Commonwealth v. Dancy (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-168-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1139 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. DAMONTE DANCY. No. 15-P-1139. Suffolk. October 21, 2016. – November 29, 2016. Present: Cypher, Kinder, & Lemire, JJ. Firearms. Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on September 5, 2012. After transfer to the Central Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department, the case was tried before Michael J. Coyne, J. Mehmet Baysan for the defendant. Priscilla A. Guerrero (Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth. Lemire, J. Following a jury trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the defendant, Damonte Dancy, was convicted of possession of a loaded firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10(n). On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his motion to suppress photographs seized from his cellular telephone, and certain evidentiary rulings at trial. He also claims that his conviction was unlawful because he was acquitted of possession of a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), the predicate offense for conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10(n).[1] Because we agree that the conviction was unlawful, we reverse without reaching the defendant’s other claims of error. Background. We summarize the facts the jury could have found. On the morning of August 25, 2012, the defendant was among a large group of people attending a festival in Dorchester. An unknown passerby stopped a Boston police officer, stated that “a man had a gun,” and pointed to a small group of black males, which included the defendant, walking down the street away from the parade. Officers then began to follow and surveil that group. At one point, when the defendant was near a parked vehicle, one of the officers, who was on the opposite side of the street, observed the defendant, who was walking at a fast pace, “[s]low[] down a little bit” next to the vehicle, and heard a noise that, based on his experience, was consistent with a gun hitting the pavement. The two other males from the group were about ten to fifteen feet away from the defendant at that time. After stopping the group to ask questions, the police canvassed the immediate area. A loaded firearm was recovered from beneath the parked vehicle, and the defendant was arrested. The […]
Commonwealth v. Martin (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-183-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12056 COMMONWEALTH vs. PIERCE A. MARTIN. Norfolk. September 7, 2016. – November 25, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Costs, Fees and costs, Probation. Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department on October 19, 2010. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea, filed on October 3, 2012, was heard by Mary Hogan Sullivan, J., and motions for the return of seized property, filed on November 21, 2012, and July 22, 2013, were heard by Mark S. Coven, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Ilse Nehring for the defendant. Susanne M. O’Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. In October, 2011, the defendant, Pierce A. Martin, pleaded guilty in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department to possession of a class D substance (second offense). At sentencing, the plea judge imposed a one-year term of probation and, as mandated by statute, the probation supervision fees (G. L. c. 276, § 87A) and the victim-witness assessment (G. L. c. 258B, § 8). In October, 2012, after the revelation of misconduct at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton laboratory), a judge granted the defendant’s unopposed motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that Annie Dookhan,[1] the subsequently discredited analyst at the center of the misconduct allegations, performed the analysis of the substances seized during the defendant’s arrest. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014). The Commonwealth entered a nolle prosequi on the underlying complaint. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for return of property, including probation supervision fees ($ 780) paid during the term of probation and the victim-witness assessment (fifty dollars), claiming a right to recoup these amounts where the conviction, in the defendant’s view, was vacated on constitutional grounds.[2] The judge denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion. We conclude that there is no statutory authority for the return of the probation supervision fees and the victim-witness assessment paid by the defendant. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion for return of property. Background. We summarize the relevant facts from the record. On […]
Commonwealth v. Long (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-167-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-925 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. DAMIEN LONG. No. 15-P-925. Plymouth. September 14, 2016. – November 23, 2016. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Massing, JJ. Larceny. False Pretenses. Intent. Evidence, Intent. Practice, Criminal, Required finding. Complaint received and sworn to in the Plymouth Division of the District Court Department on December 16, 2011. The case was tried before James M. Sullivan, J. Amy Muscato-Wolter for the defendant. Jessica Heaton, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. MASSING, J. The defendant, Damien Long, prepared an estimate to do some home improvement work for a married couple, who owned a house in Marshfield. He cashed their deposit check, bought some supplies, performed a few days of minimal work that was not to the homeowners’ satisfaction, and then abandoned the job. A week later he slipped a final invoice under the door, purporting to show that the homeowners owed him money. On those facts, he was charged and convicted in District Court, after a jury trial, of larceny over $ 250 by false pretenses.[1] To sustain the conviction, the Commonwealth was required to prove that at the time the defendant promised the homeowners he would do the work, inducing them to write him a check, he did so with the intention of never performing the job. Because we conclude that the evidence did not establish that essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse. Background. We begin by summarizing the facts presented in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). Joseph and Maryann Watts,[2] the homeowners, wanted new windows, new window sills, a new sliding door, and some other minor improvements done on their house in Marshfield. Joseph made some calls and eventually contacted the defendant. On September 23, 2011, the defendant met the Wattses at their house to discuss the work they wanted done. They agreed on a price of about $ 32,000 for the entire project, and Joseph gave the defendant a check for $ 11,800, dated either September 25 or 26, 2011, as a down payment. The deposit was for “purchasing the windows and getting those in,” as well as the “trim and all that stuff [the defendant] need[ed] to finish it.” The […]
Commonwealth v. Dustin (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-182-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12036 COMMONWEALTH vs. DONALD DUSTIN. November 23, 2016. Assault and Battery. Words, “Substantive dating relationship.” After a jury trial, the defendant, Donald Dustin, was convicted in the Marlborough Division of the District Court Department of assault and battery on a family or household member, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).[1] We granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review to consider the “substantive dating relationship” element of § 13M (a).[2] We affirm. Timing of the defendant’s motion. The defendant did not make a timely motion at the close of the Commonwealth’s case for a required finding of not guilty with respect to the assault and battery charge.[3] See Mass. R. Crim. P. 25 (a), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995). See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 762 (2007). Had he done so, we would have considered only the evidence admitted during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief to decide “whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt to submit the case to the jury.”[4] Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 400 (2003). See Brown, supra; Commonwealth v. Berry, 431 Mass. 326, 331-332 (2000). Cf. Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 69 n.15 (2009) (motion for required finding filed “after the Commonwealth has rested and before the defense was invited to present evidence” must be ruled on at that time). Instead, we consider whether the evidence during the entire trial, including the evidence presented during the defendant’s case, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Factual background. A detailed description of the events of August 28, 2014, which gave rise to the criminal charges, is unnecessary to this appeal. It suffices to say that in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979), there was evidence at trial that the defendant and Stacey D. Rock were in a parked vehicle when a witness observed an altercation between the two of them. After they were confronted by the witness, the defendant drove off at a high rate of speed and he was stopped a short time later for various motor vehicle infractions. A police officer testified that when he asked the defendant why he had been driving “that way,” the defendant replied, “something to the nature of that he was pissed off because he had just […]
George v. George (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-181-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12059 CLIFFORD E. GEORGE vs. JACQUELYN A. GEORGE. Suffolk. September 6, 2016. – November 23, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment. Complaint for divorce filed in the Suffolk Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on May 29, 2001. A complaint for modification, filed on August 26, 2013, was heard by Jeremy A. Stahlin, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Brian J. Kelly for Clifford E. George. Matthew P. Barach (Alessandra Petrucelli with him) for Jacquelyn A. George. LOWY, J. Clifford E. George and Jacquelyn A. George married in 1989 and divorced in 2002.[1] Their separation agreement, and the judgment that followed, provided that Clifford would pay Jacquelyn monthly alimony. In 2013, Clifford filed a complaint for modification of the divorce judgment that sought, among other things, to modify his alimony obligation based on G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b), part of the Alimony Reform Act, St. 2011, c. 124 (act), which became effective on March 1, 2012, nearly ten years after the parties’ divorce. Section 49 (b) provides that general term alimony for marriages lasting more than ten years but fewer than fifteen years shall not continue for “longer than [seventy] per cent of the number of months of the marriage,” G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b) (3), a process by which a judge can deviate from the durational limit, where doing so is “required in the interests of justice.” G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b). The act also provided a phase-in schedule for when complaints for modification based on the new durational limits could be brought for alimony obligations that predated the effective date of the act. St. 2011, c. 124, §§ 4, 5. In his memorandum of decision, the Probate and Family Court judge denied Clifford’s complaint for modification because he found that deviation beyond the durational limits of the act was warranted. Clifford appealed from this judgment to the Appeals Court, and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm the judge’s denial of relief but on the ground that Clifford’s complaint was filed prematurely. However, we utilize this opportunity to set forth guidance for how the “interests […]
Service Employees International Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-180-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12035 SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 509 vs. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH & others.[1] Suffolk. September 6, 2016. – November 22, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Privatization Act. Commissioner of Mental Health. Commonwealth, Contracts. Contract, Validity. Public Employment. Laches. Practice, Civil, Judgment on the pleadings. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 15, 2012. Following review by this court, 469 Mass. 323 (2014), the case was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Ian O. Russell (Katherine D. Shea with him) for the plaintiff. Iraida J. Álvarez, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Mental Health. Carl Valvo & Ariel G. Sullivan, for Advocates, Inc., & others, were present but did not argue. Mark G. Matuschak & Robert Kingsley Smith, for Pioneer Institute, Inc., were present but did not argue. Anita S. Lichtblau & Robert E. Cowden, III, for Massachusetts Council of Human Services Providers, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. This is the second time that the plaintiff labor union appeals from dismissal of the declaratory judgment action it first brought against the Department of Mental Health (DMH or agency) in 2012. Service Employees International Union, Local 509 (SEIU or union) maintains that certain contracts DMH made in 2009 with private vendors are “privatization contracts” subject to the requirements of the Pacheco Law, G. L. c. 7, §§ 52-55. The Pacheco Law establishes certain prerequisites that agencies must meet when seeking to enter into privatization contracts. Because DMH had determined that the subject contracts were not privatization contracts, however, it did not comply with those statutory prerequisites. In bringing this action, the union seeks, among other things, a declaration invalidating the contracts on the basis of G. L. c. 7, § 54 (§ 54), which provides that no privatization contract “shall be valid” where an agency did not follow the necessary procedures. In our previous decision in this case, Service Employees Int’l Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health, 469 Mass. 323, 324 (2014) (SEIU I), we rejected DMH’s contention that the union lacked standing to challenge, in a declaratory judgment action, the agency’s unilateral determination that the contracts were not […]
Rosen v. Rosen (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-166-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-848 Appeals Court REGINA ROSEN vs. SCOTT ROSEN. No. 15-P-848. Essex. April 8, 2016. – November 22, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Wolohojian, & Maldonado, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Child support, Modification of judgment, Child custody. Parent and Child, Child support, Custody. Contempt. Complaint for divorce filed in the Essex Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on January 17, 2001. Complaints for modification and contempt, filed on August 2, 2011, and October 12, 2012, respectively, were heard by Susan D. Ricci, J.; a motion for reconsideration, filed on July 7, 2014 was heard by her, and judgment was entered by her. Mary-Ellen Manning for the mother. Mark A. Perkins for the father. WOLOHOJIAN, J. Today we reach the question left open in T.M. v. L.H., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 856, 861 (2001), namely, whether “a judge, in compelling circumstances of an equitable nature, and without contravening G. L. c. 119A, § 13(a), may apply a credit in calculating child support arrearages to reflect payments made in a manner other than as directed by the original [child support] order.”[1] We conclude that, despite the statutory prohibition against retroactive modification of child support judgments “except with respect to any period during which there is pending a complaint for modification,” G. L. c. 119A, § 13(a), inserted by St. 1987, c. 714, § 1, a judge may — in certain very limited circumstances — grant and apply such an equitable credit to offset a child support arrearage accrued during a period when there was no pending complaint for modification. Background. After fourteen years of marriage, the parties divorced on July 14, 2003, pursuant to a judgment of divorce which incorporated the parties’ separation agreement. The separation agreement provided, in pertinent part, that the mother would have primary physical custody of the parties’ three children, Elliot, Ari, and Hannah, and that the father would pay monthly child support in the amount of $ 4,500. The separation agreement also contained several provisions relating to the children’s college education. In one of those provisions, the parties “agree[d] that the choice of college or other institutions shall be made jointly, with due regard to the children’s wishes, welfare, needs and aptitudes, and the parties’ respective financial circumstances. Neither party shall make commitments to a . . . college . . . without first notifying […]
Halbach, et al. v. Normandy Real Estate Partners, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-165-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1500 Appeals Court ERIC HALBACH & another[1] vs. NORMANDY REAL ESTATE PARTNERS & others.[2] No. 15-P-1500. Suffolk. September 12, 2016. – November 18, 2016. Present: Kafker, C.J., Milkey, & Blake, JJ. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Negligence, One owning or controlling real estate, Use of way, Duty to prevent harm, Pedestrian. Way, Public: defect. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on February 17, 2012. The case was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Michael B. Bogdanow (John J. Carroll, Jr., with him) for the plaintiffs. Matthew Kirouac for the defendants. BLAKE, J. Plaintiff Eric Halbach (Halbach) suffered serious injuries when he fell as a result of uneven pavement on a public sidewalk adjacent to a commercial building owned by defendant 100 & 200 Clarendon Street, LLC (Clarendon), and operated, leased, and maintained by one or more of the remaining defendants (collectively, Normandy). Halbach and his wife, Kathleen Halbach, subsequently filed a complaint alleging that the defendants had a duty to either repair the sidewalk or warn pedestrians and the city of Boston (city) of the hazard. Concluding that no such duty exists, a judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We agree, and affirm. Background. The following undisputed facts are taken from the summary judgment record. On June 4, 2009, Halbach was walking on Clarendon Street in the city, near the John Hancock garage (garage). He tripped and fell on uneven payment on a part of the sidewalk directly adjacent to the garage, sustaining significant injuries as a result.[3] The sidewalk where Halbach fell is owned by the city. At the time of the fall, the commercial property adjacent to the sidewalk was owned by Clarendon and maintained by Normandy. After the incident, Normandy hired a company to grind down the uneven payment at a cost of $ 798. On February 17, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court, which was amended on October 4, 2013. The amended complaint alleges that the defendants were negligent in their “ownership, control, maintenance and/or inspection” of the sidewalk adjacent to the garage by their “failure to ensure a safe pedestrian walkway” and their “failure to keep the area of the walkway free from defects and conditions […]
Commonwealth v, Sanders (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-164-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1100 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. EMERY SANDERS. No. 15-P-1100. Essex. October 7, 2016. – November 15, 2016. Present: Agnes, Maldonado, & Desmond, JJ. Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Assistance of counsel. Search and Seizure, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause, Assistance of counsel. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 5, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by David A. Lowy, J., and the cases were tried before James F. Lang, J. James E. Methe for the defendant. Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. For more than seventy-five years, we have avoided an overly formulaic approach to the determination of whether there is probable cause to search or arrest a person who is suspected of participation in a street-level drug transaction. Instead we endorsed the observation made in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949): “In dealing with probable cause, however, . . . we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men [and women], not legal technicians, act.” For example, in Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992), the Supreme Judicial Court set forth a nonexclusive list of factors that, when taken together, support a ruling that there was probable cause to search a person in the context of a suspected street-level drug transaction. In Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 426 Mass. 703, 708-711 (1998), the court added that while there is no per se rule (and the court declined to adopt such a rule) that an officer must observe an identifiable object being passed or received in order to have probable cause to believe a street-level drug transaction had occurred, “whether the officer sees an object exchanged is an important piece of evidence that supports probable cause, and its absence weakens the Commonwealth’s probable cause showing.” More recently, in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 469 Mass. 257, 263 (2014), the court took a step beyond Kennedy, and stated that, in these cases, “the suspect’s movements, as observed by the officer, must provide factual support for the inference that the parties exchanged an object.” See Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 631 (2015). […]
DeGiacomo v. City of Quincy, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-179-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11940 JAMES R. DeGIACOMO, trustee, vs. CITY OF QUINCY & others. Suffolk. September 7, 2016. – November 15, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Res Judicata. Collateral Estoppel. Judgment, Preclusive effect. Trust, Charitable trust. Contract, Lease of real estate, Rescission. Real Property, Lease. Fiduciary. Attorney General. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on February 19, 2014. The case was heard by Spina, J., on motions for summary judgment. James R. DeGiacomo (Susan J. Baronoff with him) for the plaintiff. James S. Timmins, City Solicitor, for city of Quincy. Barry S. Pollack (Phillip Rakhunov with him) for Quincy Historical Society. GANTS, C.J. In 1971, the city of Quincy (Quincy), as trustee of the Adams Temple and School Fund (Adams Fund), filed a “bill of complaint” in equity asking a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to enter a decree authorizing it to execute a proposed fifty-year lease of the building and parking lot of the Adams Academy that it had negotiated with the Quincy Historical Society (Society). The Attorney General was a defendant in that action, but the Woodward School for Girls, Inc. (Woodward School or School), which was the sole income beneficiary of the Adams Fund, was not. In 1972, the single justice decreed that Quincy was authorized to execute the proposed lease. The successor trustee of the Adams Fund now seeks rescission of that lease, as well as money damages and restitution, claiming that Quincy violated its fiduciary duty of loyalty by executing the lease approved by the single justice. The issue presented on appeal is whether the successor trustee of the Adams Fund is precluded by res judicata from obtaining that relief. The successor trustee contends that he should not be precluded because neither he nor the Woodward School was a party to the equity proceeding in 1972, and the School could not reasonably have intervened because it was not given notice of the proposed lease or the filing of the complaint. Quincy and the Society contend that preclusion is appropriate because, where the Adams Fund is a public charitable trust, the only necessary party to the equity proceeding was the Attorney General, who was in privity with the School based on a statutory responsibility under G. L. c. 12, § 8, […]