Red Door Real Estate, LLC v. Karwashan, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-146-16)
1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 14-03235-BLS 2 RED DOOR REAL ESTATE, LLC, Plaintiffs vs. SOUSAN KARWASHAN, RED DOOR PROPERTIES, INC., and RED REAL ESTATE, INC. Defendants FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER OF JUDGMENT In this action, plaintiff Red Door Real Estate, LLC (Red Door) alleges that the defendants have infringed upon its state service mark and otherwise engaged in unfair business practices. The five count Amended Complaint seeks damages as well as injunctive relief. The matter came before this Court for jury waived trial in August 2016. Based on that evidence this Court finds to be credible together with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, I makes the following findings and rulings. FINDINGS OF FACT Plaintiff Red Door is a limited liability company that has its principal place of business in Quincy, Massachusetts. It was founded by Madeline Cheney in January 2010. Red Door is a real estate brokerage firm that represents buyers and sellers in commercial and residential real estate transactions. In addition to Cheney, it employs between 12 and 17 other brokers. The focus of Red Door’s business is in the South Shore, with most of its residential sales occurring in Quincy and its environs. Its total sales volume in 2015 was $ 23 million. 2 In July 2010, Red Door applied for and obtained state registration of a service mark.1 Cheney, who holds a bachelor’s degree in marketing, was the person who designed the logo that was part of that mark. The logo consists of black and red writing with the word “Red Door” appearing in block letters above the word “Real Estate” written in cursive. An angular drawing suggesting a roof and a door is positioned above the word “Red” in the logo. The registration for this service mark was renewed in 2015. It appears on all of Red Door’s marketing and advertising materials. It is also used on its internet site and on each broker’s business card. Shortly after Red Door opened its business, Cheney learned that there was another real estate agency located in Milton by the name of Red Door Realty. Cheney did not disclose this on her application for a service mark, even though the application expressly sought such information. In any event, the owner of Red Door Realty did not object to Cheney’s use of the Red Door title. In fact, the two companies have actually been co-brokers on one deal. There was no evidence presented at trial that there was any confusion among customers of either firm as a result of the name similarity even though they are both in the same line of business and operate in adjoining communities. That there has […]
Paasch, et al. v. INVO Bioscience, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-150-16)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION NO. 2009-05519-BLS1 RONALD PAASCH & others1 vs. INVO BIOSCIENCE, INC. & others2 MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES AGAINST MEDELLE CORPORATION PURSUANT TO RULES 54 AND 55 AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL OF INVO BIOSCIENCE, INC., BIO-X-CELL, INC., AND KATHELEEN KARLOFF This case arises out of the 2006 auction of the assets of the Medelle Corporation (Medelle), a Delaware business corporation formed in or about 1996 to develop and market products to treat human infertility. Plaintiffs Ronald Paasch, Francis G. Gleason, Jr., and Jo Ann Gorge, minority shareholders of Medelle, claimed that the sale was improper and filed the present lawsuit against Medelle, INVO Bioscience, Inc. (INVO), Bio-X-Cell, Inc. (Bio-X-Cell)3 Claude Ranoux, and Katheen Karloff. Medelle never appeared and was defaulted under Mass. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Plaintiffs subsequently moved for an assessment of damages and default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2) but the court deferred a hearing on the motion. As the case 1 Francis G. Gleason, Jr. and Jo Ann Gorge. 2 Medelle Corp., Bio-X-Cell, Inc., Claude Ranoux, and Katheen Karloff. 3 Bio-X-Cell is a wholly-owned subsidiary of INVO. Plaintiffs asserted that INVO and Bio-XCell were successors to Medelle by de facto merger and therefore subject to successor liability. proceeded, the other defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the court granted in full as to INVO, Bio-X-Cell, and Karloff but only in part as to Ranoux. Plaintiffs now renew their motion for entry of default judgment and assessment of damages against Medelle. In response, INVO and Bio-X-Cell have filed an opposition to plaintiffs’ renewed motion and have also filed, along with Karloff, a motion seeking an entry of final judgment of dismissal as to the claims asserted against them. For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED and defendants’ motion is ALLOWED. BACKGROUND For several years, Medelle sought FDA approval for an intra-vaginal incubation device invented by Claude Ranoux, Medelle’s founder, president, chief scientist, and a director of the company. This effort, however, proved unsuccessful and by the autumn of 2006, the company was heavily in debt, almost out of cash, and unable to raise additional capital. As a result, in November 2006, Medelle’s directors voted unanimously to assign the company’s assets for the benefit of creditors. An auction was held on December 22, 2006, during which time Ranoux, the only bidder, submitted the winning bid. Ranoux subsequently conveyed the assets to Bio-X-Cell, a corporation that Ranoux had formed following the auction. Bio-X-Cell eventually became a wholly-owned subsidiary of INVO. INVO (through Bio-X-Cell) continued to develop Ranoux’s device. Ranoux is currently INVO’s president […]
Commonwealth v. Powell (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-151-16)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL ACTION 2002-11199 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHN POWELL MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION ACCESS TO EVIDENCE AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS PURSUANT TO G.L. c. 278A In November of 2005, a Suffolk County jury convicted John Powell (“Powell” or the “Defendant”) of (1) murder in the second degree, G.L. c. 265, § 1; (2) assault with intent to kill, G.L. c. 265, § 18(b), a lesser included offense of the charged assault with intent to murder; (3) unlawful possession of a firearm, G.L. c. 269, § 10(a); (4) unlawful possession of ammunition, G.L. c. 269, § 10(h); and (5) possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, G.L. c. 94C, § 32A. Powell appealed these convictions, and the Appeals Court affirmed all but the conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (which it reversed). Powell subsequently filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.[1] With an eye toward a second new trial motion, the Defendant has now filed a motion for forensic discovery pursuant to G.L. c. 278A. In this motion, Powell seeks DNA testing of blood on a baseball bat that was found at the crime scene and used by the victim in the hours before his murder. The Commonwealth opposes the motion, arguing that the Defendant cannot show, as he must under G.L. c. 278A, § 7(b)(4), that the testing will potentially result in evidence that is material to the identity of the murder’s perpetrator. Upon consideration the parties’ arguments and a review of the appellate authority construing and applying Chapter 278A, the Court concludes that the Defendant’s motion shall be ALLOWED. BACKGROUND The victim, Paul Gauthier, was shot and killed in his apartment at 18 Wardman Road in Roxbury. Gauthier was found in the kitchen/dining area, lying in a pool of blood and near a silver baseball bat. There was blood on the victim’s hands, on the baseball bat, and throughout the victim’s apartment. Earlier that day, Gauthier had used the baseball bat to vandalize 16 Wardman Street, a reputed crack house where the Defendant sold cocaine, causing extensive property damage. The victim had also been seen chasing two unidentified black men (neither of whom was the Defendant) with the bat in his hands. The Defendant seeks to test the blood-stained baseball bat in accordance with G.L. c. 278A, asserting that the presence of third-party DNA will show that someone other than Powell (i.e., someone whom Gauthier may have assaulted and injured with the bat earlier in the day) had a motive to commit the murder. A post-conviction request for […]
Tavares v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-178-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11829 DANIEL D. TAVARES vs. COMMONWEALTH. November 10, 2016. Bail. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. The petitioner, Daniel D. Tavares, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court that denied his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, but directed that he could seek, in the Superior Court, return of certain forfeited bail. We affirm. Tavares has been charged, in three different indictments, with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c); conspiracy to violate the drug law, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 40; and larceny over $ 250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1). Each of the cases originated with a complaint in the District Court and was subsequently transferred to the Superior Court after the corresponding indictment issued. The cases are now pending in the Superior Court where, according to their respective dockets, that court has imposed a “unified bail.” Although the record before us is not entirely clear, it appears that the bail set in the District Court in the possession with intent to distribute case and in the conspiracy case was transferred to the Superior Court, after Tavares was indicted on those charges, in the total amount of $ 2,500. In the larceny case, it does not appear that bail was transferred. Rather, it appears that, after Tavares was indicted on that charge, the bail that had been set in the District Court — $ 1,000 — was reduced to zero and the posted amount returned to the surety. Bail was then set in the Superior Court in the amount of $ 500, bringing the total bail in the three Superior Court cases to $ 3,000. 2 Docket entries for each of the cases indicate that on September 11, 2013, Tavares defaulted and a warrant issued. On October 21, 2013, Tavares was brought into court, the default was removed, and the warrant was recalled. The following day, the court held a new bail hearing, revoked the previous order of bail, and set a new unified bail in the amount of $ 13,000. On November 5, 2013, the court held a bail forfeiture hearing, after which the court denied forfeiture in the possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy cases but allowed it in the larceny […]
O’Donnell, et al. v. O’Donnell, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-148-16)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 1684-CV-0897 BLS 1 J. JOSEPH O’DONNELL, PATRICK A. O’DONNELL, BRIAN M. O’DONNELL and DANIEL O’DONNELL vs. MARYELLEN O’DONNELL, JOSEPH F. RYAN and PARKLAKE REALTY CORP. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT This is a dispute among members of the family of James J. O’Donnell III (“JJO”) who died on May 4, 2011. Plaintiffs are children of JJO and his first wife (deceased). Defendants are JJO’s second wife, Maryellen, and the long time lawyer, Joseph F. Ryan, for JJO and the real estate company that constitutes the major asset left by JJO. In addition, the real estate company, Parklake Realty Corp., is named as a nominal defendant for plaintiffs’ derivative claims of corporate waste and mismanagement, including the failure to pay dividends. The present motion does not challenge the claims by plaintiffs as shareholders of Parklake, brought both as direct and derivative claims, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste and mismanagement. Instead, this motion for partial summary judgment seeks to dismiss claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with purchases of shares in Parklake by an insurance trust and by the company from the estate of JJO. Specifically, the motion requests the dismissal of Count III of the Verified Amended Complaint (“complaint”) alleging breach of fiduciary duty by Ryan as 1 trustee of the insurance trust. In addition, however, the motion requests that the court eliminate from the other counts of the complaint any allegations by plaintiffs for breach of fiduciary duty arising from transactions in the insurance trust and the estate of JJO. Defendants contend that such allegations are barred by plaintiffs’ previous consents or by operation of law. The complaint alleges that Maryellen and Ryan in their fiduciary capacities as directors and, in Maryellen’s case, controlling shareholder, of Parklake caused Parklake to consent to the purchase of a number of shares from the JJO estate in a manner that allegedly benefitted Maryellen to the detriment of plaintiffs. Because the sale by the estate was accomplished as part of a plan to provide cash to the estate to pay estate taxes, and those transactions were approved by the Probate and Family Court, defendants argue that plaintiffs are barred in this action from challenging the transactions. Accordingly, defendants want all allegations in the complaint concerning purchases of shares in Parklake held by the estate, whether by the insurance trust or as a redemption by Parklake, to be stricken or dismissed. BACKGROUND At the time of his death, JJO owned 96.7% of the shares of Parklake. The remaining 3.3% of the shares were owned by his ten children in equal amounts. Parklake owned and operated […]
In Re Civil Investigative Demand No. 2016-CPD-50 (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-149-16)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION No. 2016-2098 BLS 1 IN RE CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND NO. 2016-CPD-50, ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ORDER ON MOTION OF GLOCK, INC. TO SET ASIDE OR MODIFY THE CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND OR ISSUE A PROTECTIVE ORDER Glock, Inc., a manufacturer of pistols, commenced this action to set aside a Civil Investigative Demand (“CID”) issued by the Attorney General to Glock on May 26, 2016. In the alternative to a complete quashing of the CID, Glock requests that a protective order issue limiting the information that must be produced pursuant to the CID. As described below, Glock’s motion to set aside the CID is denied. Action on the motion for a protective order is deferred, as the parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding the scope of discovery guided by the general principles governing CID discovery, discussed herein. BACKGROUND The CID was issued to Glock pursuant to G.L. c. 93A, § 6. The CID recites that it is issued as “part of a pending investigation by the Office of the Attorney General into compliance with G.L. c. 93A, as well as related Massachusetts laws, regulations and common law requirements that impact gun safety and product warranties.” The CID requires production of documents from Glock pursuant to G.L. c. 93A, § 6 (1). The requests for documents are detailed 1 in twelve separate paragraphs. The general nature of the documents requested include customer complaints about safety, the company’s responses, product recalls, warranties, testing, specifications, authorized dealers and legal actions and settlements. There is no geographic limitation to the scope of documents that must be produced. The relevant time period for documents that must be produced is four years prior to the date of the CID. Upon receipt of the CID, Glock, through counsel, began communications with the Office of the Attorney General. According to Glock’s complaint (styled as a “petition”), the Attorney General agreed to an extension of the twenty-one day period allowed by statute for a recipient of a CID to move or object to the CID, to July 1, 2016. On July 1, 2016, having failed to reach an agreement with the Attorney General regarding the validity and scope of the CID, Glock filed its complaint along with an emergency motion to set aside or modify the CID. The emergency motion was denied, without prejudice to re-filing pursuant to Rule 9A of the Superior Court. On August 11, 2016, Glock served its renewed motion to set aside or modify the CID on the Attorney General. On September 15, 2016, the parties’ Rule 9A package was filed in this action. Oral argument was heard on October 19, 2016.1 […]
Commonwealth v. Bois (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-177-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-10725 COMMONWEALTH vs. RYAN BOIS. Norfolk. January 12, 2016. – November 10, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Homicide. Rape. Armed Home Invasion. Felony-Murder Rule. Insanity. Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Jury and jurors, Conduct of juror, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 30, 2007. The cases were tried before Janet L. Sanders, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on October 12, 2012, was heard by her. Dennis Shedd for the defendant. Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. In 2009, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder. The jury found that, on August 4, 2007, the defendant broke into his grandmother’s house and then raped and strangled his six-year-old cousin, who was staying there for the night. The defendant was convicted also of nine other charges, including home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 18C.[2] At trial, the defendant conceded that he had killed the victim, but argued that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. On appeal from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant asserts that (a) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence relevant to his insanity defense and to object to the jury charge on the insanity defense; (b) the judge did not respond adequately to reports that a juror slept through certain portions of the trial; (c) the evidence was insufficient on an element of the home invasion charge, and the judge incorrectly instructed the jury on that element; (d) the instructions on felony-murder impermissibly removed from the jury’s consideration one of its elements; and (e) the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. The defendant asks also that, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we reduce the murder conviction to murder in the second degree as more consonant with justice, because his actions were the product of mental illness. We affirm the conviction of murder in the first degree, and decline to exercise our power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the degree of guilt […]
Rass Corporation v. The Travelers Companies, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-163-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-358 Appeals Court RASS CORPORATION vs. THE TRAVELERS COMPANIES, INC., & another.[1] No. 15-P-358. Suffolk. February 24, 2016. – November 10, 2016. Present: Katzmann, Maldonado, & Blake, JJ.[2] Insurance, Coverage, Insurer’s obligation to defend, Notice, Settlement of claim, Unfair act or practice. Notice, Insurance claim. Commercial Disparagement. Trade Secret. Libel and Slander. Consumer Protection Act, Insurance, Unfair act or practice, Offer of settlement, Damages, Attorney’s fees. Damages, Libel, Wrongful use of trade secret, Consumer protection case, Attorney’s fees. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 7, 2010. Motions for summary judgment were heard by Janet L. Sanders, J., and the case was heard by her. Anil Madan for the plaintiff. Michael F. Aylward for the defendants. BLAKE, J. At issue in the present case is whether the defendant insurance companies, The Travelers Companies, Inc., and Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (collectively Travelers), breached their duties to defend, indemnify, and settle in good faith, as to their insured, the plaintiff, Rass Corporation (Rass). The underlying action, arising out of Rass’s decision to cut the underlying plaintiff out of its food marketing and distribution business, alleged that Rass’s principal had committed trade libel, defamation, and misappropriation of trade secrets. After a three-month delay in notice, Travelers agreed to defend the case from that point forward under a reservation of rights that disclaimed coverage of the trade secrets claim, and subject to Traveler’s limit on defense counsel’s hourly rate. Rass ultimately settled the case on its own, refusing the insurer’s offer to contribute a nominal amount conditioned on a waiver of Rass’s right to seek indemnification. Thereafter, Rass commenced the present action against Travelers, seeking indemnity for the settlement and the reasonable attorney’s fees left unpaid by Travelers, and alleging violations of G. L. c. 93A. Following a bench trial in the Superior Court, the judge allocated $ 140,000 of the settlement to Travelers for indemnification of the covered claims and found that Travelers owed an additional $ 25,000 in reasonable attorney’s fees. The judge also found that Travelers had committed violations of G. L. c. 93A based on its commission of unfair claim settlement practices. In a summary judgment ruling issued prior to trial, the judge rejected Rass’s claim for attorney’s fees incurred prior to its notice of the […]
Commonwealth v. Sylvester (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-176-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11966 COMMONWEALTH vs. WILLIAM JOSEPH SYLVESTER. Norfolk. April 4, 2016. – November 9, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Community Parole Supervision for Life. Constitutional Law, Sex offender, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Assistance of counsel. Complaint received and sworn to in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department on July 11, 2002. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, filed on July 25, 2013, was heard by Mary A. Orfanello, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Jeffrey Harris for the defendant. Susanne M. O’Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Merritt Schnipper, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. HINES, J. The issue in this appeal is whether plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the right to counsel guaranties of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights when counsel advised the defendant in 2002 that he would need to “register” if he decided to plead guilty to indecent assault and battery, a sex offense under G. L. c. 6, § 178C, without explaining the consequences of sex offender registration. We conclude that plea counsel was not constitutionally ineffective in rendering this advice in 2002, although we leave for another day the question whether such advice would be constitutionally ineffective based on the current statutory scheme for sex offender registration. We affirm the decision of the District Court judge denying the defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea.[2] Background. We summarize the material facts in the record, reserving certain details for later discussion.[3] On July 9, 2002, the defendant, then twenty-three years of age, approached a fifteen year old female from behind as she was standing with four teenage friends in a subway station in Quincy. The defendant placed his hands on the female’s buttocks and began to “massage” them. He also tried to prevent her retreat by running in front of her, grabbing her front pockets, and pulling her close to him. The defendant walked away, but returned several minutes later and robbed the one male in the group. He first took thirty dollars from a sweater the male was holding and […]
Commonwealth v. Rocheleau (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-162-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-870 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MATTHEW R. ROCHELEAU. No. 14-P-870. Bristol. September 8, 2016. – November 9, 2016. Present: Green, Wolohojian, & Massing, JJ. Breaking and Entering. Destruction of Property. Practice, Criminal, Security measures, Fair trial, New trial, Harmless error, Instructions to jury, Assistance of counsel, Required finding. Constitutional Law, Fair trial, Harmless error. Due Process of Law, Fair trial. Fair Trial. Error, Harmless. Evidence, Impeachment of credibility. Witness, Impeachment. Complaint received and sworn to in the New Bedford Division of the District Court Department on May 23, 2013. The case was tried before Joseph I. Macy, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by him. David M. Osborne for the defendant. David B. Mark, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GREEN, J. Over objection, the defendant was ordered to remain shackled in ankle restraints throughout his trial on charges of breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a felony, assault and battery, and wanton destruction of property over $ 250, and to remain seated as jurors entered and left the courtroom (apparently to prevent jurors from observing his shackles). On appeal, as he argued in a posttrial motion for new trial denied by the trial judge, the defendant contends that the shackling denied his rights to due process and the presumption of innocence. We conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and discern in the defendant’s other claims of error no cause to disturb the judgments.[1] Background. On May 22, 2013, at around 12:30 in the afternoon, the defendant, Matthew Rocheleau, broke into the victim’s home. The victim, a sixty-two year old woman, was sleeping on a couch when she was awakened by a “thump” and heard her dog yelp. The victim went to her kitchen, where she found the defendant standing next to her stove, having entered through a closed but unlocked door. Frightened, the victim grabbed a knife and confronted the defendant, asking him, “What are you doing here?” The defendant did not respond, and left the house. The victim called 911 after the defendant went outside; as she did so, she watched the defendant try to escape through her backyard gate, which was secured by a padlock. The defendant was unable to open […]