Santiago, et al. v. Rich Products Corporation, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-158-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-504 Appeals Court KELVIN SANTIAGO & others[1] vs. RICH PRODUCTS CORPORATION & others.[2] No. 16-P-504. Middlesex. September 8, 2017. – December 28, 2017. Present: Milkey, Hanlon, & Shin, JJ. Negligence, Spoliation of evidence, School. Food. School and School Committee, Liability for tort. Practice, Civil, Instructions to jury, Summary judgment. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 21, 2006. A motion for summary judgment was heard by Garry V. Inge, J.; the case was tried before Bruce R. Henry, J., and the entry of judgment was ordered by him. Marc Diller (Jonathon D. Friedmann also present) for the plaintiffs. Myles W. McDonough for Rich Products Corporation & others. Hannah B. Pappenheim, Assistant City Solicitor (Elliott Veloso, Assistant City Solicitor, also present) for city of Lowell. SHIN, J. Kelvin Santiago (Kelvin) suffered traumatic brain damage after choking on meatballs served in the cafeteria of a city of Lowell (city) public school. He and his parents filed suit against the city and Rich Products,[3] the company that produced and sold the meatballs, asserting negligence and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, among other claims. A judge allowed the city’s motion for summary judgment, and, after seventeen days of trial, a jury returned a verdict in Rich Products’ favor.[4] On appeal the plaintiffs claim error in the trial judge’s denial of their request for an adverse-inference instruction against Rich Products for alleged spoliation of documentary evidence and in the motion judge’s allowance of summary judgment for the city. We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to give a spoliation instruction because the plaintiffs failed to establish the necessary factual predicate that Rich Products lost or destroyed the missing evidence when it knew or should have known of a potential lawsuit. We further conclude that the motion judge correctly ordered the entry of summary judgment for the city because no rational jury could have found that its employees acted negligently. For these reasons we affirm the judgment. Background. 1. The choking incident. The basic facts regarding what occurred during the incident are not in dispute. In 2004 Rich Products began producing meatballs to sell to schools through the Federal government’s National School Lunch Program. The meatballs contained a binding agent called Profam 974, which […]
Commonwealth v. Santiago (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-017-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11619 COMMONWEALTH vs. ANGEL SANTIAGO. Hampden. October 7, 2014. – February 4, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Standing to object, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion, Probable cause, Fruits of illegal search. Constitutional Law, Investigatory stop, Probable cause, Reasonable suspicion, Search and seizure. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Standing. Threshold Police Inquiry. Probable Cause. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 19, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John S. Ferrara, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Katherine E. McMahon, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Frederic G. Bartmon for the defendant. Michael K. Fee, P. R. Goldstone, Alex G. Philipson, Matthew R. Segal, & Jessie J. Rossman, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Murat Erkan, for Erkan & Associates, LLC, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. The defendant has been indicted on a charge of unlawful distribution of a class B controlled substance (cocaine), second or subsequent offense. See G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c), (d). He was stopped and arrested by police officers at the same time and in the same location as another man, Edwin Ramos, to whom the Commonwealth alleges the defendant distributed the cocaine; Ramos was charged with possession of cocaine by complaint in the District Court. A judge in the Superior Court allowed the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the alleged cocaine on a theory of “target standing.” We consider here the Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal from the allowance of the motion. We conclude that this is not an appropriate case in which to consider the adoption of target standing. Accordingly, we reverse the order allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress. Background. We take the relevant facts from the motion judge’s findings: “On May 14, 2012, Springfield Police Officer William Catellier observed the defendant . . . riding a bicycle in the North End section of Springfield. This is an area […]