Commonwealth v. Morse (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-103-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11433 COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVEN J. MORSE. Hampshire. February 3, 2014. ‑ June 13, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Misleading a Police Officer. Vessel, Homicide. Evidence, Intent. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 7, 2010, and July 19, 2011. The cases were tried before Daniel A. Ford, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Linda J. Thompson, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Monica R. Shah, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. The defendant was piloting a motorboat in the late afternoon of August 17, 2010, when it struck a kayak.[1] Ten year old Augustus Adamopoulos, who was in the kayak fishing with his father, died as a result of the collision; his father sustained serious injuries. The defendant was charged with manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13; serious bodily injury and homicide by vessel, G. L. c. 90B, §§ 8A, 8B; and three counts of child endangerment while operating a vessel while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, G. L. c. 90, § 24V. In an interview with police following the collision, the defendant admitted to having drunk beer before operating the boat, but responded negatively to the question whether he had “consume[d] any other, you know, substances that could’ve impaired [his] ability to, you know, be aware of what was going on around [him].” Because police later discovered that the defendant had smoked marijuana before the collision, the defendant also was charged, under the witness intimidation statute, G. L. c. 268, § 13B (§ 13B), with misleading a police officer. Evidence of his negative response to the question was admitted against him at trial; the jury were instructed to consider such evidence only in relation to the § 13B misleading charge. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of misleading a police officer and misdemeanor homicide by vessel, and acquitted him of the other charges. The defendant appealed, and we granted his application for direct appellate review. The defendant challenges the validity of both convictions. He argues that his conviction of misleading a police officer should be reversed because […]
Morse, trustee v. Kraft, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-140-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11233 RICHARD MORSE, trustee,[1] vs. JONATHAN A. KRAFT & others.[2] Suffolk. April 1, 2013. ‑ July 29, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Trust, Irrevocable trust, Distribution. Minor, Guardian ad litem. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on April 23, 2012. The case was reported by Cordy, J. Daniel L. Goldberg (Charles L. Solomont with him) for the plaintiff. SPINA, J. Richard Morse, the trustee of The Kraft Irrevocable Family Trust (1982 Trust), commenced this action before a single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, § 1, and G. L. c. 215, § 6, and the single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court.[3] See Hillman v. Hillman, 433 Mass. 590, 590 (2001), and cases cited; Walker v. Walker, 433 Mass. 581, 581-582 (2001), and cases cited. “We have regularly recognized the appropriateness of granting declaratory relief to fiduciaries seeking instructions concerning the manner in which an instrument . . . should be construed in connection with the possible application of Federal estate tax provisions.” First Agric. Bank v. Coxe, 406 Mass. 879, 882 (1990). See Walker v. Walker, supra at 582 & n.5, 583. All of the parties have stipulated to the relevant facts, and each of the defendants, with the exception of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[4] has assented to the relief sought. 1. Background. By declaration of trust dated January 4, 1982, the plaintiff established the 1982 Trust, and each of four separate subtrusts created therein, for the benefit of the four sons of Robert and Myra Kraft (the Krafts).[5] Each of the four sons is an income beneficiary of his subtrust, and also is a potential object of the powers of appointment held by each son as the income beneficiary of his respective subtrust. The sons’ children (the Krafts’ grandchildren) are the contingent remainder beneficiaries of the subtrusts, and also are the potential objects of the sons’ powers of appointment. The 1982 Trust permits only “Disinterested Trustee[s]” — defined in the 1982 Trust as “all those trustees who are not transferors of property to [the] trust and who are not eligible, and who are not legally obligated to support any person who is eligible, to […]