Posts tagged "Holyoke"

Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem, et al. v. Vibram USA, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-031-17)

1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2321 BLS1 HOLYOKE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY IN SALEM and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY vs. VIBRAM USA, INC. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON RECOUPMENT AND RECOVERY OF DEFENSE COSTS INTRODUCTION This action arises out of a coverage dispute between the plaintiff insurance companies, Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem (Holyoke)1 and Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland) (individually an Insurer, and collectively the Insurers), and the defendant, Vibram USA, Inc. (Vibram). Each of the insurers issued commercial general liability policies to Vibram (or its affiliate) (the Policies).2 An action was filed against Vibram in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Tacoma captioned: Tefere Abebe Bikila, and others, v. Vibram, case no. 3:15-cv-05082-RBL (the Underlying Action). Vibram asserted coverage under the Policies and tendered defense of the Underlying Action to the Insurers. The 1 Holyoke has been replaced as a plaintiff in this action by its successor, Country Mutual Insurance Company. For consistency, the court will continue to refer to it as Holyoke in this Memorandum of Decision and Order. 2 Holyoke issued policies to Vibram for several years, while Maryland issued policies to an affiliate of Vibram,Vibram Five Fingers, LLC. It is not necessary to distinguish between Vibram and its affiliate for the purposes of this motion, and the court will refer to them collectively as Vibram. Additionally, for purposes of this motion the relevant policy language in all of the policies is identical, and is it also unnecessary to distinguish among policy years. The court will therefore simply refer to the Holyoke and Maryland policies collectively as the Policies. 2 Insurers each sent a “reservation of rights” letter to Vibram in which they agreed to provide its defense to the claims asserted in the Underlying Action, but also maintained that coverage did not exist under the Policies and reserved their rights to bring a declaratory judgment action and seek reimbursement for defense costs advanced. The Insurers then filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the claims asserted against Vibram in the Underlying Action are not covered under the Policies; Vibram counterclaimed for a declaration that they are. In a Memorandum of Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment originally issued on August 17, 2016 (the Decision), this court held that the Policies do not provide coverage for the claims asserted against Vibram in the Underlying Action and, accordingly, there is no duty to defend. The case is now before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment addressing the issues of recoupment of defense costs advanced or, conversely, recovery of defense costs incurred before […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 6, 2017 at 5:20 am

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Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Sale,, et al. v. Vibram USA, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-031-17)

1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2321 BLS1 HOLYOKE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY IN SALEM and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY vs. VIBRAM USA, INC. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON RECOUPMENT AND RECOVERY OF DEFENSE COSTS INTRODUCTION This action arises out of a coverage dispute between the plaintiff insurance companies, Holyoke Mutual Insurance Company in Salem (Holyoke)1 and Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland) (individually an Insurer, and collectively the Insurers), and the defendant, Vibram USA, Inc. (Vibram). Each of the insurers issued commercial general liability policies to Vibram (or its affiliate) (the Policies).2 An action was filed against Vibram in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington at Tacoma captioned: Tefere Abebe Bikila, and others, v. Vibram, case no. 3:15-cv-05082-RBL (the Underlying Action). Vibram asserted coverage under the Policies and tendered defense of the Underlying Action to the Insurers. The 1 Holyoke has been replaced as a plaintiff in this action by its successor, Country Mutual Insurance Company. For consistency, the court will continue to refer to it as Holyoke in this Memorandum of Decision and Order. 2 Holyoke issued policies to Vibram for several years, while Maryland issued policies to an affiliate of Vibram,Vibram Five Fingers, LLC. It is not necessary to distinguish between Vibram and its affiliate for the purposes of this motion, and the court will refer to them collectively as Vibram. Additionally, for purposes of this motion the relevant policy language in all of the policies is identical, and is it also unnecessary to distinguish among policy years. The court will therefore simply refer to the Holyoke and Maryland policies collectively as the Policies. 2 Insurers each sent a “reservation of rights” letter to Vibram in which they agreed to provide its defense to the claims asserted in the Underlying Action, but also maintained that coverage did not exist under the Policies and reserved their rights to bring a declaratory judgment action and seek reimbursement for defense costs advanced. The Insurers then filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the claims asserted against Vibram in the Underlying Action are not covered under the Policies; Vibram counterclaimed for a declaration that they are. In a Memorandum of Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment originally issued on August 17, 2016 (the Decision), this court held that the Policies do not provide coverage for the claims asserted against Vibram in the Underlying Action and, accordingly, there is no duty to defend. The case is now before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment addressing the issues of recoupment of defense costs advanced or, conversely, recovery of defense costs incurred before […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - April 3, 2017 at 4:31 pm

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MacLaurin, et al. v. City of Holyoke, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-130-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-11865 SJC-11866   ROBERT MacLAURIN[1] & another[2]  vs.  CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.[3]   ROBERT MacLAURIN[4] & another[5]  vs.  CITY OF HOLYOKE & others.[6]       Hampden.     September 10, 2015. – August 18, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[7]     Fire Prevention.  Practice, Civil, Action in nature of certiorari.  Administrative Law, Hearing.       Civil actions commenced in the Hampden Division of the Superior Court Department on April 26, 2012, and May 14, 2012, respectively.   After transfer to the Western Division of the Housing Court Department and consolidation, the case was heard by Robert Fields, J., on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.   The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court.     Thomas D. Moore for the plaintiffs. Kara Lamb Cunha for the defendants. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jason R. Ferenc for Greater Holyoke Rental Housing Association Joseph N. Schneiderman for Fire Chiefs Association of Massachusetts. Maura Healey, Attorney General, Benjamin K. Golden, Assistant Attorney General, Steven P. Rourke, Special Assistant Attorney General, & Peter Senopoulos for the State Fire Marshal.     LENK, J.  We are called upon in these consolidated cases to construe G. L. c. 148, § 26I, the residential sprinkler provision, one of a number of provisions requiring the installation of automatic sprinkler systems contained in G. L. c. 148, the fire prevention act.  The residential sprinkler provision mandates the installation of automatic sprinklers in new residential buildings of four or more units, and in such existing buildings when they are “substantially rehabilitated so as to constitute the equivalent of new construction.”  See G. L. c. 148, § 26I. In 2006, the plaintiff, Robert MacLaurin,[8] purchased the second of two vacant apartment buildings in the city of Holyoke (city), which he intended to rehabilitate and return to occupancy.  As existing residential buildings of four or more units, the buildings were subject to the residential sprinkler provision.  MacLaurin contends that the renovations he undertook on the buildings do not meet the statutory standard triggering the requirement that sprinklers be installed.  Concluding, to the contrary, that the two buildings had been substantially rehabilitated within the meaning of the residential sprinkler provision, the city’s fire chief ordered, without a hearing, that automatic sprinkler systems be installed in each building. The residential […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - August 18, 2016 at 2:32 pm

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Charbonneau v. Presiding Justice of the Holyoke Division of the District Court Department (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-009-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us   SJC-11908   JOSHUA CHARBONNEAU  vs.  PRESIDING JUSTICE OF THE HOLYOKE DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT.       Suffolk.     October 8, 2015. – January 22, 2016.   Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.     Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.  District Court.  Practice, Criminal, Plea.  Statute, Construction.       Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 13, 2015.   The case was reported by Botsford, J.     Paul R. Rudof, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him) for the plaintiff. Susanne G. Reardon, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. William C. Newman, Chauncey B. Wood, & Joseph N. Schneiderman, for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.   HINES, J.  In this appeal, we determine whether a standing  order of the Holyoke Division of the District Court Department (Holyoke District Court), prohibiting the tender of a so-called “defendant-capped” plea on the day of trial, contravenes the guilty plea procedure mandated in G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12, as appearing in 442 Mass. 1511 (2004).  Joshua Charbonneau, who stands charged in the Holyoke District Court with larceny over $ 250, challenges the standing order on statutory and constitutional grounds.  He contends that the standing order violates his right to tender a defendant-capped plea at any time prior to trial because neither G. L. c. 278, § 18, nor Mass. R. Crim. P. 12 imposes a time limit on such tenders.  He also asserts that the judicially imposed time limit unconstitutionally burdens his right to due process.  We conclude that the standing order conflicts with and impairs a  defendant’s right to tender a defendant-capped plea as provided in G. L. c. 278, § 18, and Mass. R. Crim. P. 12.  Consequently, we vacate the standing order on that ground and bypass Charbonneau’s constitutional claim.[1] 1.  Background.  On February 19, 2015, the presiding justice of the Holyoke District Court[2] (presiding justice) promulgated a standing order applicable to trials beginning with the June, 2015, jury-of-six session.  In accordance with the standing order, a defendant who intended to proffer a defendant-capped plea was required to do so at the final pretrial status conference which, in the Holyoke District Court, is scheduled for the Wednesday two weeks prior to […]

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Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - January 22, 2016 at 6:02 pm

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