Commonwealth v. Chukwuezi (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-155-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11579 COMMONWEALTH vs. XZENIYEJU CHUKWUEZI. Suffolk. February 12, 2016. – September 29, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Homicide. Firearms. Evidence, Computer simulation, Prior consistent statement, Alibi. Alibi. Constitutional Law, Sentence. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Sentence, Capital case. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 1, 2009. The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, and of unlawful possession of a firearm, in connection with the 2009 shooting death of Soheil Turner, a fifteen year old boy. The defendant was eighteen years old at the time of the shooting. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge abused her discretion in excluding from evidence a computer-generated simulation that was intended to assist the jury in determining the shooter’s height. He also asserts error in several other respects, described in greater detail below, and seeks relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. Having reviewed the entire record, we affirm the convictions and discern no reason to exercise our authority to grant extraordinary relief. Background and procedural posture. We recite the facts the jury could have found, reserving certain details for later discussion. At approximately 7:20 A.M. on May 7, 2009, Turner was shot in the back of the head and in the right shoulder while waiting for a school bus in the Roxbury section of Boston. He died later that day as a result of the shooting. Police recovered two shell casings from the scene of the shooting that appeared to have been fired from a semiautomatic firearm. Several video surveillance cameras recorded the shooting and the surrounding circumstances.[2] Shortly after 7 A.M. on the morning of the shooting, the shooter, an African-American male carrying a yellow umbrella, walked north on Adams Street from the direction of Forest Street, and stopped at the northeast corner of Dudley Street and Adams Street. The shooter was wearing a black hooded sweatshirt with the hood up, and a loose fitting T-shirt and pants. A few minutes later, a young woman, later identified as […]
Commonwealth v. White (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-154-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11917 COMMONWEALTH vs. ONYX WHITE. Suffolk. December 8, 2015. – September 28, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Cellular Telephone. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Warrant, Fruits of illegal search. Practice, Criminal, Warrant. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 19, 2010. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Patrick F. Brady, J. An application for leave to file an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Cordy, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by him. Cailin M. Campbell, Assistant District Attorney (David J. Fredette with her) for the Commonwealth. J.W. Carney, Jr. (Danya F. Fullerton with him) for the defendant. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: David A.F. Lewis, Alexis L. Shapiro, & Christine Dieter for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Vivek Krishnamurthy & Andrew J. Sellars for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. Alan Butler & John Tran, of the District of Columbia, Marc Rotenberg, & Caitriona Fitzgerald for Electronic Privacy Information Center. Afton M. Templin for Committee for Public Counsel Services. LENK, J. In February, 2010, a Boston police detective investigating an armed robbery and shooting at a convenience store went to the defendant’s high school, after suspicion had focused on the defendant as one of the three perpetrators. The detective spoke with a school administrator, who informed him that, pursuant to school policy, she was holding the defendant’s cellular telephone. After consultation with his supervisor, the detective seized the telephone to prevent the defendant from retrieving it and removing evidence or destroying the device. At that point, however, the detective had no information that the cellular telephone had been used to plan, commit, or cover up the crime, or that it contained any evidence of the crime. From experience, the detective was aware, however, that cellular telephones frequently are used when an offense involves multiple perpetrators. Sixty-eight days later, having held — but not searched — the telephone throughout that period, police obtained a warrant to search it on the basis of information that had emerged after the seizure. A forensic search yielded evidence relevant to the investigation, which the defendant then […]
Frost-Stuart v. Stuart (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-137-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-100 Appeals Court MARGOT E. FROST-STUART vs. CHARLES F. STUART. No. 15-P-100. Middlesex. April 15, 2016. – September 27, 2016. Present: Cypher, Agnes, & Massing, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Child support, Modification of judgment. Parent and Child, Child support. Contempt. Practice, Civil, Contempt. Complaint for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on March 4, 2010. A complaint for modification and complaints for contempt were heard by George F. Phelan, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. Kelly L. Petrakis (Karen W. Stuntz with her) for the mother. Alexander D. Jones for the father. CYPHER, J. Margot E. Frost-Stuart (mother) appeals from a modification judgment, as amended, of the Probate and Family Court terminating alimony and increasing child support paid by her former husband, Charles F. Stuart (father), and also disposing of several complaints for contempt.[1] We affirm in part and vacate in part. Background. After fifteen years of marriage, the parties divorced in July, 2010, pursuant to a judgment of divorce nisi. The separation agreement (agreement), which was incorporated into the judgment, required the father to pay to the mother a minimum amount of $ 63,000 each year as alimony[2] and $ 4,750 each month as child support.[3] The agreement further provided that the father’s “support obligation may be reviewed and adjusted upon a change in circumstances, including but not limited to . . . his loss or change of employment, [or] the [mother’s] cohabitation with a dating partner.” The parties share legal custody of their three children, aged ten, seven, and four years at the time of the modification judgment. The father remarried and has two children with his new wife. The mother has cohabited with her boy friend since September, 2010. The father has been employed as a portfolio manager at two successive investment management companies, and the mother has been out of the workforce for many years. In March, 2013, the father filed a complaint for modification,[4] primarily seeking termination of alimony on the basis that the mother had been cohabitating with a dating partner for more than three months, and that the father had a new job with fee-based income and no longer received an annual bonus. The mother counterclaimed, requesting that the […]
JNM Hospitality, Inc. v. McDaid, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-136-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1946 Appeals Court JNM HOSPITALITY, INC. vs. EDWIN McDAID & others,[1] trustees.[2] No. 14-P-1946. Norfolk. January 19, 2016. – September 27, 2016. Present: Grainger, Rubin, & Milkey, JJ. Condominiums, Parking, Common area. Real Property, Condominium, Lease. Landlord and Tenant, Execution of lease, Parking. Contract, Lease of real estate, Performance and breach, Interference with contractual relations. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 19, 2012. A motion for summary judgment was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by him. William E. Gens for the plaintiff. Henry A. Goodman for the defendants. GRAINGER, J. This is an appeal from the dismissal of a claim brought by the commercial tenant of a condominium unit owner against the condominium trustees. The plaintiff, JNM Hospitality, Inc. (JNM), appeals from the summary judgment in favor of the defendant trustees of The Village at Forge Pond Condominium Trust (collectively the trust) ordered by a judge of the Superior Court. JNM asserts that the trust’s execution of a license agreement allowing employees of an abutting United States Postal Service (USPS) facility to use spaces in the vehicle parking lot of the condominium where JNM’s restaurant was located constituted intentional interference in JNM’s contract with its landlord. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.[3] Background. For purposes of our consideration of the allowance of summary judgment, the facts are not in dispute. JNM operated a restaurant and bar on premises leased from Canton Viaduct, LLC, as assignee of the owner of two commercial units in The Village at Forge Pond Condominium, a mixed-use condominium complex in Canton. The trust is the condominium’s governing entity. See G. L. c. 183A, §§ 8(i), 10. At issue are the provisions of JNM’s lease governing the ability to provide vehicle parking spaces to its customers. The lease provisions relating to the number and location of parking spaces are both unclear and, due to handwritten revisions,[4] difficult to decipher. The parties dedicate significant energy and many strained arguments to the meaning of lease provisions relating to this issue, with particular emphasis on so-called nonexclusive parking, i.e., spaces not reserved for any particular person or entity. For purposes of reviewing factual allegations in the motion for summary judgment we adopt, as […]
Commonwealth v. Bigelow (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-153-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11974 COMMONWEALTH vs. HARVEY J. BIGELOW. Bristol. January 8, 2016. – September 27, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Criminal Harassment. Constitutional Law, Freedom of speech and press. Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor. Complaint received and sworn to in the Taunton Division of the District Court Department on November 18, 2011. The case was tried before Gregory L. Phillips, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Diana Cowhey McDermott for the defendant. David B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. In 2013, the defendant Harvey Bigelow was convicted of two counts of criminal harassment under G. L. c. 265, § 43A (§ 43A). The charges were based on five letters the defendant allegedly wrote and sent to Michael Costello and Susan Costello[2] in 2011, following a local election in the town of Rehoboth (town) in which Michael had been elected as a town selectman. We consider here the defendant’s appeal from these convictions; his principal claim is that both convictions must be reversed because the letters consisted of political speech — expressions of dissatisfaction with Michael’s performance as a selectman — that is constitutionally protected. We reverse the defendant’s conviction of criminal harassment of Michael and order that count of the complaint dismissed; we vacate his conviction of criminal harassment of Susan, set aside the verdict, and remand for a new trial on the count of the complaint relating to Susan. Background. In April, 2011, Michael was elected as a selectman of the town. Between May 9 and July 23, 2011, at approximately two-week intervals, the Costellos received five anonymous, type-written letters that were mailed to their home. The letters were addressed to both Costellos or to Susan, and all were authored by the defendant.[3] The first letter, received around May 9, was sent to the Costellos in an envelope addressed to “Mr. and Mrs. Costello,” but the salutation in the letter itself mentioned only Michael. Although the letter included a variety of personal insults directed to and at Michael, in significant part it consisted of statements criticizing Michael’s performance as a selectman, including, as its opening salvo, the following: “Michael Costello — The biggest fucking loser I […]
M.C.D. v. D.E.D. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-135-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1537 Appeals Court M.C.D. vs. D.E.D. No. 15-P-1537. Essex. June 2, 2016. – September 23, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Hanlon, & Neyman, JJ. Abuse Prevention. Domestic Violence Record Keeping System. Fraud. Practice, Civil, Notice of appeal, Fraud. Complaint for protection from abuse filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on December 15, 2014. A motion to vacate the abuse prevention order and to expunge the record, filed on March 6, 2015, was heard by Theresa A. Bisenius, J. Natalie L. Lorenti, Special Assistant Attorney General (Sarah M. Joss with her) for Commissioner of Probation. D.E.D., pro se. HANLON, J. In this cross appeal, the Commissioner of Probation (commissioner) appeals from an order of a Probate and Family Court judge to expunge a G. L. c. 209A abuse prevention order (209A order) entered against the defendant. The commissioner challenges the judge’s findings that the plaintiff’s allegations of abuse were knowingly false and constituted a fraud on the court, as explained in Commissioner of Probation v. Adams, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 729-730 (2006). We agree that the judge’s subsidiary findings were insufficient to support her ultimate finding of fraud on the court, and we vacate the order for expungement.[1] Background. The plaintiff obtained the ex parte 209A order against the defendant on December 15, 2014. She alleged in her affidavit that, on December 3, 2014, the defendant had beaten her and that she was in fear of him. At the ex parte hearing, the plaintiff barely spoke, but her lawyer told the judge that his client had been beaten and that she was extremely reluctant to talk about the incident, but that the people who had treated her medically, as well as members of her family, believed that her injuries could not have been the result of a fall and were, in fact, the result of serious abuse.[2] On December 22, 2014, the day scheduled for the hearing after notice, the plaintiff did not appear and an associate of her lawyer appeared for her. The defendant was represented by counsel, who immediately informed the judge that her client was “an Assistant City Solicitor for [a city in Massachusetts].” She represented that she had “[overwhelming] evidence that . . . this allegation never . . . happened, that [D.E.D.] […]
B.C. v. F.C. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-134-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1067 Appeals Court B.C. vs. F.C. No. 15-P-1067. Norfolk. June 2, 2016. – September 23, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Hanlon, & Neyman, JJ. Abuse Prevention. Domestic Violence Record Keeping System. Complaint for protection from abuse filed in the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 8, 2011. A motion to expunge the record, filed on March 5, 2015, was heard by George F. Phelan, J., and questions of law were reported by him. Natalie L. Lorenti, Special Assistant Attorney General (Sarah M. Joss with her) for Commissioner of Probation. Scott C. Gladstone for B.C. & another. HANLON, J. We are asked by a judge of the Probate and Family Court to answer two questions of law, reported under rule 5 of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure,[1] as amended, 378 Mass. 930 (1979), regarding the inherent authority of a trial judge to order the expungement of an abuse prevention order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (order) from the Statewide domestic violence registry system (registry), and to clarify the type of fraud on the court that would warrant expungement. The case was reported after a final disposition in the trial court,[2] and therefore, we consider the report equivalent to a notice of appeal and proceed under our standard appellate procedure; we accept the judge’s designation of the Commissioner of Probation (commissioner) as the appellant.[3] See Mass.R.A.P. 5.[4] Here, although the judge ordered expungement, he did not find by clear and convincing evidence that the order was obtained through a fraud on the court. For this reason, he lacked the authority to override the statutory requirement that a computerized record of any abuse prevention order be maintained in the registry. See Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18, 24-25 (2014); Commissioner of Probation v. Adams, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 737 (2006); Quinn v. Gjoni, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 414, n.14 (2016). As a result, the judge’s order to expunge the order from the registry must be vacated. Background. The judge found the following facts, which the parties do not challenge.[5] On July 8, 2011, the order was issued after the judge found the plaintiff credible based on the “complaint, her affidavit, and her testimony under oath.”[6] At the hearing after notice held on July 14, […]
Esteraz, petitioner
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-660 Appeals Court JUSTO ESTERAZ, petitioner. No. 15-P-660. Suffolk. June 14, 2016. – September 22, 2016. Present: Trainor, Vuono, & Blake, JJ. Sex Offender. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion, Scientific test. Practice, Civil, Sex offender, Waiver, Assistance of counsel. Waiver. Petition filed in the Superior Court Department on December 2, 2010. The case was tried before Merita A. Hopkins, J. Ethan C. Stiles for the petitioner. Melissa A. Juarez for the Commonwealth. BLAKE, J. After a trial in the Superior Court, the jury returned a verdict finding that the petitioner, Justo Esteraz, remained a sexually dangerous person (SDP) as defined by G. L. c. 123A, § 1. He appeals, arguing that the judge erred by failing to hold a Daubert/Lanigan hearing to determine the admissibility of the results of a risk assessment tool known as the Multisample Age-Stratified Table of Sexual Recidivism Rates (MATS-1), which purports to measure an individual’s likelihood to reoffend. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-595 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24-26 (1994). He also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in his advocacy for the admission of the same evidence. We affirm, addressing, in our discretion, the question whether the MATS-1 evidence was directly admissible as part of the petitioner’s expert’s report. Background. The petitioner was civilly committed as an SDP on October 18, 2010. On December 2, 2010, he filed a petition for release and discharge pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9. At the time of trial, the petitioner was a seventy-four year old man with a significant history of charged and uncharged crimes of sexual abuse spanning over four decades. The petitioner’s victims include three generations of young girls in his extended family, including his daughter, nieces, granddaughters, and step-granddaughters. His conduct has included fondling, vaginal and digital penetration, and oral sex. The petitioner’s criminal record includes four convictions in 1994 for sex crimes committed in Puerto Rico and four convictions in 2008 in Massachusetts for indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen years of age. Pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, the petitioner was examined by two qualified examiners who prepared reports opining that the petitioner remained an SDP. Those reports explained that, despite the petitioner’s advanced age, his extensive and prolonged history of […]
Categories: News Tags: Esteraz, petitioner
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-132-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-131 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. CARLOS RODRIGUEZ. No. 15-P-131. Hampden. March 18, 2016. – September 22, 2016. Present: Milkey, Agnes, & Maldonado, JJ. Assault and Battery. Evidence, Spontaneous utterance, Hearsay, Unavailable witness. Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses. Practice, Criminal, Hearsay, Confrontation of witnesses. Witness, Unavailability. Complaint received and sworn to in the Springfield Division of the District Court Department on March 7, 2014. A motion in limine was heard by Robert A. Gordon, J., and the case was tried before William P. Hadley, J. Anders Smith for the defendant. Thomas R. Worger (Amal Bala, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. The defendant, Carlos Rodriguez, was convicted on August 14, 2014, of assault and battery following a two-day jury trial. He was sentenced to a term of six months in a house of correction. The Commonwealth’s case was based principally on the testimony of West Springfield police Officer Paulina Hannah, the second officer to respond to the scene of a domestic violence incident. She testified to certain statements made to her by the victim, who did not testify at the trial. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge improperly admitted those statements because they did not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule, and they violated his independent constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to confront the witnesses against him. We agree with the judges[1] below that the statements in question made by the victim to Officer Hannah were admissible as excited utterances. However, we agree with the defendant that those initial statements were testimonial, and thus were subject to the confrontation clause. Finally, we conclude that despite the testimonial character of those statements, the defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated and the statements were properly admitted, because the victim was unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had an adequate prior opportunity to cross-examine her at a pretrial dangerousness hearing. Background. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude all of the statements made by the victim to the first police officer at the scene, Officer Robert Wise, and to Officer Hannah. Following an evidentiary hearing, at which both officers […]
Commonwealth v. Lenk (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-152-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11957 COMMONWEALTH vs. DAISY OBI. Middlesex. January 8, 2016. – September 21, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Constitutional Law, Sentence. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Probation, Challenge to jurors, Jury and jurors, Conduct of judge, Disqualification of judge. Jury and Jurors. Judge. Complaint received and sworn to in the Somerville Division of the District Court Department on August 28, 2012. The case was tried before Paul M. Yee, Jr., J., and a motion for resentencing was heard by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Kimberly M. Peterson for the defendant. Mary F.P. O’Neill, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. The defendant, a landlord, was convicted of assault and battery after pushing a tenant who is Muslim down a flight of stairs. The defendant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of two years in a house of correction, six months to serve, with the balance suspended for a period of two years. The judge imposed two special conditions of probation during the period of suspension: that the defendant provide a written disclosure to prospective tenants that she had been convicted of assaulting a tenant and had had several harassment prevention orders issued against her; and that the defendant attend an introductory class on Islam. A single justice of the Appeals Court stayed execution of the defendant’s sentence pending this appeal. The defendant contends that imposition of this length of a period of incarceration, and the special conditions of probation, would violate her constitutional rights under both the Federal and State Constitutions. She also asserts error in a number of the judge’s rulings at trial. We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing the sentence of incarceration or in requiring the defendant to provide written disclosure to prospective tenants as a condition of probation. We do not address the defendant’s constitutional objections to being required to attend the class on Islam as a condition of probation, which were not raised in the trial court. We further conclude that the judge’s other contested rulings were not error. Accordingly, we affirm. Trial proceedings. We recite the facts the jury could have found, reserving certain details for later […]