoffman, Rona claims that he has a contractual right to be paid 10 percent of that portion of the fee and that Greene & Hoffman, Greene, and Tabb are liable under the Massachusetts Wage Act (G.L. c. 149, §§ 148 & 150) for failing to pay Rona a 10 percent share of the 2015 fee. Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings in their favor on the Wage Act claims in Counts XII and XIII. The Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the Wage Act claims and will therefore allow the motion.1 Rona alleges that he was entitled to receive 10 percent of any fee earned at any time for any case that Rona worked on while employed by Greene & Hoffman, including the Neurontin class action that ultimately generated $ 23.25 million in income for Greene LLP. In other words, the payment that Rona claims he is now owed 1 Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is governed by the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Health and Human Svcs., 463 Mass. 447, 450 (2012); Welch v. Sudbury Youth Soccer Ass’n, Inc., 453 Mass. 352, 353-354 (2009). – 2 – was contingent upon Greene & Hoffman (or its successor, as Rona alleges) someday collecting a fee for a case on which Rona worked. According to Rona, that contingency did not come about until 2015, almost three years after Rona stopped worked for Greene LLP. Rona’s counsel conceded at oral argument that the unpaid amount that […]
Matter of Greene (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-184-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11935 MATTER OF EVAN A. GREENE. December 2, 2016. Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension. The respondent attorney, Evan A. Greene, appeals from the order of a single justice of this court indefinitely suspending him from the practice of law.[1] We affirm. Background. Bar counsel filed an amended three-count petition for discipline with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) against the respondent arising out of his participation in certain residential mortgage foreclosure “rescue transactions” during 2005 and 2006. At the time, the respondent worked with his father, Attorney Barry D. Greene, at a law firm specializing in real estate transactions.[2] Count one of the petition described seven similar transactions. In each instance, a mortgage broker referred to the Greenes a homeowner who had either defaulted on a mortgage or was facing foreclosure, or both, but who had substantial equity in the property. The broker was paid a referral fee. The respondent (or his father) arranged for financing to purchase the property, and then entered into a purchase and sale agreement with the homeowner. The respondent (or his father) also entered into a lease with the former owner, whereby he or she could remain in the property, and a one-year option-to-repurchase agreement. In most cases, the lease payments exceeded the amount of the monthly mortgage payments. In addition, each option agreement required the homeowner to pay a nonrefundable fee ranging from $ 27,000 to $ 50,000. All of the homeowners defaulted on their monthly payments; only one homeowner exercised the option to repurchase. According to the petition for discipline, the respondent personally or through an associate made various misrepresentations on mortgage applications; misrepresented the terms of the transactions on HUD-1 settlement statements; executed and delivered false documents to the lender; and failed to notify the lender of the existence of the lease and option agreements. The petition additionally alleged that, by directing or permitting on more than one occasion an associate attorney of his firm to represent the lender in a transaction in which one of the Greenes was a borrower, without the lender’s consent, the respondent engaged in conflicts of interest. Count two of the petition alleged that the respondent had been convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on twelve counts of violation of 12 […]