Commonwealth v. Mazariego (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-045-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11719 COMMONWEALTH vs. EDWIN MAZARIEGO. Worcester. January 12, 2016. – March 31, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Rape. Constitutional Law, Voluntariness of statement, Waiver of constitutional rights. Evidence, Voluntariness of statement, Inflammatory evidence, Prior misconduct. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Voluntariness of statement, Argument by prosecutor, Postconviction relief, Duplicative convictions. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 14, 2010. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James R. Lemire, J., and the cases were tried before David Ricciardone, J. Kathleen M. McCarthy for the defendant. Susan M. Oftring, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SPINA, J. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of felony-murder, based on the predicate felony of aggravated rape. He also was convicted of aggravated rape, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison. On appeal, the defendant asserts error in (1) the denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty; (2) the denial of his separate motions to suppress two statements he made to police; (3) the admission in evidence of emotional testimony from the victim’s daughter; (4) the admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts; (5) improper closing argument by the prosecutor; and (6) the denial of his postconviction motion to reduce the verdicts to rape and felony-murder in the second degree. We affirm the convictions of murder in the first degree and order dismissal of the aggravated rape conviction as duplicative. We decline to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt or order a new trial. 1. Background. The jury could have found the following facts. We reserve other details for discussion of particular issues. Walter Martinez lived with his father, Rafael Martinez, on Benefit Street in Worcester in August, 2006. Rafael owned the house. He rented one room to Julio Mancias, Walter’s cousin, and another room to the defendant, Mancias’s friend. On August 18, 2006, at about 10:20 P.M., Walter saw Mancias and the defendant talking to the victim in the hallway of their home. At about 11 P.M., Rafael was driving home and saw Mancias with two other people, one […]
Commonwealth v. Bonilla (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-037-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1348 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LUIS BONILLA No. 14-P-1348. Suffolk. October 1, 2015. – March 30, 2016. Present: Cypher, Milkey, & Hanlon, JJ. Larceny. Uttering Forged Instrument. Practice, Criminal, Required finding. Complaint received and sworn to in the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on March 5, 2013. The case was tried before Raymond G. Dougan, Jr., J. Edward Crane for the defendant. Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HANLON, J. Following a jury trial, the defendant, Luis Bonilla, was convicted of larceny over $ 250 by a single scheme (count 1), and uttering a false instrument (count 2); he was sentenced to two one-year concurrent sentences to the house of correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part. Background. On February 26, 2013, the defendant deposited six $ 5,000 checks, one into each of six newly opened bank accounts at Metro Credit Union, for a total amount of $ 30,000. The next day, the defendant returned to Metro Credit Union and withdrew $ 600 in cash, $ 200 from each of three of the new accounts: $ 200 was the maximum amount available for each new account until the original deposit checks cleared. Sometime after the defendant withdrew the $ 600, Metro Credit Union was informed that all six of the initial checks had been dishonored and were being returned to the bank. Three of the returned checks were drawn from the defendant’s TD Bank account, which had been opened only one week earlier; the other three checks, from his East Boston Savings Bank account, were returned because the account had been closed. Thereafter, the defendant made no attempt to pay back the money he had withdrawn. In addition, some of the identification information that the defendant had provided to Metro Credit Union when he opened his accounts was incorrect.[1] Specifically, both the social security number and mother’s maiden name were incorrect. 1. Larceny. In order to sustain a conviction for larceny, the Commonwealth must prove “that a defendant took the personal property of another without the right to do so, and ‘with the specific intent to deprive the other of the property permanently.’ Commonwealth v. Murray, 401 Mass. 771, 772 […]
Van Liew v. Stansfield (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-044-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11905 ROLAND VAN LIEW vs. COLLEEN STANSFIELD. Middlesex. January 8, 2016. – March 30, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. “Anti-SLAPP” Statute. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Appeal, Review of interlocutory action. District Court, Appellate Division. Civil Harassment. Civil action commenced in the Lowell Division of the District Court Department on February 22, 2012. A special motion to dismiss was heard by Laurence D. Pierce, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Michael J. Fencer for the defendant. Karen A. Pickett for the plaintiff. BOTSFORD, J. In this case we first consider a procedural issue concerning the appropriate forum to hear appeals from the allowance of a special motion to dismiss under G. L. c. 231, § 59H (§ 59H), the so-called “anti-SLAPP”[1] statute, by a judge in the District Court. This case also requires us to evaluate the relationship between G. L. c. 258E, the statute governing civil harassment prevention orders, and allegedly political speech. On the procedural issue, we conclude that a party seeking to appeal from a District Court order allowing or denying a special motion to dismiss may file the appeal directly in the Appeals Court, rather than in the Appellate Division of the District Court Department (Appellate Division). We further conclude that with one possible exception, the speech at issue here — primarily concerning a local municipal election and more generally issues of local public concern — did not qualify as either “fighting words” or “true threats,” see O’Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425 (2012), and therefore, no civil harassment prevention order should have issued in this case. In the circumstances presented, Roland Van Liew established that Colleen Stansfield’s petition for a civil harassment prevention order was devoid of factual support, that he had sustained injury, and that Stansfield’s special motion to dismiss Van Liew’s complaint for abuse of process and malicious prosecution should have been denied. Background.[2] Van Liew and Stansfield are both residents of Chelmsford (town). Stansfield has been an elected member of the local planning board since April, 2009. At the time of the events at issue here, in 2012, Van Liew did not hold public office but was an active participant […]
Drummer Boy Homes Association, Inc. v. Britton, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-043-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11969 DRUMMER BOY HOMES ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. CAROLYN P. BRITTON & another.[1] Middlesex. January 7, 2016. – March 29, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Condominiums, Common expenses. Real Property, Condominium. Lien. Mortgage, Priority. Practice, Civil, Standing, Attorney’s fees. Civil actions commenced in the Concord Division of the District Court Department on August 8, 2007; February 6, 2008; and October 6, 2008. After consolidation, the case was heard by Peter J. Kilmartin, J., on a motion for summary judgment, and a motion to alter and amend the judgment was also heard by him. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Thomas O. Moriarty (Jennifer L. Barnett with him) for the plaintiff. Michael A.F. Johnson, of the District of Columbia (Rhiannon A. Campbell with him), for Federal Housing Finance Agency & others, amici curiae. Randy A. Britton, pro se. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Alan E. Lipkind & Elizabeth Brady Murillo for Avidia Bank & others. Henry A. Goodman, Ellen A. Shapiro, Charles A. Perkins, Jr., Scott J. Eriksen, & David R. Chenelle for Community Associations Institute. Clive D. Martin & Diane R. Rubin for Real Estate Bar Association for Massachusetts, Inc. Stephen C. Reilly & Jennifer E. Greaney for Bank of America, N.A. SPINA, J. At issue in this case is whether G. L. c. 183A, § 6, permits an organization of unit owners to establish multiple contemporaneous priority liens on a condominium unit by filing successive legal actions to collect unpaid monthly common expense assessments (common expenses).[2] We conclude that the statute allows for such liens. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division of the District Court,[3] which reached a contrary conclusion.[4] 1. Background. Over the last ten years, the parties in this case have been involved in protracted and contentious litigation concerning parking rights at a condominium complex. Our recitation of the factual background and procedural history encompasses only those matters that relate to the specific issues now before this court. Drummer Boy Condominium II, which consists of twelve individual units, is one of nine condominiums comprising Drummer Boy Green in Lexington. In the aggregate, the nine condominiums have approximately 150 units. The defendant, Carolyn […]
Commonwealth v. Keene (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-036-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1793 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ANTOINE KEENE. No. 14-P-1793. March 28, 2016. Firearms. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Reasonable suspicion. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. This case began when two men, one of whom is the defendant, ran out of a nightclub in Stoughton at 12:52 A.M. on April 21, 2013. When stopped by Stoughton police Officer Mark Baldner, they said they were leaving the club because there was a fight inside, which was true. The officer told them they could leave, and saw them get into a Nissan Altima vehicle, the license plate number of which he wrote down. He did not see them again. Approximately ten minutes later there was a shooting outside the nightclub. The officer told Stoughton police dispatch to issue a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) bulletin for the Altima, requesting that it be “stop[ped] and h[e]ld.” Although the defendant and his companion had left the scene before the shooting occurred, the Boston police department issued a broadcast for units to be on the lookout for a Nissan Altima with the license plate number provided by Officer Baldner, which was described as “coming back to 130 Cummings Highway, [Boston] containing two occupants” and “last seen heading northbound on route 138.” The broadcast directed units to “stop and hold for the Stoughton [police department] regarding a shooting” and, for reasons that are unexplained in the record, added that the occupants “should be considered armed and dangerous.” Boston police officers saw the Altima on Radcliffe Street in Mattapan. They stopped the car and approached it with guns drawn, ordering its occupants to keep their hands up and make no sudden movements. The officers secured the defendant, who had been driving, and put him in a police car with his hands cuffed behind his back. Police searched the car for a gun without success. An officer from the K9 unit then conducted a more thorough search, during which he lifted the armrest of the driver’s side door, which seemed to be loose and not sealed as designed. He saw a cloth bag and the baseplate of firearm magazine. He then closed the armrest and put his K9 partner inside the car, and the dog alerted to the driver’s side door armrest. Two firearms were recovered. A Suffolk County […]
Commonwealth v. Oliveira (and a companion case) (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-042-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11972 SJC-11973 COMMONWEALTH vs. JEMAUL R. OLIVEIRA (and a companion case[1]). Bristol. January 8, 2016. – March 28, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Inventory, Impoundment of vehicle. Complaints received and sworn to in the New Bedford Division of the District Court Department on March 19, 2013. Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Kathryn E. Hand, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Duffly, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Yul-mi Cho, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Jemaul R. Oliveira. Christopher DeMayo for Mitchell T. Violet. GANTS, C.J. The interlocutory appeal in these companion cases requires us to examine whether it was reasonable for the police to impound a vehicle lawfully parked in a department store lot and conduct an inventory search of the vehicle after the authorized driver of the vehicle was arrested for shoplifting. We conclude that where the driver had offered the police an alternative to impoundment that was lawful and practical under the circumstances, it was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional to impound the vehicle and conduct an inventory search. We therefore affirm the motion judge’s allowance of the defendants’ motions to suppress the fruits of the inventory search. Background. The defendants, Mitchell T. Violet and Jemaul R. Oliveira, were charged with shoplifting by concealing merchandise, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30A, and unlawfully carrying a firearm, in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).[2] Both moved to suppress the firearm located during the inventory search of the vehicle that they used to travel to the department store. We summarize the facts found by the motion judge following the evidentiary hearing, supplemented where necessary with undisputed testimony that was implicitly credited by the judge. Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 431 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008). At about 4:30 P.M. on March 18, 2013, Dartmouth police Officers Robert St. Denis and […]
City of Springfield v. United Public Service Employees Union (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-035-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-742 Appeals Court CITY OF SPRINGFIELD vs. UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION. No. 15-P-742. Hampden. February 11, 2016. – March 25, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Rubin, & Agnes, JJ. Arbitration, Collective bargaining, Authority of arbitrator, Judicial review. Employment, Sexual harassment, Termination. Public Policy. Public Employment, Collective bargaining, Termination, Reinstatement of personnel. Civil Service, Termination of employment, Reinstatement of personnel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 2, 2014. The case was heard by John S. Ferrara, J. Gordon D. Quinn for the plaintiff. Lan T. Kantany for the defendant. KAFKER, C.J. The issue presented is whether an arbitrator exceeded her authority when she ordered a terminated employee reinstated without loss of pay or other rights, even though she found that he had engaged in conduct amounting to sexual harassment. Because the mitigating circumstances the arbitrator identified supported her determination that the employer lacked just cause for termination, and her order does not preclude appropriate remedial action to address the employee’s sexual harassment, we conclude that her award does not offend public policy or require a result prohibited by statute. We therefore affirm the Superior Court judge’s decision confirming the validity of the award. 1. Background. The city of Springfield (city) discharged Gregory Ashe, a long-time employee, following an investigation and hearing after a coworker complained of sexually inappropriate conduct. Ashe, through his union, grieved the city’s decision to terminate his employment. Pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the case was submitted to an arbitrator. The parties presented the following question: ”Was the termination of the Grievant Gregory Ashe supported by just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?” After two days of hearings, the arbitrator issued her award. She determined that much of the alleged harassing conduct did occur, but found that mitigating circumstances meant there was not just cause for termination. She concluded: ”As a remedy, the Grievant is entitled to be reinstated to his position without loss of compensation or other rights.” The city sought to vacate the award in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 150C, § 11. In its appeal, the city argued that the arbitrator exceeded her authority under the CBA by reinstating the employee in direct violation of the public policy and statutory requirements governing sexual harassment. The judge, in […]
Commonwealth v. Sanchez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-034-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1392 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LUIS SANCHEZ. No. 14-P-1392. Bristol. February 5, 2016. – March 23, 2016. Present: Green, Hanlon, & Henry, JJ. Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Curtilage, Warrant. Witness, Privilege. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Required finding, Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury. Evidence, Constructive possession. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 28, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Renée P. Dupuis, J., and the case was tried before Robert J. Kane, J. Brad P. Bennion for the defendant. Tara L. Blackman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GREEN, J. Among various challenges to his conviction of trafficking in one hundred grams or more of “crack” cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E, the defendant contends that a search warrant authorizing a search of his apartment did not extend to a free-standing shed in the backyard outside the three-unit apartment building.[1] We conclude that the motion judge correctly concluded that the shed was a part of the curtilage of the apartment, so that the search authorized by the warrant properly extended to the shed. Discerning no merit in the defendant’s other claims of error, we affirm. Background. We summarize the findings of the motion judge on the defendant’s motion to suppress, reserving other facts for our discussion of the defendant’s other claims. On August 28, 2012, New Bedford police Officer Jason Gangi and other members of the New Bedford police department executed a search warrant authorizing a search of the third-floor apartment at 101 Coffin Avenue and any persons present. The building at 101 Coffin Avenue is a multi-family dwelling consisting of three apartments. Police set up surveillance at the target location. Two vehicles approached the location, and the defendant was a passenger in one of the vehicles. Police stopped the defendant and obtained a set of keys from him.[2] Using a key from the set, police opened the door to the third-floor apartment. Within minutes after gaining entry to the apartment, Officer Gangi went to the backyard to search. The entire backyard was fenced. While in the yard, Officer Gangi discovered a locked shed and, using one of the keys on the key ring obtained from the defendant, unlocked a padlock on the shed door and gained access to the […]
Commonwealth v. Boucher (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-041-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11605 COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD M. BOUCHER, JR. Plymouth. September 11, 2015. – March 23, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Armed Assault with Intent to Murder. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury. Intoxication. Mental Impairment. Intent. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 2, 2010. The cases were tried before Raymond P. Veary, Jr., J. Leslie W. O’Brien for the defendant. Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Chauncey B. Wood, Paul E. Nemser, & Joshua M. Daniels, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty in the May 27, 2010, shooting death of James Tigges at a party in Plymouth.[1] The defendant also was convicted of armed assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in the shooting of Tigges’s friend, Jackson Duncan, who was paralyzed from the chest down when a bullet severed his spinal cord.[2] On appeal, the defendant contends that the judge’s instructions as to the manner in which the jury could consider evidence of mental impairment by intoxication precluded them from considering that evidence on the question whether the defendant acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty. Specifically, he contends that the instructions improperly limited the jury’s consideration of that evidence to the elements of murder in the first and second degree requiring intent or knowledge, such as premeditation or malice, whereas conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty does not require either that a defendant know his or her acts are extremely atrocious or cruel, or that he or she intend them to be. In the alternative, the defendant suggests that this court should adopt a specific intent requirement for murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty, as was proposed in concurring opinions in Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799, 828-829 (2014) (Duffly, J., concurring), andCommonwealth v. Berry, 466 Mass. 763, 777-778 (2014)(Gants, J., concurring). We decline the invitation to adopt a new formulation of extreme atrocity or […]
Lasher v. Leslie-Lasher (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-040-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11954 JEFFREY M. LASHER vs. TRICIA LESLIE-LASHER. March 22, 2016. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Divorce and Separation, Relief from judgment. Practice, Civil, Relief from judgment. The petitioner, Jeffrey M. Lasher, was divorced from the respondent, Tricia Leslie-Lasher, pursuant to a judgment of divorce nisi in 2014. In March, 2015, he filed a motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b) (2) and (3), which was denied by a judge of the Probate and Family Court in May, 2015. The petitioner then filed a petition in the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., seeking review of that order.[1] He alleged both that the respondent had been untruthful about her financial resources in the divorce proceedings and that the Probate and Family Court judge should have recused himself from ruling on the postjudgment motion. A single justice of the Appeals Court initially remanded the case to the Probate and Family Court judge for clarification and findings regarding the status of the petitioner’s recusal motion and the judge’s ruling on it. After the judge issued his findings,[2] the single justice denied the petition and later denied a motion for reconsideration. A second single justice of the Appeals Court struck the petitioner’s notice of appeal. See McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 189 (2008). The petitioner subsequently filed a substantially similar petition in the county court, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. A single justice of this court denied the petition. After allowing the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the single justice again denied the petition. We affirm the judgment of the single justice of this court. It is incumbent on a party seeking exercise of this court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3, to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of alternative means of redress. See Russell v. Nichols, 434 Mass. 1015, 1016 (2001); McGuiness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 497 (1995), and cases cited. In this case, the petitioner failed to allege, much less demonstrate, that the Probate and Family Court judge’s order denying relief from the divorce judgment could not adequately be addressed through the ordinary appellate process, in an appeal to a panel of the Appeals Court from the postjudgment order.[3] See, e.g., Raheman v. Raheman, 59 Mass. […]