Matter of Greene (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-184-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11935 MATTER OF EVAN A. GREENE. December 2, 2016. Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension. The respondent attorney, Evan A. Greene, appeals from the order of a single justice of this court indefinitely suspending him from the practice of law.[1] We affirm. Background. Bar counsel filed an amended three-count petition for discipline with the Board of Bar Overseers (board) against the respondent arising out of his participation in certain residential mortgage foreclosure “rescue transactions” during 2005 and 2006. At the time, the respondent worked with his father, Attorney Barry D. Greene, at a law firm specializing in real estate transactions.[2] Count one of the petition described seven similar transactions. In each instance, a mortgage broker referred to the Greenes a homeowner who had either defaulted on a mortgage or was facing foreclosure, or both, but who had substantial equity in the property. The broker was paid a referral fee. The respondent (or his father) arranged for financing to purchase the property, and then entered into a purchase and sale agreement with the homeowner. The respondent (or his father) also entered into a lease with the former owner, whereby he or she could remain in the property, and a one-year option-to-repurchase agreement. In most cases, the lease payments exceeded the amount of the monthly mortgage payments. In addition, each option agreement required the homeowner to pay a nonrefundable fee ranging from $ 27,000 to $ 50,000. All of the homeowners defaulted on their monthly payments; only one homeowner exercised the option to repurchase. According to the petition for discipline, the respondent personally or through an associate made various misrepresentations on mortgage applications; misrepresented the terms of the transactions on HUD-1 settlement statements; executed and delivered false documents to the lender; and failed to notify the lender of the existence of the lease and option agreements. The petition additionally alleged that, by directing or permitting on more than one occasion an associate attorney of his firm to represent the lender in a transaction in which one of the Greenes was a borrower, without the lender’s consent, the respondent engaged in conflicts of interest. Count two of the petition alleged that the respondent had been convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on twelve counts of violation of 12 […]
In the Matter of Diviacchi (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-172-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12025 IN THE MATTER OF VALERIANO DIVIACCHI. November 2, 2016. Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension, Contingent fee agreement, Attorney-client relationship. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Administrative Law, Substantial evidence. Board of Bar Overseers. The respondent, Valeriano Diviacchi, appeals from an order of a single justice of this court suspending him from the practice of law for twenty-seven months, as recommended by the Board of Bar Overseers (board). We affirm. Procedural background. Bar counsel filed a petition for discipline with the board, alleging that Diviacchi committed the following violations of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct: (a) failure to explain to the client contingent fee agreement provisions not contained in Forms A or B of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (f), as appearing in 459 Mass. 1301 (2011), and to obtain the client’s informed consent to these provisions, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (f); (b) limitation of representation of the client, failure to seek the client’s lawful objectives, and failure to represent the client competently and diligently, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, 426 Mass. 1308 (1998); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a), 426 Mass. 1310 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, 426 Mass. 1313 (1998); (c) false statements of material fact to the United States District Court and the Boston Municipal Court, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (a) (1), 426 Mass. 1383 (1998); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (c), 426 Mass. 1429 (1998); and (d) attempting to charge and collect a clearly excessive fee, in violation of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (a), as appearing in 459 Mass. 1301 (2011).[1] Diviacchi denied any violation of the disciplinary rules. After an evidentiary hearing, a hearing committee found all the violations charged by bar counsel, found no mitigating factors and several aggravating factors, and recommended that Diviacchi be suspended from the practice of law for fifteen months. The respondent appealed to the board, which adopted the hearing committee’s findings and made some additional findings. The board filed an information in the county court recommending that Diviacchi be suspended for twenty-seven months. After a hearing, the single justice adopted the board’s recommendation and entered an order of term suspension. Factual background. The single justice summarized the following relevant findings made by the hearing committee […]
In the Matter of E.C. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-095-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-964 Appeals Court IN THE MATTER OF E.C. No. 15-P-964. Plymouth. May 11, 2016. – August 3, 2016. Present: Grainger, Meade, & Hanlon, JJ. Incompetent Person, Commitment. Practice, Civil, Civil commitment. Petition for civil commitment filed in the Brockton Division of the District Court Department on March 4, 2013. The case was heard by Beverly J. Cannone, J., and a motion for reconsideration was also heard by her. Edward J. O’Donnell for the petitioner. Joseph A. Robinson, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the respondent. MEADE, J. Following a hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 16(b), a judge of the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department (BMC) found E.C. incompetent to stand trial and committed him to Bridgewater State Hospital (BSH) for six months. After the § 16(b) commitment expired and the 2 underlying criminal charges against E.C. were dismissed, a judge of the Brockton Division of the District Court Department (Brockton District Court) denied BSH’s timely petition to extend the commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 16(c). The judge also denied BSH’s motion to amend that petition to one pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 and 8, seeking continued civil commitment of a mentally ill person whose discharge from BSH would create a likelihood of serious harm. The Appellate Division of the District Court affirmed. On appeal, BSH claims error in the denial of the original and amended petitions. We reverse. Background. The material facts are not in dispute. On May 30, 2012, E.C. was charged in the BMC with malicious destruction of property having a value greater than $ 250 in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 127. Following a hearing pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15(a), a judge ordered E.C. hospitalized pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15(b), in order to evaluate his competency to stand trial. Based on the resulting § 15(b) report, the judge on August 7, 2012, found E.C. incompetent to stand trial. Thereafter, pursuant to BSH’s G. L. c. 123, § 16(b), petition, E.C. was committed to BSH for six months.1 1 General Laws c. 123, § 16(b), as amended by St. 1992, c. 286, § 190, states in pertinent part: “During the period of observation of a person believed to be incompetent to stand trial or within sixty days after a person […]
In the Matter of Weiss (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-039-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11890 IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD S. WEISS. March 17, 2016. Attorney at Law, Suspension, Reinstatement. The petitioner, Richard S. Weiss, appeals from the judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for reinstatement to the bar. We affirm. After Weiss “stipulated to facts warranting the conclusion that he violated the applicable disciplinary rules,” see Matter of Weiss, 460 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2011), he was suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, effective May 20, 2011. His first petition for reinstatement was denied by a single justice of this court in 2013, and he was given leave to reapply for reinstatement on or after January 1, 2014. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (8), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). He filed a second petition for reinstatement on June 25, 2013. The single justice denied the petition without prejudice to filing a new petition on or after January 1, 2014. The petition he filed thereafter, his third, is the subject of this appeal. On October 23, 2014, a hearing committee of the Board of Bar Overseers (board) held a hearing, at which Weiss was represented by counsel, on his third petition. The committee issued a report on December 2, 2014, setting forth its findings and recommending that the petition for reinstatement be denied. On February 22, 2015, the board voted unanimously to adopt the report of the hearing committee and its recommendation that the petition be denied. A single justice of this court reviewed the record before the hearing committee and the board, concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the findings, and denied the petition for reinstatement.[1] The case is now before us on Weiss’s preliminary memorandum, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 471 Mass. 1303 (2015). That rule requires an appellant to “set forth the relevant background and summarize the appellant’s arguments on appeal, with citations to applicable authority. It is incumbent on the appellant to demonstrate in this memorandum that there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the single justice; that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence; that the sanction is markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in other cases involving similar circumstances; or that for other reasons the decision will result in […]
In the Matter of Chalupowski (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-191-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11548 IN THE MATTER OF MALGORZATA CHALUPOWSKI. December 1, 2015. Attorney at Law, Admission to practice, Bar application. Supreme Judicial Court, Membership in the bar. Practice, Civil, Membership in the bar. On May 16, 2008, Malgorzata Chalupowski applied for admission to the Massachusetts bar. She took and passed the written bar examination in July, 2008. After reviewing the disclosures included in her application, the Board of Bar Examiners (board) requested a meeting to address certain areas of concern. Chalupowski attended an informal meeting with the board in November, 2008, after which the board notified her that it was going to conduct a hearing to determine whether she “is of good moral character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications” for admission to the bar. G. L. c. 221, § 37. See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.1, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). The board then appointed a special counsel to conduct an investigation prior to the hearing, which included, among other things, meeting with Chalupowski, interviewing various individuals regarding Chalupowski’s character and fitness to practice law, and reviewing numerous documents and other materials. The special counsel submitted a report to the board in August, 2009, and a formal hearing was held in May, 2010. In January, 2011, the board issued its report of nonqualification, concluding that Chalupowski was “lacking in the requisite good moral character, acquirements and qualifications to warrant admission to the bar,” and directing that her application be dismissed unless, within sixty days, she sought relief from this court and a hearing was ordered. See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.3, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). Chalupowski timely appealed to a single justice of this court who, after a hearing, ordered that her application for admission to the bar be dismissed. Chalupowski now appeals from the single justice’s decision. We agree with the board, and the single justice, that her application for admission to the bar should be dismissed. 1. Background. The board’s decision includes thorough and extensive findings of fact and a well-reasoned discussion of why Chalupowski is not qualified to be admitted to the bar. The single justice, in turn, also issued a detailed and well-reasoned decision. We summarize here only some of the facts detailed by the board, focusing, in particular, on those facts relevant to the board’s two main concerns — Chalupowski’s lack of candor […]
In the Matter of G.P. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-179-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11911 IN THE MATTER OF G.P. Suffolk. September 10, 2015. – November 5, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Practice, Civil, Civil commitment, Standard of proof, Hearsay, Appeal, Moot case. Uniform Trial Court Rules for Civil Commitment Proceedings. Moot Question. Words, “Likelihood of serious harm,” “Very substantial risk.” Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on June 1, 2015. The case was reported by Lenk, J. Ann Grant (Robert H. Weber with her) for the petitioner. Julia Kobick, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent. Sandra J. Staub & Robert D. Fleischner, for Mental Health Legal Advisors & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. We consider here questions concerning proceedings under G. L. c. 123, § 35 (§ 35), a statute that authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person, for care and treatment, where there is a likelihood of serious harm as a result of the person’s alcoholism or substance abuse, or both. In May, 2015, a District Court judge ordered G.P., the petitioner, committed pursuant to § 35 to the Women’s Addiction Treatment Center (WATC), a facility operated by the Department of Public Health. After an unsuccessful appeal of the commitment order to the Appellate Division of the District Court, G.P. filed a petition for relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, to challenge and vacate the order. A single justice reserved and reported the case. G.P. is no longer committed to the facility, rendering moot her challenge to the order of commitment. See Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 103 (2000) (Baker). Nevertheless, we decide the case because it raises important issues concerning the operation of § 35 as well as the Uniform Trial Court Rules for Civil Commitment Proceedings for Alcohol and Substance Abuse (uniform § 35 rules) scheduled to go into effect on February 1, 2016, and these issues are likely to evade review on account of the relatively short duration of a commitment under § 35. See, e.g., Baker, supra; Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 274 (1978) (Hagberg).[1] See also Guardianship of V.V., 470 Mass. 590, 591-592 (2015). Background. On May 4, […]
Matter of Pansé, Chandrakant Shridhar (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-173-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11846 MATTER OF CHANDRAKANT SHRIDHAR PANSÉ. October 6, 2015. Attorney at Law, Admission to practice. Supreme Judicial Court, Membership in the bar. Practice, Civil, Membership in the bar. On May 13, 2008, Chandrakant Shridhar Pansé applied for admission to the Massachusetts bar. He took and passed the written bar examination in July, 2008. At first, the Board of Bar Examiners (board) received no objections to his admission and reported him qualified. Before he could take the oath of attorney, however, three attorneys in good standing contacted the board, raising significant concerns about whether Pansé “is of good moral character and sufficient acquirements and qualifications” to warrant admission to the bar. G. L. c. 221, § 37. See S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.1, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). After two informal interviews with Pansé, an investigation by an attorney appointed as special counsel, and a formal hearing, the board determined that Pansé was not qualified for admission to the bar and recommended that his application be dismissed. S.J.C. Rule 3:01, § 5.3, as appearing in 411 Mass. 1321 (1992). Pansé filed a petition in the county court for a hearing on his application. A single justice of this court reserved and reported the matter to the full court. We agree with the board. 1. Facts. In its decision, the board made detailed findings of fact, which we summarize here. a. Divorce and related proceedings. Pansé and his ex-wife had three children. When they divorced in 2008, Ms. Pansé was determined to be the primary residential parent for the two children who were minors, including their son, M., who is intellectually disabled due to Down syndrome. In the judgment of divorce nisi, a judge in the Probate and Family Court found Pansé “to be controlling, threatening and emotionally abusive to plaintiff/wife and two of their children . . . although he has no appreciation of such. He is, from his perspective, devoted to his children . . . but his narcissism and myopic view of all relationships have resulted in his inability to note or appreciate the harm which he causes.” Pansé has filed numerous lawsuits against Ms. Pansé and others, and has filed professional complaints against numerous attorneys and judges involved in the divorce and related proceedings, each claimed by him […]
In the Matter of the Estate of Galatis (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-136-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-579 Appeals Court IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES P. GALATIS. No. 14-P-579. Middlesex. April 14, 2015. – September 9, 2015. Present: Berry, Milkey, & Massing, JJ. Will, Testamentary capacity. Petition for probate of will filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on June 12, 2000. The case was heard by Maureen H. Monks, J. Dimitrios Ioannidis for town of Skiathos. William M. Driscoll for Syriano Kyparissou Kontos & others. MILKEY, J. On January 15, 2000, Charles P. Galatis, then seventy-six years old, was admitted to Massachusetts General Hospital (MGH). Once admitted, he was diagnosed with stage IV lung cancer, and over the ensuing weeks he suffered a rapid overall decline in his physical and mental condition. Galatis remained hospitalized,[1] and he died on February 25, 2000. On February 9, 2000, Galatis executed a document purporting to be his will. The executor named in the will formally presented it for probate, joined by the will’s principal beneficiary, the town of Skiathos, Greece.[2] Two of the decedent’s cousins contested the will. After a ten-day trial, a Probate and Family Court judge declined to allow the will, because she found that Galatis lacked testamentary capacity on February 9. Because that finding is amply supported by record evidence, we affirm. Background. The judge made 559 factual findings that totaled seventy-one pages. We summarize those findings, almost all of which are unchallenged, and highlight the facts still in dispute. See Rempelakis v. Russell, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 559 (2006). 1. Galatis’s background medical conditions. By the time Galatis was admitted to MGH, he already suffered from a long list of medical problems including diabetes, hyperkalemia (excess potassium in the blood), and major depression. For such problems, Galatis was taking twelve different prescribed medications, including the antidepressant Elavil, and two different narcotics for pain relief. The symptoms of anxiety and depression worsened following his diagnosis with metastatic lung cancer. He therefore was prescribed a second antidepressant, and the dosages for both antidepressants subsequently were increased. His painkillers also were aggressively increased, and he was placed on a self-administered morphine drip beginning on February 8. 2. The February 1 document. When he entered MGH, Galatis apparently had no existing will. At some point during his initial hospitalization, he […]
In the Matter of Simkin (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-071-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11750 IN THE MATTER OF JAY EDWARD SIMKIN. April 29, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Board of Bar Overseers. Practice, Civil, Standing. Jay Edward Simkin filed a petition in the county court alleging that certain attorneys had committed breaches of the rules of professional conduct in connection with proceedings involving the revocation and reinstatement of his license to carry firearms. He requested that this court enter findings to that effect, which, he claimed, would lead to bar counsel’s reconsideration of her decision not to pursue his complaints against the attorneys. The record indicates that the Board of Bar Overseers (board) reviewed bar counsel’s decision not to take further action. A single justice denied Simkin’s petition without a hearing, reasoning that an “individual who files a complaint with the board lacks standing to challenge in a court action the board’s decision not to prosecute the complaint.” Simpkin appeals.[1] The single justice properly denied relief because, regardless of the mechanism employed, a private individual cannot prosecute a judicial action for attorney discipline. “There simply is no such private right of action.” Matter of a Request for an Investigation of an Attorney, 449 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2007) (complainant may not “commence a judicial action challenging bar counsel’s decision and seek a judicial order compelling bar counsel to act in a certain way”). That is essentially what Simkin seeks to accomplish here. He filed complaints with the board, as was his right; bar counsel investigated but declined to pursue them; and, after review, the board determined not to proceed. Simkin has no further standing in the matter. See id. See also Ellis, petitioner, 460 Mass. 1020, 1021 (2011). Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law. Jay Edward Simkin, pro se. [1] Simkin filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). That rule does not apply here because Simkin’s petition does not challenge an “interlocutory ruling in the trial court.” Id. It is evident from his submission and from the papers in the county court, however, that he has no standing to maintain the action. Full-text Opinions
In the Matter of: Dwyer-Jones, Suzanne T. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-018-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11516 IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE T. DWYER-JONES. Suffolk. October 6, 2014. – February 5, 2015. Present: Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Attorney at Law, Reciprocal discipline, Suspension, Disability, Inactive status. Information filed in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on May 16, 2012. A petition to transfer to disability inactive status was heard by Gants, J. Thomas R. Kiley for the respondent. John W. Marshall, Assistant Bar Counsel. SPINA, J. We consider in this case whether an attorney who has been suspended from the practice of law in another jurisdiction based on mental health conditions or substance abuse is subject to reciprocal transfer to disability inactive status in Massachusetts without a separate hearing in Massachusetts to determine her incapacity. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 13 (1), as amended, 435 Mass. 1302 (2002). We conclude that she is. 1. Background. The respondent, Suzanne T. Dwyer-Jones, has been admitted to practice in both Maine and Massachusetts. On March 25, 2013, a final hearing was held before a single justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on a petition filed by the Maine board of overseers of the bar for suspension of the respondent pursuant to Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(B). That rule permits the board to file a petition directly with the court where it is alleged that “the continued practice of [an] attorney poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public,” id., because the attorney is “incapacitated from continuing practice by reason of mental infirmity or addiction to drugs or intoxicants.” Me. Bar R. 7.3(e)(2)(A). After the hearing, at which the respondent was both present and represented by counsel, the Maine single justice found that the respondent “is afflicted with a substantial proclivity for substance abuse and a very serious mental health condition.” He stated: “[T]he combined effects of these conditions clearly produced a substantial incapacity that adversely impacted [the respondent’s] ability to practice law and resulted in a substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public. Indeed, . . . she was essentially unable to manage her own affairs, let alone the complex matters involved in the representation of others. The court finds that the incapacitating symptoms of these conditions remain essentially as florid today as they were during […]