J.H. v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-055-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12395 J.H. vs. COMMONWEALTH. Suffolk. December 7, 2017. – April 12, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice, Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Transfer hearing, Lesser included offense, Delay in commencement of prosecution. Due Process of Law, Notice. Notice. Rape. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on July 3, 2017. The case was reported by Lenk, J. Thomas A. Dougherty, III, for the juvenile. Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Afton M. Templin, for Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Service, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. KAFKER, J. A single justice of the county court reserved and reported this case involving the transfer of certain charges from the Juvenile Court to adult court pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 72A. In September, 2014, juvenile delinquency complaints were issued against the defendant for the crime of rape of a child with force (three counts) arising out of incidents that occurred seven years earlier when the defendant was sixteen years old and the complainant was thirteen years old. Because the defendant was not “apprehended” according to the statute until after his nineteenth birthday, he could not be tried in the Juvenile Court. The judge was faced with discharging the defendant or transferring the charges to adult court. After a hearing she dismissed the offenses charged for lack of probable cause but transferred the lesser included offenses, statutory rape. The defendant filed a petition for relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. In her reservation and report, the single justice posed two questions to the full court: “1. Whether G. L. c. 119, § 72A, permits a Juvenile Court judge, who has dismissed an offense charged for lack of probable cause, to order a defendant to be tried in an adult court for lesser included offenses, where the lesser included offenses are supported by probable cause. “2. Whether, if the statute so permits, its application against this defendant would be unconstitutional for failure to have provided him with proper notice of the charges pending against him or the possibility of such a transfer.” We conclude that G. L. c. 119, § 72A, permits a Juvenile Court judge to transfer lesser included offenses […]
J.C. v. J.H. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-119-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1612 Appeals Court J.C. vs. J.H.[1] No. 15-P-1612. Essex. November 14, 2016. – September 14, 2017. Present: Sullivan, Maldonado, & Neyman, JJ. Civil Harassment. Harassment Prevention. Protective Order. Statute, Construction. Evidence, Intent, Presumptions and burden of proof. Practice, Civil, Burden of proof, Presumptions and burden of proof. Firearms. Complaint for protection from harassment filed in the Lynn Division of the District Court Department on October 14, 2014. A hearing to extend the harassment prevention order was had before Albert S. Conlon, J. J.H., pro se. Christine I. Wetzel for the plaintiff. SULLIVAN, J. The defendant, J.H., appeals from a civil harassment prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 258E.[2] He contends that his former girl friend, the plaintiff, J.C., did not prove three or more acts of harassment as defined by G. L. c. 258E, § 1. He further contends that the judge was without authority to order the surrender of his firearms. For the reasons that follow, we vacate so much of the order as required the defendant to surrender his firearms. Background. We summarize the facts consistent with the judge’s findings and rulings based on the affidavits filed and the testimony given at the hearing on the extension of the harassment prevention order. The defendant initiated a relationship with the plaintiff in August of 2010 after meeting her at an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meeting. The plaintiff ended their relationship in April of 2013. After the relationship ended, the defendant made the plaintiff “very uncomfortable.” The plaintiff changed her activities to avoid him. She did so because he was “pushy” and “suggested [they] get together for sex,” even though she said no and repeatedly stated the relationship was over. She attended a different AA meeting and switched to a different yoga studio than the one she had frequented when she was with the defendant. The defendant continued to contact the plaintiff. He sent her text messages, and she responded that she wanted to be left alone. In July of 2013, the plaintiff received a series of text messages from the defendant.[3] In the first message, the defendant texted, “You should be scared. I know where you practice yoga. See you at yoga, bitch!” The plaintiff asked him not to contact her, and sought the assistance of the police, who […]