Posts tagged "university"

Columbia Plaza Associates, et al. v. Northeastern University (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-175-16)

1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT SUCV2013-2392-BLS 2 COLUMBIA PLAZA ASSOCIATES, et al. Plaintiffs vs. NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY Defendant FINDINGS OF FACT, RULINGS OF LAW AND ORDER OF JUDGMENT This case arises from a series of agreements between the defendant Northeastern University (Northeastern) and the plaintiff Columbia Plaza Associates (CPA), a minority owned general partnership. The agreements related to the development of land known as Parcel 18 adjacent to Northeastern’s main campus. Northeastern owned the parcel, and plaintiffs held certain development rights. Plaintiffs allege that that Northeastern reaped unbargained for benefits in developing the parcel without adequately compensating them, and also convinced the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) to approve plans needed to allow that development by misrepresenting to the BRA that it had the plaintiffs’ participation. This matter came before the Court in October 2016 for jury-waived trial on the sole remaining count of the Verified Complaint, Count VII, alleging a violation of Chapter 93A. This Court concludes that judgment should enter for the defendant. 2 FINDINGS OF FACT1 Parcel 18 is located in the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston next to Northeastern’s main campus. It consists of five sub parcels: 18-1A, 18-1B, 18-2, 18-3A and 18-3B. The BRA designated Parcel 18 as a Planned Development Area (PDA), specifically PDA 34. A PDA is a zoning overlay district and is one of the tools used by the BRA to impose certain controls on commercial development. Those tools include Cooperation Agreements, Sales and Construction Agreements, Master Plans and Development Plans. In June 1989, the BRA adopted a Master Plan and a Development Plan for Parcel 18. The Master Plan provided for the development of multiple buildings on four of the sub parcels, 18-1A, 18-1B, 18-3A, and 18-3B (collectively the “Development Parcels”). The remaining sub parcel, 18-2, was to be the site of a parking garage (the “Garage Parcel”). At the time, Parcel 18 was owned by various government entities, although Northeastern would ultimately become the owner of all of Parcel 18. CPA was formed for the purpose of participating in Boston’s “linkage plan,” a program created to promote development in areas of Boston in need of revitalization by linking together a commercial developer with a minority partner. CPA held certain development rights on Parcel 18. The commercial developer with whom CPA was paired was Metropolitan Structures, an Illinois-based general partnership. From its inception until December 2008, CPA had two general partners: plaintiff Ruggles-Bedford Associates Limited Partnership, (Ruggles-Bedford LP) comprised primarily of 1 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment in this case, another Superior Court judge outlined in the “Background” section of his decision certain facts contained in the summary judgment record, with all inferences drawn in favor of the […]


Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - December 31, 2016 at 5:14 am

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Myrick v. Harvard University (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-037-16)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030;   SJC-11976   KYL V. MYRICK  vs.  HARVARD UNIVERSITY. March 15, 2016. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Appeals Court.  Practice, Civil, Stay of proceedings.      Kyl V. Myrick appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court that denied relief from a ruling of a single justice of the Appeals Court in a case that is currently pending in the Appeals Court.  We affirm.   The case originated in the Superior Court when Myrick filed a complaint against Harvard University alleging employment discrimination.  A judge in the Superior Court dismissed the complaint on Harvard’s motion and denied Myrick’s subsequent attempts to reinstate the case.  Myrick appealed to the Appeals Court and, while his appeal was pending, moved to stay the appeal so that he could file a new complaint and seek additional discovery in the underlying action in the Superior Court.  A single justice of the Appeals Court declined to stay the appeal.  Myrick then requested that a single justice of this court grant relief from the Appeals Court single justice’s order by either staying the appeal in the Appeals Court or remanding the entire matter to the Superior Court.   On the day this appeal was entered in the full court, Myrick filed a two-page memorandum and an appendix of material from the record in the county court.  It appears that he filed these things in an attempt to comply with S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001).  That rule does not apply here, however.  It applies to cases in which a single justice of this court “denies relief from an interlocutory ruling in the trial court.”  Id.  Here the single justice denied relief from an order of a single justice of the Appeals Court in an appeal that is pending there.   That said, we have reviewed Myrick’s submission and the entire record that was before the single justice in the county court, and it is apparent that the single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion by denying Myrick’s request for relief.  Once the Appeals Court single justice denied Myrick’s request for a stay, Myrick could have sought review of that ruling from a panel of the Appeals Court, see Kordis v. Appeals Court, 434 Mass. 662 (2001), but did not do so.  It was unnecessary, and it would have been especially inappropriate […]


Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - March 15, 2016 at 7:44 pm

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Cameron Painting, Inc. v. University of Massachusetts (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-034-13)

NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750;  (617) 557-1030;       12‑P‑968                                        Appeals Court   CAMERON PAINTING, INC.  vs.  UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS.     No. 12‑P‑968. Hampshire.     January 7, 2013.  ‑  February 25, 2013. Present:  Grasso, Kafker, & Meade, JJ.   University of Massachusetts.  Contract, Performance and breach, Under seal, Implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Limitations, Statute of.  Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations.  Governmental Immunity.  Estoppel.       Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 21, 2011.   A motion to dismiss was heard by Mary‑Lou Rup, J.     Michael K. Callan for the plaintiff. Jean M. Kelley for the defendant.     MEADE, J.  Cameron Painting, Inc. (Cameron), appeals from a judgment dismissing its complaint for breach of contract[1] against the University of Massachusetts (University).  On appeal, Cameron claims it was error to dismiss the complaint based on the three-year statute of limitations in G. L. c. 260, § 3A, when the twenty-year statute of limitations in G. L. c. 260, § 1, applied.  Cameron also claims that even if the three-year period applied, the University should be estopped from asserting it.  We affirm, and hold that any action in which the Commonwealth has consented to be sued must be brought within the three-year limitations period provided by G. L. c. 260, § 3A. 1.  Background.  The facts are not in dispute.  On May 9, 2006, Cameron submitted a general bid to the University for a contract for painting services valued at $ 500,000.  The State contract was for “campus painting services” and labor at the University’s Amherst campus. On May 26, 2006, Cameron and the University entered into a one-year contract for the same project.  The contract estimated the volume of business would be $ 500,000, and guaranteed Cameron a minimum payment of $ 1,000 under the contract.  All work pursuant to this contract was to be completed on or before May 31, 2007.  The parties executed the contract as a sealed instrument. The terms of the contract required that prior to the commencement of a particular painting project, both Cameron and the University must reach an agreed-upon price for the particular project.  Over the course of the contract period, the parties could not agree upon any quotes submitted by Cameron for any painting projects at the University.  The University therefore authorized no work for Cameron under the contract terms, and notified Cameron on February 16, 2007, it would […]


Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - February 25, 2013 at 7:02 pm

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Part 2: Does Massachusetts Predict Employer Behavior Under Obamacare … – Forbes



Posted by Massachusetts Legal Resources - January 31, 2013 at 1:09 pm

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