St. Laurent, et al. v. Middleborough Gas & Electric Department (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-039-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 17-P-835 Appeals Court ALLISON ST. LAURENT & another[1] vs. MIDDLEBOROUGH GAS & ELECTRIC DEPARTMENT. No. 17-P-835. April 4, 2018. Municipal Corporations, Municipal electric plant, Governmental immunity. Middleborough. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Statute, Construction. Middleborough Gas & Electric Department (MGED) appeals from a Superior Court order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of presentment. The motion judge denied the motion on the ground that MGED is not a “public employer” subject to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, and thus the presentment requirement of G. L. c. 258, § 4, did not apply. We disagree and remand so that the Superior Court can address whether the presentment requirement was satisfied on the facts here. Background.[2] The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs were injured in October, 2013, when a ladder they were near came into contact with an “arc[ing]” electrical current. They claim that the current came from an “improperly grounded” line maintained by MGED, and that MGED was negligent. Between November, 2013, and July, 2015, and prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs’ attorney communicated with representatives of MGED multiple times, both orally and in writing. Eventually efforts at presuit resolution failed, and the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on April 19, 2016. MGED filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to make presentment as required by the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G. L. c. 258, § 4. The plaintiffs responded (1) that no presentment was required because MGED is not a “public employer” as defined in G. L. c. 258, § 1, as amended by St. 1993, c. 110, § 227, and thus the Tort Claims Act does not apply and (2) that in any event the plaintiffs had satisfied the presentment requirement through correspondence with representatives of MGED. The motion judge denied MGED’s motion on the ground that MGED was not a public employer, but rather was a “commercial business.” Discussion. The question before us turns on the definition of “public employer,” found at c. 258, § 1, which provides that “public employer” includes “any . . . town . . . and any department . . . thereof . . . including a municipal gas or electric plant.” In construing a statute we begin with its plain language, and we think the language here admits of only one interpretation. See Commonwealth v. Stewart-Johnson, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 592, 600 (2011) (“A statute is to be interpreted according […]
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Care and Protection of Laurent (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-005-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-189 Appeals Court CARE AND PROTECTION OF LAURENT.[1] No. 14-P-189. Middlesex. September 5, 2014. – January 9, 2015. Present: Green, Graham, & Katzmann, JJ. Minor, Care and protection. Parent and Child, Care and protection of minor. Practice, Civil, Care and protection proceeding, Findings by judge. Petition filed in the Middlesex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on October 17, 2011. The case was heard by Kenneth J. King, J. David J. Cohen, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the mother. Richard A. Salcedo for Department of Children and Families. Julia A.B. Pearson for the child. GRAHAM, J. On October, 17, 2011, the Department of Children and Families (department) filed a care and protection petition in the Middlesex County Division of the Juvenile Court Department pursuant to G. L. c. 119 § 24, alleging Laurent was a child in need of care and protection. On that day, the trial court judge granted temporary emergency custody of Laurent to the department. The department later placed him in foster care, where he remained through the conclusion of the trial. Trial on the department’s petition occurred over seven non-consecutive days, beginning on November 1, 2012, and concluding on January 3, 2013. On February 21, 2013, the judge found the mother unfit, essentially, on the basis that she was too cognitively limited to parent the child. Accordingly, the child was committed to the custody of the department, with reunification as the plan. On appeal, the mother contends that the judge’s findings regarding her parenting deficiencies, taken as a whole, do not support a conclusion that the child was at risk of serious harm, and thus in need of care and protection.[2] We agree with mother and, accordingly, reverse the judgment. 1. Background. We summarize the material facts from the judge’s extensive findings, which are supported by the evidence, and essentially undisputed. Laurent is one of five children born to the mother, who was forty years old at time of trial. The mother experienced significant trauma and neglect as a child. As a child, the mother contracted lead poisoning, which resulted in severe developmental disabilities. In addition, the mother sustained a skull fracture when she was eight years old. When she was fourteen, she was placed in department custody due to abuse and neglect. She was […]