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Commonwealth v. Richardson (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-061-18)

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12375 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSHUA A. RICHARDSON. Middlesex. December 7, 2017. – April 17, 2018. Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. Marijuana. Medicine. Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Affidavit, Probable cause, Warrant. Probable Cause. License. Jury and Jurors. Evidence, Expert opinion, Intent. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Affidavit, Motion to suppress, Warrant, Instructions to jury. Complaint received and sworn to in the Framingham Division of the District Court Department on September 9, 2013. A motion to dismiss was heard by Douglas W. Stoddart, J.; a pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Martine Carroll, J.; and the case was tried before David W. Cunis, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Allison Callahan for the defendant. Elizabeth J. May, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KAFKER, J. The defendant, a medical marijuana patient, was arrested when police discovered twenty-two marijuana plants growing in his basement. After a jury trial, he was convicted of unlawful cultivation of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. On appeal, he argues that (1) the criminal complaint and the search warrant lacked probable cause; (2) the jury instructions were in error; (3) the evidence was insufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the medical marijuana law’s sixty-day supply limit is unconstitutionally vague as applied. For the reasons stated below, we reverse in part and affirm in part. Background. The defendant, Joshua A. Richardson, was an unemployed tattoo artist living in Framingham at the time of his arrest. On July 2, 2013, he obtained a written certification from a qualifying physician that approved his use of medical marijuana to treat a number of medical conditions. The certification constituted a valid hardship cultivation registration permitting the defendant to grow up to ten ounces of marijuana every sixty days for his personal, medical use.[1] Approximately two months later, on September 7, 2013, the defendant telephoned 911 to report a home invasion at his residence. The defendant told the 911 operator that three men had entered his home and “started beating the hell out of [him].” Officer Wayne Jordan reported to the defendant’s residence within a few minutes of receiving the dispatch. The defendant told Wayne that three men had broken into […]

Commonwealth v. Richardson (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-019-17)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT Docket No. 11-10159 COMMONWEALTH vs. KAREEM RICHARDSON FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOLLOWING MISTRIAL Defendant Kareem Richardson is facing long-pending, serious charges arising from events that occurred at Rumors nightclub in 2010.1 After defendant’s successful motion for a mistrial, the case is before me on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Egregious Misconduct (Docket #106).2 After hearing, I am constrained to deny the motion. Introduction After a series of previously failed attempts,3 this case came before me for trial in July 2017. In the midst of trial, and without prior notice to the Court, the Boston Police caused a warrant to be issued for Mr. Richardson for misdemeanor charges out of the Taunton District Court; arranged for its fugitive unit to arrest Mr. Richardson on that warrant; and chose to make the arrest at about 8:30 a.m. as Mr. Richardson was entering the public entrance of the Suffolk County Courthouse for the fourth day of trial. Not surprisingly, jurors selected for this trial were 1 Defendant is charged with indecent assault and battery on a person over 14, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (two counts), assault with a dangerous weapon, assault and battery, and carrying a dangerous weapon. 2 Also before me is a motion to dismiss on speedy trial act grounds. I will address that motion separately. 3 Trial has begun, or nearly begun, a number of times. Issues in the case have been reviewed at least twice by a Single Justice under G.L. c. 211, § 3. 2 also entering the building through the public entrance and observed the police apprehend Mr. Richardson. Because the police removed Mr. Richardson from the premises, trial proceedings were delayed and jurors understandably discussed their observations in the jury room as the jury, the lawyers, investigators, witnesses and the Court waited for the police to bring Mr. Richardson back to the courthouse. After interviewing each of the jurors, I granted a defense request for a mistrial. Defendant now moves to dismiss the case, claiming that the police officers’ actions induced him to move for a mistrial and should be chargeable to the Commonwealth for double jeopardy purposes. Over two days, I conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss. I heard testimony from 12 witnesses and received 12 exhibits. I now find the following facts based on a preponderance of the credible evidence. FINDINGS OF FACT On June 5, 2017,4 this case was set for trial on July 17.5 On July 13, I held a final pretrial conference. The Commonwealth was represented by Assistant District Attorney Lindsey Weinstein. At all relevant times before me, […]

Commonwealth v. Richardson (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-134-14)

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11472 COMMONWEALTH vs. TARI RICHARDSON. Plymouth. March 6, 2014. – August 7, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Firearms. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Execution of sentence, Investigation of jurors, Voir dire. Evidence, Firearm, Prior violent conduct, Identity. Jury and Jurors. Statute, Construction. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 27, 2007. The cases were tried before Jeffrey A. Locke, J., and a posttrial motion to inquire of jurors or for alternative relief was heard by him. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. William W. Adams for the defendant. Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Michael J. Fellows, for Committee for Public Counsel, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, J. In Bynum v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 707, 709 (1999), we declared that, where the Legislature enacts a sentencing enhancement statute that provides for a longer sentence where a defendant convicted of the crime has one or more specified prior convictions, “[t]he prior offense is not an element of the crime for which a defendant is charged but concerns the punishment to be imposed if he is convicted . . . and the prior offense is proved.” We, therefore, concluded that the Legislature did not intend that two sentences be imposed, one for the underlying offense and a second for having committed the offense after a prior conviction of the same offense. Id. at 709. Here, the defendant was convicted of a firearms offense for which there were two applicable sentencing enhancement statutes, and the Commonwealth proved convictions of separate prior offenses for each. The primary issue on appeal is whether the defendant may be sentenced under both sentencing enhancement statutes. We conclude that, unless the Legislature has explicitly declared its intent to permit multiple sentencing enhancements, a defendant may be sentenced under only one sentencing enhancement statute.[2] Background. Because the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. After midnight on March 4, 2007, the defendant, an African-American man wearing a white T-shirt, entered a night club in Brockton, along with another African-American man wearing a white T-shirt. The club manager, Aldo […]