Commonwealth v. Lugo (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-033-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1208 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSE LUGO. No. 14-P-1208. Suffolk. November 9, 2015. – March 18, 2016. Present: Cypher, Trainor, & Rubin, JJ. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Joint venturer, Knife. Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 27, 2012. The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. Jacob B. Stone for the defendant. Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney (Megan E. O’Rourke, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. The defendant, Jose Lugo, appeals from his convictions by a jury of assault and battery with a knife, assault and battery with a shod foot, and assault with a knife. He argues that the trial judge’s denial of his motions for a required finding of not guilty was error because there was insufficient evidence of his participation in a joint venture to support his convictions of assault and battery with a knife and assault with a knife. He claims error also in the prosecutor’s closing argument and the jury instructions on prior inconsistent statements. We affirm the defendant’s convictions. Background. On April 12, 2012, friends Victor Ramos, Milton Henriquez, Edwin Colon, and Alejandro Naranjo spent the evening together at a Boston nightclub. At closing time, around 2:00 A.M., the four friends returned to their car, which was parked across the street in a multilevel garage. Waiting in a line of vehicles to exit the garage, the friends were approached by a man from a vehicle in front of theirs who, thinking that they had been honking the horn, punched Colon and Naranjo through their open passenger’s side windows. The four friends got out of their car and Henriquez traded blows with the man before being separated by the friends and others from surrounding vehicles. When the brawl subsided and the crowd of people who had gathered to watch or take part in the fight began to disperse, a sport utility vehicle (SUV) from an upper level of the garage approached the area and stopped and two men emerged. One was a tall, skinny man, later identified as Javier Fernandez, and the other was a short man with braids, later identified as the defendant. According to testimony […]
Almeida, et al. v. Arruda, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-032-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-292 Appeals Court JILLIAN ALMEIDA & others[1] vs. ANTONIO ARRUDA & others.[2] No. 15-P-292. Bristol. January 12, 2016. – March 18, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Cohen, & Blake, JJ. Alcoholic Liquors. Zoning, Nonconforming use or structure. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on October 18, 2011. The case was heard by Robert J. Kane, J. Marc R. Deshaies for the plaintiffs. Walter Fraze, Jr., for Antonio Arruda and another. KAFKER, C.J. This appeal arises from a dispute over the addition of beer and wine sales at a convenience store in the town of Westport. The store, owned by Antonio and Darlene Arruda (collectively, Arrudas) and located on land that is currently zoned as residential, operates as a lawful, preexisting nonconforming use pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 6. The Arrudas sought a finding by the zoning board of appeals of Westport (board) allowing the sale of beer and wine at the store. The board voted unanimously in favor of the Arrudas on the ground that the addition of beer and wine sales to the store’s preexisting nonconforming use is not substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood. The plaintiffs, abutters to the store, appealed pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17. After a bench trial, a Superior Court judge affirmed the board’s decision, finding that the sale of beer and wine was neither a “substantial change” in use nor a “detriment to the neighborhood.” Judgment entered and the plaintiffs appealed. We affirm. Background. The convenience store is located on land that is currently zoned for residential use. The Arrudas purchased the store in 2005, at which time it presumably was operating as a lawful nonconforming use under G. L. c. 40A, § 6.[3] The store was within commonly owned commercial space that also contained a beauty shop and an insurance company. In 2006, the Arrudas sought permission from the board to enlarge the convenience store by encapsulating the space then reserved for the beauty shop and the insurance company. The Arrudas also sought permission to sell beer and wine at the store. After a public hearing, the board granted permission for the store’s expansion but denied permission to sell beer and wine. Apparently no one appealed the board’s decision. In September, 2011, the Arrudas leased the store to Lino Rego while maintaining ownership of the property. The Arrudas […]
In the Matter of Weiss (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-039-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11890 IN THE MATTER OF RICHARD S. WEISS. March 17, 2016. Attorney at Law, Suspension, Reinstatement. The petitioner, Richard S. Weiss, appeals from the judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for reinstatement to the bar. We affirm. After Weiss “stipulated to facts warranting the conclusion that he violated the applicable disciplinary rules,” see Matter of Weiss, 460 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2011), he was suspended from the practice of law for one year and one day, effective May 20, 2011. His first petition for reinstatement was denied by a single justice of this court in 2013, and he was given leave to reapply for reinstatement on or after January 1, 2014. See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (8), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009). He filed a second petition for reinstatement on June 25, 2013. The single justice denied the petition without prejudice to filing a new petition on or after January 1, 2014. The petition he filed thereafter, his third, is the subject of this appeal. On October 23, 2014, a hearing committee of the Board of Bar Overseers (board) held a hearing, at which Weiss was represented by counsel, on his third petition. The committee issued a report on December 2, 2014, setting forth its findings and recommending that the petition for reinstatement be denied. On February 22, 2015, the board voted unanimously to adopt the report of the hearing committee and its recommendation that the petition be denied. A single justice of this court reviewed the record before the hearing committee and the board, concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the findings, and denied the petition for reinstatement.[1] The case is now before us on Weiss’s preliminary memorandum, pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:23 (b), 471 Mass. 1303 (2015). That rule requires an appellant to “set forth the relevant background and summarize the appellant’s arguments on appeal, with citations to applicable authority. It is incumbent on the appellant to demonstrate in this memorandum that there has been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the single justice; that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence; that the sanction is markedly disparate from the sanctions imposed in other cases involving similar circumstances; or that for other reasons the decision will result in […]
Abrahamson v. Estate of LeBold (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-031-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-474 Appeals Court RICHARD ABRAHAMSON vs. ESTATE OF JOHN LeBOLD. No. 15-P-474. Barnstable. January 14, 2016. – March 17, 2016. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Maldonado, JJ. Limitations, Statute of. Executor and Administrator, Short statute of limitations. Practice, Civil, Statute of limitations. Jurisdiction, Equitable. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on July 3, 2014. A motion to dismiss was heard by Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J. Alexander J. Durst, of Ohio (David V. Lawler with him) for the plaintiff. Eric P. Finamore for the defendant. SULLIVAN, J. The plaintiff, Richard Abrahamson, appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint because it was not filed within one year of the date of death of the decedent, John LeBold, as required by § 3-803(a) of the Massachusetts Uniform Probate Code (MUPC). See G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803(a). Abrahamson contends that his suit was timely filed pursuant to the savings statute, see G. L. c. 260 § 32, and, alternatively, he should have been granted equitable relief from the one-year limitations period in the MUPC. We conclude that G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803(a), governs, and G. L. c. 190B, § 3-803(e), bars the award of equitable relief in the trial court. 1. Procedural history. The following procedural history is undisputed on appeal. Abrahamson first filed suit against John LeBold in the Court of Common Pleas in Hamilton County, Ohio, in September of 2012. A little over two months later, on December 5, 2012, LeBold died. The Ohio trial court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction on January 22, 2013, and Abrahamson appealed. While the appeal was pending, on February 13, 2013, LeBold’s counsel filed a “Suggestion of Death” with the trial court. Abrahamson then successfully substituted LeBold’s estate as the defendant in the Ohio appeal. On December 6, 2013, a year and a day after LeBold’s death, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. Abrahamson did not file suit in Massachusetts until July 3, 2014, over a year and a half after LeBold’s death. The estate filed a motion to dismiss the Massachusetts action, which was allowed. In a comprehensive and well-reasoned memorandum, the motion judge ruled that Abrahamson’s claims were barred as a matter of law because LeBold had died more than a year before the plaintiff filed suit in Massachusetts, thereby […]
Kilnapp Enterprises, Inc. v. Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers Association, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-030-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-101 Appeals Court KILNAPP ENTERPRISES, INC.[1] vs. MASSACHUSETTS STATE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION & others.[2] No. 15-P-101. Suffolk. December 7, 2015. – March 17, 2016. Present: Rubin, Maldonado, & Massing, JJ. Libel and Slander. Actionable Tort. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 10, 2014. A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith Fabricant, J. Travis J. Jacobs for the plaintiff. Alan D. Rose, Sr., for Fisher & Phillips LLP & another. James F. Radke for Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers Association. RUBIN, J. This is an action for defamation brought by Kilnapp Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Real Clean (Real Clean), which describes itself as “a broker for automobile detailing and reconditioning between service providers and automobile dealerships.”[3] Real Clean brought this action against the Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers Association (MSADA) for its published statements concerning an investigation by the United States Department of Labor (DOL) into the practices of automobile detailing “brokers” including Real Clean. The complaint asserts not only a claim for defamation, but includes several other related counts that will be described more fully below. It names as a defendant not only MSADA but the author of the published statements, Attorney Joseph Ambash, and his law firm, Fisher & Phillips LLP. The defendants brought a motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), which was allowed. Real Clean appeals. Because the materials properly considered by the judge in the Superior Court demonstrate that Real Clean will be unable to prove that the defendants’ statements were materially false under the applicable standard, which requires demonstration that actionable statements have been made with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity, we affirm the judgment dismissing all of Real Clean’s claims. Background. Our review of the allowance of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermkts., Inc., 469 Mass. 752, 754 (2014). For purposes of reviewing the allowance of a motion to dismiss we must, of course, take all the allegations in the plaintiff’s operative complaint, here the amended and verified complaint filed on May 7, 2014, as true. Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). […]
Categories: News Tags: 1103016, Association, Automobile, Dealers, Enterprises, Inc., Kilnapp, Lawyers, massachusetts, state, Weekly
Commonwealth v. Chatman (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-038-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-08921 COMMONWEALTH vs. DEMOND CHATMAN. Suffolk. December 11, 2015. – March 16, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Competency to stand trial, Capital case. Evidence, Competency. Due Process of Law, Competency to stand trial. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 5, 2000. After review by this court, 466 Mass. 327 (2013), a motion for a new trial was heard by Barbara J. Rouse, J. Edward L. Hayden for the defendant. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (Mark T. Lee, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. CORDY, J. On February 10, 2000, police responded to a telephone call made by the defendant, Demond Chatman, reporting that his mother, the victim, had been shot. The defendant directed officers to the home of the victim’s aunt, where the defendant was living. The police found the victim’s body in the aunt’s bedroom. On January 24, 2002, a jury returned a guilty verdict against the defendant on the charge of murder in the first degree. The defendant appealed, and, in May, 2008, during the pendency of that appeal, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that he had not been competent to stand trial. The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, denied the motion in October, 2011, after a nonevidentiary hearing. The defendant appealed. In September, 2013, we reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing consistent with a newly established burden of proof on defendants who, postverdict, seek a new trial on the basis of incompetency when the issue was not raised or considered at the time of, or prior to, trial. See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 466 Mass. 327, 335-336, 339 (2013). In November, 2014, after four days of evidentiary hearings, the motion judge again denied the defendant’s motion. Now before us for the second time, the defendant combines his direct appeal from his conviction with his challenge to the denial of his motion for a new trial.[1] He also requests relief pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. As we explain below, our review of the entire record discloses no basis on which to grant relief. We therefore […]
Myrick v. Harvard University (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-037-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11976 KYL V. MYRICK vs. HARVARD UNIVERSITY. March 15, 2016. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Appeals Court. Practice, Civil, Stay of proceedings. Kyl V. Myrick appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court that denied relief from a ruling of a single justice of the Appeals Court in a case that is currently pending in the Appeals Court. We affirm. The case originated in the Superior Court when Myrick filed a complaint against Harvard University alleging employment discrimination. A judge in the Superior Court dismissed the complaint on Harvard’s motion and denied Myrick’s subsequent attempts to reinstate the case. Myrick appealed to the Appeals Court and, while his appeal was pending, moved to stay the appeal so that he could file a new complaint and seek additional discovery in the underlying action in the Superior Court. A single justice of the Appeals Court declined to stay the appeal. Myrick then requested that a single justice of this court grant relief from the Appeals Court single justice’s order by either staying the appeal in the Appeals Court or remanding the entire matter to the Superior Court. On the day this appeal was entered in the full court, Myrick filed a two-page memorandum and an appendix of material from the record in the county court. It appears that he filed these things in an attempt to comply with S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). That rule does not apply here, however. It applies to cases in which a single justice of this court “denies relief from an interlocutory ruling in the trial court.” Id. Here the single justice denied relief from an order of a single justice of the Appeals Court in an appeal that is pending there. That said, we have reviewed Myrick’s submission and the entire record that was before the single justice in the county court, and it is apparent that the single justice neither erred nor abused her discretion by denying Myrick’s request for relief. Once the Appeals Court single justice denied Myrick’s request for a stay, Myrick could have sought review of that ruling from a panel of the Appeals Court, see Kordis v. Appeals Court, 434 Mass. 662 (2001), but did not do so. It was unnecessary, and it would have been especially inappropriate […]
Commonwealth v. Henderson (No. 1) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-029-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1459 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. KEITH HENDERSON (NO. 1). No. 14-P-1459. Hampden. October 5, 2015. – March 15, 2016. Present: Vuono, Carhart, & Sullivan, JJ. Motor Vehicle, Operation, Leaving scene of accident. Evidence, Intent. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Duplicative convictions, Double jeopardy. Constitutional Law, Double jeopardy. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 9, 2013. The case was tried before Edward J. McDonough, J. Leslie H. Powers for the defendant. Alyson C. Yorlano, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SULLIVAN, J. Following a trial on multiple indictments, a jury convicted the defendant, Keith Henderson, on two indictments charging leaving the scene of an accident causing personal injury in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a1/2)(1), and on three indictments charging leaving the scene of an accident causing property damage in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a).[1] On appeal, the defendant maintains that (1) the judge erred in failing to instruct that the Commonwealth must prove that he had the specific intent to leave the scene of the accident, and (2) he was convicted of multiple counts of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of his right to be free from double jeopardy.[2] We conclude that the jury were properly instructed, but that, on the facts presented, the convictions were duplicative. We therefore vacate the judgment on one of the counts of leaving the scene of an accident causing personal injury and the judgments on all but one of the counts of leaving the scene of an accident causing property damage. We affirm the remaining judgments. Background. The evidence pertinent to the appeal may be summarized as follows. Sean Kydd’s car was taken from him at gunpoint on March 5, 2013, by a man he was unable to identify. Kydd filed a police report that day, reporting the car stolen. Nine days later on March 14, 2013, Kydd spotted his car in Springfield and called the police. Two police officers in marked police cruisers met Kydd, and all three drove separately to where the car was located. As the caravan passed Kydd’s stolen car, one police officer made eye contact with the driver, who was later identified as the defendant. ”[T]he [car] took off” in the opposite direction. The officers followed in pursuit. The defendant “continued accelerating” and […]
Commonwealth v. Beltrandi (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-027-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1926 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. AMY B. BELTRANDI. No. 14-P-1926. Hampshire. December 14, 2015. – March 14, 2016. Present: Grainger, Hanlon, & Agnes, JJ. Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence, Operation. Practice, Criminal, Required finding, Argument by prosecutor, Witness. Evidence, Absence of witness. Witness. Complaint received and sworn to in the Eastern Hampshire Division of the District Court Department on May 29, 2012. The case was tried before John M. Payne, Jr., J. Tara B. Ganguly for the defendant. Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. In this appeal from her conviction of operating a motor vehicle on a public way while under the influence of alcohol in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1), the defendant raises two issues. First, she argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that she operated the vehicle. While the question is a close one, we conclude that on the basis of the circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth, the jury were entitled to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant was the operator of the vehicle. Second, she argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper because in the absence of a missing witness instruction, the prosecutor should not have urged the jury to draw an adverse inference against the defendant due to the absence of a potential witness. We agree with the defendant that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, and conclude that it constituted prejudicial error. Accordingly, we reverse. Background. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found that at approximately 2:30 A.M. on May 29, 2012, a resident of Ware awoke to see a truck (later identified as a 2006 Toyota Tacoma pickup truck) stopped on Route 9 (Belchertown Road). Two-thirds of the vehicle was in the road and about one-third was over the fog line. The resident placed a telephone call to 911. Officer Scott Underwood of the Ware police department arrived soon thereafter. Initially, he saw the truck in the westbound lane, with its engine running and its lights out. He noticed that the windows were fogged up. He did not see any movement inside the vehicle. While standing at the vehicle’s back bumper, he […]
N-Tek Construction Services, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-028-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1483 Appeals Court N-TEK CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC. vs. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 14-P-1483. Essex. November 5, 2015. – March 14, 2016. Present: Agnes, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ. Public Works, Payment bond. Surety. Notice. Bond, Public works, Construction contract bond. Contract, Public works, Construction contract, Bond, Surety. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 18, 2010. After transfer within the Superior Court Department, the case was heard by Timothy Q. Feeley, J. Edward J. Quinlan for the plaintiff. John W. DiNicola, II, for the defendant. AGNES, J. In this case we address the notice provision contained in G. L. c. 149, § 29, as amended by St. 1972, c. 774, § 5 (§ 29),[1] in the context of a $ 23.29 million publicly funded project to repair a bridge in Gloucester (project). In particular, we decide whether the electronic mail message (e-mail) notice given by the claimant, N-Tek Construction Services, Inc. (N-Tek), to the general contractor, SPS New England, Inc. (SPS), satisfied § 29. N-Tek contends that the Superior Court judge, who tried this case without a jury, erred in concluding that the e-mail sent to SPS by N-Tek’s principal failed to satisfy the requirements of § 29. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. SPS, the general contractor, posted a payment bond from a surety, Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford). N-Tek filed the underlying action, seeking recovery against SPS’s bond pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 29, based on its claim that it had not been fully paid for its work furnished to a subcontractor, Seaway Coatings, Inc. (Seaway). N-Tek sought to reach and apply the payment bond funds to satisfy outstanding invoices. Hartford denied liability. After a bench trial, the judge found that N-Tek did not provide sufficient written notice of its bond claim to SPS as required by § 29, and ordered judgment to enter for Hartford. On appeal, N-Tek argues that the judge misinterpreted § 29 by imposing an added requirement that the notice “include and communicate an intent to assert a claim against the [g]eneral [c]ontractor’s” bond, based on Federal cases construing the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131-3134 (2002), the Federal analogue to § 29.[2] Facts. We summarize the facts found by the judge, supplemented by undisputed parts of the record. 1. Project. On August 14, 2008, the Massachusetts Highway Department (department)[3] […]