G6 Hospitality Property LLC v. Town of Braintree Board of Health (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-107-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS NORFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION 17-0882 G6 HOSPITALITY PROPERTY LLC vs. TOWN OF BRAINTREE BOARD OF HEALTH MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION In its complaint in this action, Plaintiff G6 Hospitality Property LLC (“G6”), which operates a Motel 6 located at 125 Union Street, Braintree, Massachusetts (“the Motel”), seeks certiorari review under G.L. c. 249, § 4 of a decision made by the defendant, Town of Braintree Board of Health (“the Board”), to revoke G6’s license to operate the Motel under G.L. c. 140, §32B and c. 111, §122.[1] At issue before the Court is G6’s application for a temporary restraining order and motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Board from enforcing its July 13, 2017, decision to revoke G6’s license while this case is litigated. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that G6 has not shown that it is entitled to a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, as it cannot show that it is likely to succeed on the merits. Its application and motion are thus DENIED. FACTS The relevant facts in the administrative record provided to this Court are as follows: Procedural History: On May 12, 2017, the Board notified the Motel that an emergency license revocation hearing would be held on May 18, 2017, to determine whether, pursuant to G.L. c. 140, §§30 and 32B, G.L. c. 111, §122 and 105 C.M.R. 410, the Motel had “violated certain provisions of [its] license” because of “concerns relating to public health and safety … as the result of the exorbitant number of police-related responses to the motel since 2010, including but not limited to sudden deaths, sexual assaults/offenses, drug overdoses, warrant services, as well as the most recent shooting of a Braintree police officer and apparent suicide [of the officer’s assailant] that took place at Motel 6 on Friday, May 5, 2017.” Representatives of G6 and Braintree Mayor Joseph Sullivan (“the Mayor”) agreed that the Board would not oppose G6’s request to continue the hearing if G6 agreed to voluntarily close the Motel for 45-days, from June 1 to July 15, 2017, during which time G6 would work on improving the Motel’s security protocol. Accordingly, G6 requested a continuance of the hearing. The Board approved the Motel’s request. The Motel voluntarily closed June 1. The hearing was rescheduled for July 13, 2017. Prior to the July 13 hearing, a public notice was published in the local newspaper. Facts Disclosed at the July 13, 2017 Hearing: At the July 13, 2017 hearing (“the Hearing”), the Board heard testimony […]
Yarpah v. Bowden Hospitality Newton LLC, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-061-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT. 1684CV02746-BLS2 ____________________ ROLAND YARPAH, and all others similarly situated v. BOWDEN HOSPITALITY NEWTON LLC d/b/a Crowne Plaza Hotel, and INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP RESOURCES, INC. ____________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON INTERNATIONAL HOTELS GROUP RESOURCES, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS and PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO ADD NEW DEFENDANTS Roland Yarpah worked for several years at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Newton, Massachusetts. He claims that the Hotel violated the Massachusetts Tips Act (G.L. c. 149, § 152A) by levying an eight percent “administrative charge” for functions where food or alcohol are served, not telling customers that this charge is not a tip paid to servers, and nonetheless keeping monies collected for this charge instead of paying them to wait staff and service bartenders. Yarpah sued Bowden Hospitality Newton LLC, which owns and operates the Hotel. He has also sued Intercontinental Hotels Group Resources, Inc. (IHGR). IHGR has moved to dismiss the claims against it with prejudice on the ground that the facts alleged do not plausibly suggest that IHGR charged, received, or had any control over the disputed charge. IHGR also showed that it has no contractual relationship with Bowden, and that Holiday Hospitality Franchising, LLC (“HHFL”) is the entity that gave Bowden license to do business as a Crowne Plaza Hotel. Yarpah then moved to amend the complaint to delete IHGR as a defendant and instead sue HHFL and its parent Six Continent Hotels, Inc. (“SCH”); both of these entities assert that Yarpah has no standing to sue them. Yarpah also seeks to add as a defendant Ward Childs, who manages the hotel for Bowden. The Court will allow the motion to dismiss the claims against IHGR with prejudice because Yarpah made clear at oral argument that he does not oppose that request. It will also permit Yarpah to add Childs as a defendant, without opposition. The Court will deny the request to add HHFL and SCH as defendants, however. Neither of them had any control over or received any revenue from the – 2 – administrative charges. As a result they owe no duty under the Tips Act, and Yarpah lacks standing to sue them. It would therefore be futile to amend the complaint to add them as defendants. See generally Johnston v. Box, 453 Mass. 569, 583 (2009) (“Courts are not required to grant motions to amend prior [pleadings] where ‘the proposed amendment … is futile.’ ” (quoting All Seasons Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Boston, 416 Mass. 269, 272 (1993)); Thermo Electron Corp. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 194, 203 (2005) (affirming denial of motion for leave to assert counterclaim that […]
JNM Hospitality, Inc. v. McDaid, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-136-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1946 Appeals Court JNM HOSPITALITY, INC. vs. EDWIN McDAID & others,[1] trustees.[2] No. 14-P-1946. Norfolk. January 19, 2016. – September 27, 2016. Present: Grainger, Rubin, & Milkey, JJ. Condominiums, Parking, Common area. Real Property, Condominium, Lease. Landlord and Tenant, Execution of lease, Parking. Contract, Lease of real estate, Performance and breach, Interference with contractual relations. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 19, 2012. A motion for summary judgment was heard by Paul D. Wilson, J., and entry of separate and final judgment was ordered by him. William E. Gens for the plaintiff. Henry A. Goodman for the defendants. GRAINGER, J. This is an appeal from the dismissal of a claim brought by the commercial tenant of a condominium unit owner against the condominium trustees. The plaintiff, JNM Hospitality, Inc. (JNM), appeals from the summary judgment in favor of the defendant trustees of The Village at Forge Pond Condominium Trust (collectively the trust) ordered by a judge of the Superior Court. JNM asserts that the trust’s execution of a license agreement allowing employees of an abutting United States Postal Service (USPS) facility to use spaces in the vehicle parking lot of the condominium where JNM’s restaurant was located constituted intentional interference in JNM’s contract with its landlord. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.[3] Background. For purposes of our consideration of the allowance of summary judgment, the facts are not in dispute. JNM operated a restaurant and bar on premises leased from Canton Viaduct, LLC, as assignee of the owner of two commercial units in The Village at Forge Pond Condominium, a mixed-use condominium complex in Canton. The trust is the condominium’s governing entity. See G. L. c. 183A, §§ 8(i), 10. At issue are the provisions of JNM’s lease governing the ability to provide vehicle parking spaces to its customers. The lease provisions relating to the number and location of parking spaces are both unclear and, due to handwritten revisions,[4] difficult to decipher. The parties dedicate significant energy and many strained arguments to the meaning of lease provisions relating to this issue, with particular emphasis on so-called nonexclusive parking, i.e., spaces not reserved for any particular person or entity. For purposes of reviewing factual allegations in the motion for summary judgment we adopt, as […]