Parkview Electronics Trust, LLC v. Conservation Commission of Winchester (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-006-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-276 Appeals Court PARKVIEW ELECTRONICS TRUST, LLC vs. CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF WINCHESTER. No. 13-P-276. Middlesex. November 6, 2014. – January 12, 2016. Present: Trainor, Agnes, & Maldonado, JJ. Municipal Corporations, Conservation commission, By-laws and ordinances. Wetlands Protection Act. Department of Environmental Protection. Jurisdiction, Administrative matter. Zoning, By-law, Wetlands. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 25, 2004. The case was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. Jill Brenner Meixel (Vincent J. Pisegna with her) for the plaintiff. Wade M. Welch (Melissa C. Donohoe with him) for the defendant. AGNES, J. The Wetlands Protection Act, G. L. c. 131, § 40 (act), sets forth “minimum wetlands protection standards, and local communities are free to impose more stringent requirements.” Oyster Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Conservation Commn. of Harwich, 449 Mass. 859, 866 (2007). As we noted in Fafard v. Conservation Commn. of Reading, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 568 (1996), it is not uncommon for a town, under its local by-law, to establish wetland protection standards that are more demanding than those under State law. In such a case, when a local commission concludes that a project meets the requirements of State law, but does not satisfy the requirements of municipal law, it “introduces no legal dissonance and violates no principle of State preemption.” Ibid. In Healer v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 718 (2009), we explained the requirements that must be met by a local conservation commission that decides to act independent of State law by exercising jurisdiction over wetlands exclusively on the basis of a more stringent local by-law.[1] In the present case, the by-law of the town of Winchester (local by-law) has a more expansive standard for “land subject to flooding” than does the act.[2] Nevertheless, the plaintiff, Parkview Electronics Trust, LLC (Parkview), contends that an order of resource area delineation (ORAD) issued by the conservation commission of Winchester (commission) is invalid under Healer because it was not based “exclusively” on the more stringent provisions of local law.[3] In effect, Parkview maintains that Healer requires a local commission to choose between reliance on State law or local law. For the reasons that follow, we reject this reading of Healer and affirm the judgment. The essential facts are […]
Categories: News Tags: 1100616, Commission, Conservation, Electronics, Lawyers, Parkview, Trust, Weekly, Winchester
Beacon Towers Condominium Trust v. Alex (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-005-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11880 BEACON TOWERS CONDOMINIUM TRUST vs. GEORGE ALEX. Suffolk. October 5, 2015. – January 7, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Arbitration, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 14, 2013. The case was heard by Frances A. McIntyre, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. J. Mark Dickison (Ryan A. Ciporkin with him) for the defendant. Mark A. Rosen for the plaintiff. GANTS, C.J. Under G. L. c. 251, § 10, attorney’s fees may not be awarded in arbitration proceedings “[u]nless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate.” The issue presented in this case is whether an arbitration panel applying the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA rules), having found that the arbitration agreement did not authorize an award of attorney’s fees, nonetheless may award attorney’s fees based on its finding that “substantially all of the defenses were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith.” The appellant, George Alex, contends that the arbitration panel may award attorney’s fees in these circumstances for either of two reasons: first, because AAA rule 47(a) [1] authorizes an arbitrator to “grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties”; or second, because AAA rule 47(d)(ii) provides that an arbitrator may award attorney’s fees if “it is authorized by law,” and the award of attorney’s fees in these circumstances is authorized by G. L. c. 231, § 6F. We conclude that an arbitrator lacks the authority to award attorney’s fees based on a finding that all the claims or defenses were wholly insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith unless the parties have agreed that an arbitrator may award attorney’s fees in these circumstances. We therefore affirm the Superior Court judge’s order vacating the arbitration panel’s award of attorney’s fees. Background. The appellee, Beacon Towers Condominium Trust (trust), is the unit owners’ organization for the Beacon Towers Condominium (condominium), an entity created pursuant to G. L. c. 183A, § 17. The condominium is comprised of three adjacent buildings in the Back Bay section of Boston, with the addresses of 479, 481, and 483 Beacon Street. The board of […]
Erickson v. Clancy Realty Trust, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-003-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-50 Appeals Court ROBERT J. ERICKSON vs. CLANCY REALTY TRUST & others.[1] No. 15-P-50. Barnstable. November 12, 2015. – January 6, 2016. Present: Cohen, Grainger, & Wolohojian, JJ. Way, Public: discontinuance. Estoppel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 5, 2010. The case was heard by Christopher J. Muse, J. James B. Stinson for the plaintiff. Harry R. Thomasson for the defendants. GRAINGER J. Plaintiff Robert J. Erickson appeals from a declaratory judgment in Superior Court finding that Old County Road (road) in Eastham was discontinued by a 1903 Superior Court decree pursuant to “An Act To Promote The Abolition Of Grade Crossings,” Chapter 428 of the Acts of 1890, as amended, St. 1891, c. 123 (act). The defendants are abutters or nearby landowners in Eastham. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the road was not discontinued by the 1903 Superior Court decree and that it still operates as a public way. 1. Background. The facts are uncontested. The plaintiff’s property is a parcel bounded on the northwest by the road, which extends from Route 6, a State highway, to an area past the plaintiff’s property. The Cape Cod Rail Trail, formerly the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad (railroad), lies to the east of the plaintiff’s property, and to the south are parcels owned by the Sverids. The plaintiff claims that the road is the only means of accessing his property; otherwise, it is landlocked. The road was first laid out as a public way on June 19, 1721. It is shown on various maps throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The path of the road crossed over to the eastern side of the railroad in Eastham, and crossed back to the western side of the railroad in Wellfleet — a total of two grade crossings. In 1890, the act was passed to promote the abolition of such grade crossings and authorized the Superior Court, by decree, to confirm a recommendation by a neutral commission to extinguish a specified portion of an existing public way and to establish an alternate route that avoided any grade crossings. See St. 1890, c. 428, § 4. The parties agree that the commission’s report and a subsequent Superior Court decree[2] (decree) did so. 2. Discussion. The question presented is whether […]
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company v. Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-128-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1982 Appeals Court LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY vs. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FUND. No. 13-P-1982 Suffolk. June 2, 2015. – September 3, 2015. Present: Vuono, Grainger, & Blake, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Reimbursement of insurer. Insurance, Insolvency of insurer. Administrative Law, Primary jurisdiction, Exhaustion of remedies, Agency’s interpretation of statute. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 21, 2013. The case was heard by Heidi E. Brieger, J. W. Frederick Uehlein for the plaintiff. Douglas S. Martland, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. GRAINGER, J. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company in liquidation (Lumbermens) appeals from the Superior Court judgment dismissing its claim against the Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund). Lumbermens sought partial reimbursement from the fund for workers’ compensation payments made pursuant to G. L. c. 152, §§ 37 and 65. A Superior Court judge dismissed the claim under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. We affirm. Background. We summarize the undisputed facts. Lumbermens, an Illinois Corporation, was licensed to issue workers’ compensation insurance policies in Massachusetts. Payments under these policies included so-called “second injury” benefits awarded pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 37.[1] The trust fund is authorized by that statute to provide partial reimbursement to insurers for second injury payments. Between 2000 and 2008 Lumbermens and the trust fund entered into agreements in six separate cases, referred to as Form 123 agreements,[2] establishing the reimbursement percentage to be applied to “second injury” payments made by Lumbermens in each case. In July, 2012, Lumbermens was placed into rehabilitation, also referred to as a “run-off” period, whereby it could not issue new policies but continued to administer existing policies. The trust fund, which had made reimbursement payments pursuant to the Form 123 agreements until Lumbermens entered the run-off period, thereafter refused further payment. The trust fund asserted that Lumbermens was no longer entitled to reimbursement once the run-off period commenced because it was no longer an “insurer” able to issue policies, as that term is defined in G. L. c. 152, § 1(7). Ten months later, in May, 2013, Lumbermens was placed in liquidation. Approximately one year thereafter Lumbermens filed a complaint for enforcement of the six Form 123 agreements in Superior Court. A Superior Court judge dismissed the complaint, finding that Lumbermen’s claims were more properly heard before the reviewing board (board) of the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) under the […]
The Home Insurance Company v. Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-127-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1356 Appeals Court THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY vs. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION TRUST FUND. No. 14-P-1356 Suffolk. June 2, 2015. – September 3, 2015. Present: Vuono, Grainger, Blake, JJ. Workers’ Compensation Act, Reimbursement of insurer, Cost of living allowance. Insurance, Insolvency of insurer. Practice, Civil, Standing. Administrative Law, Agency’s interpretation of statute. Statute, Construction. Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Reviewing Board. Eric A. Smith (Donald E. Wallace with him) for the plaintiff. Douglas S. Martland, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant. W. Frederick Uehlein & Dorothy M. Linsner, for Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. Joseph C. Tanski, Gregory P. Deschenes, & Kurt M. Mullen, for Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GRAINGER, J. We are called upon to analyze certain rights and obligations resulting from the liquidation of a New Hampshire insurance company that issued workers’ compensation policies in Massachusetts. At issue in this appeal is the company’s entitlement pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 65(2), to reimbursement for cost of living adjustments (COLA, COLA increases), as prescribed by G. L. c. 152, § 34B, to eleven individuals receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Both an administrative judge (judge) and the reviewing board (board) of the Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) determined, albeit on different rationales, that the company was not entitled to reimbursement. Background. The undisputed facts, excerpted below, are recounted in detail in the board’s comprehensive decision. COLA payments as part of the workers’ compensation scheme. Persons receiving workers’ compensation benefits in Massachusetts are entitled to receive annual COLA increases to reflect changes in the cost of living. See G. L. c. 152, § 34B. These COLA increases are funded, then subject to reimbursement, as follows: Revenues to fund the defendant Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund (trust fund) are raised by an annual assessment[1] on employers pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 65. Under normal circumstances (i.e., involving solvent insurers), the yearly assessments are collected from employers by their insurers such as the plaintiff Home Insurance Company (Home), who transmit them to the trust fund. The insurers then pay the COLA increases together with other monthly benefits to injured workers. See G. L. c. 152, § 65(2). This, in turn, entitles the insurers to reimbursement from the trust fund for the COLA payments on a quarterly basis. Ibid. Home’s […]
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Fitchburg Capital, LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-062-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11756 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, trustee,[1] vs. FITCHBURG CAPITAL, LLC, & others.[2] Suffolk. January 5, 2015. – April 15, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Mortgage, Real estate, Discharge, Foreclosure, Dragnet clause. Real Property, Mortgage. Limitations, Statute of. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Statute of limitations. Statute, Retroactive application, Construction. Due Process of Law, Retroactive application of statute, Statute of limitations. Constitutional Law, Contract clause. Civil action commenced in the Land Court Department on July 2, 2012. A motion for partial summary judgment was heard by Robert B. Foster, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Jeffrey T. Angley (Robert K. Hopkins with him) for Fitchburg Capital, LLC. Jeffrey B. Loeb for the plaintiff. Thomas O. Moriarty, for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc., & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. Philip F. Coppinger, for Ry-Co International, Ltd., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. Under a 2006 amendment to the so-called “obsolete mortgage” statute, a mortgage becomes unenforceable after a certain number of years: a mortgage in which the term or maturity date is stated becomes unenforceable five years after the expiration of the term and a mortgage in which the term or maturity date is not stated becomes unenforceable thirty-five years after recording.[3] G. L. c. 260, § 33, as amended by St. 2006, c. 63, § 6. The defendant Fitchburg Capital, LLC (Fitchburg), foreclosed on two mortgages at a time when both mortgages would be unenforceable under the amended statute if the five-year statute of limitations was applicable. In this appeal, we interpret the amended statute to determine whether a mortgage stating only the term or maturity date of the underlying debt is a “mortgage in which the term or maturity date of the mortgage is stated” under G. L. c. 260, § 33, and whether the retroactive application of § 33 to mortgages recorded before the effective date of the amendment is constitutional. The plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-backed Pass-through Certificates, Series 2004-R11 under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2004 (Deutsche Bank), filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the mortgages are […]
Haskins v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-146-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-506 Appeals Court JOHN E. HASKINS vs. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, trustee,[1] & others.[2] No. 13-P-506. Worcester. September 3, 2014. – November 10, 2014. Present: Green, Graham, & Katzmann, JJ. Mortgage, Foreclosure. Notice, Foreclosure of mortgage. Assignment. Consumer Protection Act, Investigative demand. Fraud. Practice, Civil, Complaint. Contract, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 13, 2012. A motion to dismiss was heard by Janet Kenton-Walker, J. Adam T. Sherwin for the plaintiff. Christopher A. Cornetta for the defendants. GREEN, J. We are called upon to address a question raised but not resolved in U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421 (2014) (Schumacher): whether a notice of a mortgagor’s right to cure a mortgage loan default, sent pursuant to G. L. c. 244, § 35A, is deficient if it is sent by the mortgage servicing agent (rather than the record holder of the mortgage), or if it identifies the servicing agent as the mortgage holder. We conclude that the notice in the present case complied with the statute, and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.[3] Background. The plaintiff, John E. Haskins, purchased his residence at 98 Southville Road, Southborough, in 2002. In 2004, incident to a refinancing transaction, he granted a mortgage to defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for First Magnus Financial Corporation (First Magnus).[4] Haskins thereafter defaulted on his loan payment obligations and, by letter dated May 4, 2010, IndyMac Mortgage Services, the mortgage servicing division of defendant OneWest Bank, FSB (IndyMac), informed Haskins that he was in default, but that he had the right to cure the default within ninety days. The letter identified “IndyMac Mortgage Services, a Division of OneWest Bank” as the mortgage holder.[5] In fact, record title to the mortgage was held at the time by MERS, and the equitable or beneficial ownership of the loan secured by the mortgage was held by defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), as trustee of the Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2004-A2, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-B (securitization trust). By letter dated December 8, 2010, IndyMac again advised Haskins of the default, and of his right to cure the default (this time within 150 days); like the May […]
Cahaly, et al. v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Company, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-062-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑956 Appeals Court GAIL A. CAHALY & others[1] vs. BENISTAR PROPERTY EXCHANGE TRUST COMPANY, INC., & others.[2] No. 12‑P‑956. Suffolk. December 2, 2013. ‑ June 6, 2014. Present: Kantrowitz, Graham, & Meade, JJ. Attorney at Law, Work product. Penalty. Practice, Civil, New trial. Civil actions commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 9, 16, 22, and 23, 2001; February 6, 2001; September 20, 2001; and April 30, 2002. Following review by the Supreme Judicial Court, 451 Mass. 343 (2008), motions for sanctions and for a new trial were heard by Stephen E. Neel, J. Anthony R. Zelle for Gail A. Cahaly & others. Michael B. Keating for the intervener. Brooks L. Glahn for Benistar Property Exchange Trust Company, Inc., & others. MEADE, J. The plaintiffs appeal from the denial of their motion for sanctions against Bingham McCutchen LLP (Bingham), intervener, the law firm that defended Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill), in the 2002 jury trial of this action. The plaintiffs claim that in that litigation Bingham wrongfully withheld documents relevant to the issue whether Merrill, in handling the accounts of Benistar Property Exchange Trust Company, Inc. (Benistar), knew that Benistar was trading with money belonging to third parties. We hold that Bingham lacked an adequate legal basis, under the guise of the work product doctrine, for its decisions to withhold information that Merrill employees had viewed certain Benistar Web pages describing its business as an intermediary for third-party funds and then to present a defense claiming that no Merrill employees had viewed the very same Web pages. As a result, we vacate that portion of the final judgment entering judgment in favor of Bingham on the plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions. As explained below, there remain certain issues that require resolution by a fact finder, and thus, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Background. For background regarding the 2002 trial and the underlying dispute, we refer to Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exch. Trust Co., 451 Mass. 343 (2008) (Cahaly), in which the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court judge granting the plaintiffs a new trial. The documents at issue here came to light during the preparation of the second trial in 2009, when Merrill, then represented by […]
Pehoviak, et al. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-024-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12‑P‑1485 Appeals Court PAUL PEHOVIAK & another[1] vs. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY. No. 12‑P‑1485. Worcester. November 5, 2013. ‑ March 11, 2014. Present: Cypher, Brown, & Fecteau, JJ. Mortgage, Foreclosure, Junior lien. Notice, Foreclosure of mortgage. Real Property, Mortgage. Taxation, Federal tax lien. Lien. Practice, Civil, Discovery, Findings by judge, Waiver. Damages, Mitigation. Waiver. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on April 10, 2006. The case was heard by John S. Ferrara, J. Marissa I. Delinks for the defendant. Howard B. D’Amico for the intervener. FECTEAU, J. The defendant, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), appeals from a judgment in the amount of $ 141,784.20,[2] plus interest, entered in favor of the intervening plaintiff, Commerce Bank and Trust Company (Commerce), after a jury-waived trial. Deutsche Bank claims that the judge erred in (1) applying G. L. c. 244, § 14, under the facts presented, (2) finding that Deutsche Bank’s failure to act in good faith and to use reasonable diligence to complete and close the foreclosure sale with Pehoviak caused Commerce harm, and (3) failing to account for Commerce’s lack of mitigation efforts. We conclude that (1) Deutsche Bank breached its duty to exercise reasonable diligence by refusing the prospective buyer’s request to provide him with evidence that it had sent statutorily required notices of foreclosure to junior lienholders, (2) the judge’s finding on causation was not clearly erroneous, and (3) Deutsche Bank waived the affirmative defense of mitigation of damages by failing to raise it in its first responsive pleading. 1. Background. Deutsche Bank was the holder of a first mortgage on real property in Westborough, Massachusetts. The mortgagors defaulted on the mortgage loan, and Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the property. The mortgagors owed Deutsche approximately $ 500,000. Commerce was the holder of a mortgage on the same property securing a home equity loan, which was subordinate to Deutsche Bank’s mortgage. The mortgagors were also in default on Commerce’s loan and owed Commerce approximately $ 170,000. In addition, there were two other liens on the property that were subordinate to Commerce; one was a Federal tax lien, and the other was a writ of attachment by one Dennis Armstrong. At the foreclosure sale on March 6, 2006, Pehoviak was the highest bidder […]
Do You Trust Boston Cabs?
It’s not surprising that the cab business can be a little dirty. Dirty, however, isn’t a strong enough word for what a recent Boston Globe seriesuncovered in Boston’s hack community. Stories of shakedowns, decrepit vehicles and coercive measures to curtail insurance claims were some of the practices unearthed. On Tuesday, Mayor Thomas Menino vowed to clean up the business, proposing independent oversight and stepped-up city inspections. Cab companies, meanwhile, have their own complaints, specifically about new app-based livery services like Uber that sidestep local regulations and use the web to locate fares. What do you think? If Boston’s cab community is in disarray, and new cab-like apps are strong-armed out of the city, how will you get around? Do you trust Boston’s cab community to offer a clean, safe ride? Or do you skip cabs altogether and stick to the T? What about late night’s out and about? Tell us your thoughts in the comments section below. South End Patch