Commonwealth v. Maingrette (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-155-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1532 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. BRIAN MAINGRETTE. No. 13-P-1532. Suffolk. June 3, 2014. – December 3, 2014. Present: Cypher, Brown, & Agnes, JJ. Search and Seizure, Fruits of illegal arrest. Practice, Criminal, Warrant. Evidence, Result of illegal arrest. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Arrest. Police, Unlawful arrest. Arrest. Firearms. Receiving Stolen Goods. Complaint received and sworn to in the West Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on September 11, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kathleen E. Coffey, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Barbara A. Lenk, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Winston D. Kendall for the defendant. CYPHER, J. The defendant, Brian Maingrette, was charged with carrying a firearm without a license, unlawful possession of ammunition, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and receiving stolen property, after he was stopped, and subsequently arrested, on an outstanding warrant. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his arrest was invalid because the warrant on which it was based had been recalled and, therefore, the incriminating items found in the trunk of his motor vehicle that were the basis for the pending charges must be suppressed. After a hearing, a judge of the Boston Municipal Court allowed the motion. The Commonwealth sought leave from a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal of that ruling. The single justice allowed the Commonwealth’s application and directed the appeal to the Appeals Court. Motion hearing. Boston police Officer John Burrows was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. Because the motion judge’s findings are soundly based on Burrows’s testimony and are not in dispute, we quote from them here. “On September 10, 2012, officers assigned to the Youth Violence Task Force received information from a superior officer within the Boston [p]olice department that the defendant had been involved in a domestic incident the night before and he had brandished a gun. The defendant was known to the officers of the Youth Violence Task Force due to prior criminal investigations. “Officer Burrows checked the warrant management system […]
Categories: News Tags: 1115514, Commonwealth, Lawyers, Maingrette, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Gopaul (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-154-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-959 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CHRISTOPHER L. GOPAUL. No. 13-P-959. Middlesex. October 16, 2014. – December 2, 2014. Present: Berry, Hanlon, & Carhart, JJ. Controlled Substances. “School Zone” Statute. Statute, Construction. Complaint received and sworn to in the Marlborough Division of the District Court Department on January 12, 2012. The case was reported by Robert G. Harbour, J. S. Anders Smith for the defendant. Jennifer Bernazzani (Kevin J. Curtin, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. CARHART, J. This case was reported to us by a District Court judge after the judge denied a motion by the defendant Christopher Gopaul to dismiss one count of a fourteen-count criminal complaint against him. The count alleges that the defendant sold marijuana within one hundred feet of a “public park or playground” within the meaning of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, as amended by St. 1993, c. 335. The issues presented are whether § 32J applies only to “public” playgrounds and whether that category excludes playgrounds located on private property, even if accessible to members of the public. Background. The following facts are agreed upon for purposes of the reported questions: “On October 28, 2011, the defendant is alleged to have sold marijuana to an undercover officer. The sale is alleged to have taken place within 100 feet of the outdoor playground at the Windsor Meadows Apartment Complex, a private apartment complex, located at 135 Broadmeadow Street, Marlborough, Massachusetts. . . . The playground has a fence that does not completely surround it and thus anyone can enter the playground without needing to open any gate or door. . . . There are no signs regarding who may access the playground. Among other play structures, there is a slide, climbing structure, and swing set with four swings within the playground.” After the defendant was arrested and the complaint issued, the defendant moved to dismiss one count alleging violation of § 32J, on the basis that the playground at the Windsor Meadows Apartment Complex is not “public.”[1] After a hearing, the judge denied the motion, ruling “that the law was clearly intended to protect children and the word “playground” should not be so narrowly construed to only include playgrounds open to the general public but should and does include playgrounds where children [play on private property].” The judge then agreed to report the […]
Washington v. Cranmer (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-153-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 12-P-1770 Appeals Court CRYSTAL WASHINGTON vs. HILARIE CRANMER. No. 12-P-1770. Suffolk. June 3, 2013. – December 1, 2014. Present: Rapoza, C.J., Cypher, Kantrowitz, Milkey, & Maldonado, JJ.[1] Medical Malpractice, Tribunal, Expert opinion. Negligence, Doctor, Medical malpractice. Practice, Civil, Offer of proof. Evidence, Offer of proof. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 30, 2010. A motion to dismiss was considered by Frances A. McIntyre, J. Nicholas D. Cappiello for the plaintiff. Matthew S. Rydzewski for the defendant. MILKEY, J. On the morning of March 22, 2008, the plaintiff, Crystal Washington, went to the emergency department at Brigham and Women’s Hospital (BWH). There, she complained of various symptoms, and the defendant, Hilarie Cranmer, M.D., examined, treated, and discharged her. After she returned home, Washington suffered a stroke overnight, which caused permanent neurological damage. She filed this action in Superior Court alleging that Dr. Cranmer caused her injuries by not complying with the applicable standard of care.[2] In accordance with G. L. c. 231, § 60B, the matter was referred to a medical malpractice tribunal.[3] After a hearing, the tribunal concluded that Washington’s offer of proof, even if properly substantiated, was insufficient to raise a “legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry.” G. L. c. 231, § 60B, inserted by St. 1975, c. 362, § 5. Washington did not post the $ 6,000 bond required by the statute, and her action therefore was dismissed.[4] See ibid. (“[i]f [the] bond is not posted within thirty days of the tribunal’s finding the action shall be dismissed”). Because we agree with Washington that her offer of proof was adequate, we reverse. Standard of review. “Before a medical malpractice tribunal, a plaintiff’s offer of proof must (1) show that the defendant is a provider of health care as defined in G. L. c. 231, § 60B; (2) demonstrate that the health care provider [in question] did not conform to good medical practice; and (3) establish resulting damage.” Saunders v. Ready, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 403-404 (2007), citing Santos v. Kim, 429 Mass. 130, 132-134 (1999). The relevant standard of care is the one that applies to “the average qualified physician in his or her area of specialty” (in this case, an emergency medicine physician). Medina v. Hochberg, 465 Mass. 102, 106 (2013). Whether the physician met the applicable standard of care generally can be answered only […]
Gallagher v. First Assistant Clerk-Magistrate of the Newburyport District Court, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-190-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11592 ROBERT GALLAGHER vs. FIRST ASSISTANT CLERK-MAGISTRATE OF THE NEWBURYPORT DISTRICT COURT & others.[1] November 28, 2014 Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees, Small claims procedure. District Court, Small claims procedure. Robert Gallagher appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court dismissing his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. In his petition, he sought relief from final judgments entered in two cases in the District Court Department. In one of the cases, after Gallagher prevailed on a complaint brought against him under the harassment prevention statute, G. L. c. 258E, the judge failed to act on his request for attorney’s fees. In the other case, judgment was entered against him on a G. L. c. 93A claim that he brought in the small claims session. As to the former case, Gallagher had, but did not pursue, adequate alternative remedies, both in the trial court and through the ordinary appellate process.[2] “Our general superintendence power under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly, not as a substitute for the normal appellate process or merely to provide an additional layer of appellate review after the normal process has run its course.” Votta v. Police Dep’t of Billerica, 444 Mass. 1001, 1001 (2005). See Foley v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep’t, 398 Mass. 800, 802 (1986), and cases cited (“Where a petitioner can raise his claim in the normal course of trial and appeal, relief will be denied”). As to the latter case, it is well established that “a plaintiff who chooses to proceed in the small claims session waives the right to appeal from any adverse judgment, and likewise is not entitled to invoke this court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence in lieu of an appeal to compel review of the judgment.” Zullo v. Culik Law P.C., 467 Mass. 1009, 1009 (2014), and cases cited. The single justice properly declined to grant extraordinary relief.[3] Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on briefs. Robert J. Gallagher, pro se. Bryan F. Bertram, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth. [1] A Justice of the Lawrence District Court, the clerk-magistrate of the Lawrence District Court, Stephen D’Angelo, Mary McCauley-Manzi, and Catherine W. Wnek. [2] For example, Gallagher could have moved […]