Bridgeman, et al. v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-014-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12157 KEVIN BRIDGEMAN & others[1] vs. DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR THE SUFFOLK DISTRICT & others.[2] Suffolk. November 16, 2016. – January 18, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Conduct of government agents. Due Process of Law, Disclosure of evidence, Presumption. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief, Conduct of government agents, Disclosure of evidence, Plea, New trial. Evidence, Certificate of drug analysis, Disclosure of evidence. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 9, 2014. The case was reported by Botsford, J. Matthew R. Segal (Daniel N. Marx, Adriana LaFaille, & Carlton E. Williams also present) for the petitioners. Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Nancy J. Caplan & Eric Brandt, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for Committee for Public Counsel Services. Quentin R. Weld, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Essex District. Susanne M. O’Neil, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Norfolk District. Vincent J. DeMore, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Suffolk District. The following were present but did not argue: Robert J. Bender & Hallie White Speight, Assistant District Attorneys, for District Attorney for the Middlesex District. Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Plymouth District. Brian S. Glenny, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Cape & Islands District. Aaron M. Katz, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Joseph S. Dowdy & Christine C. Mumma, of North Carolina, John Roddy, & Denise McWilliams for New England Innocence Project & another. Janet Moore, of Ohio, & Patricia A. DeJuneas for National Association for Public Defense. Anthony A. Scibelli & Elizabeth A. Ritvo for Boston Bar Association. Daniel K. Gelb, Chauncy B. Wood, Naveen Ganesh, & Peter Walkingshaw for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & another. GANTS, C.J. We once again confront the tragic legacy of the misconduct of Annie Dookhan when she was employed as a chemist at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory Institute (Hinton lab). In Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465, 487 (2015) (Bridgeman I), the petitioners and the intervener, […]
ABCD Holdings, LLC v. Hannon, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-172-16)
1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT SUCV2015-1367-BLS2 ABCD HOLDINGS, LLC, Plaintiff vs. PATRICK HANNON, SOFIA GAGUA, PATRICK (“P.J.”) HANNON, RHR, LLC, SIMILAR SOILS, INC. and AGRITECH, INC., Defendants And J.DERENZO CO., SOFIA GAGUA, RHR, LLC, PATRICK (“P.J.”) HANNON, SIMILAR SOILS, INC., IMMANUEL CORP., AGRITECH INC., and L-5 INC., Reach and Apply Defendants MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS This is an action seeking to collect on a personal guaranty and to recover for other allegedly wrongful conduct following the execution of that document. The guaranty was executed by defendant Patrick Hannon on a loan for $ 219,759. The lender, Bright Horizons Finance, LLC, subsequently assigned its rights under the promissory note and under the guaranty to the plaintiff ABCD Holdings, Inc. Plaintiff has sued not only Hannon but various other individuals and entities on a variety of legal theories. Now before the Court are motions to dismiss by: 1) Hannon, as to some (but not all) counts against him; 2) defendants P.J. Hannon and RHR, LLC; and 3) defendant Agritech, Inc. This Court concludes that Hannon’s Motion must be Denied but that the other two Motions must be Allowed. 2 BACKGROUND This action was instituted on June 6, 2016. Plaintiff tried and failed to obtain a preliminary injunction against Hannon. See Memorandum of Decision dated June 24, 1016 (Salinger, J.) The case was once again before the Court in connection with various motions to dismiss, which were allowed in part and as to other counts reserved, since plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he would amend the complaint. The Amended Complaint was filed on October 7, 2016. The allegations as set forth in the Amended Complaint, together with attachments thereto, are as follows. The loan which is at the heart of this case was made on July 21, 2011. It was made by Bright Horizons, an entity owned by Boston attorney George McLaughlin. The loan was made to two companies, Ware Real Estate (Ware) and ABC&D Recycling (Recycling). Ware owns real property in Ware, Massachusetts improved with a waste transfer station; at the time, it was wholly owned by defendant Hannon. Recycling was in the business of recycling debris from construction sites and operated the waste transfer station in Ware. Hannon was its president and sole officer. Hannon was also a long time client of McLaughlin. The loan to Ware and Recycling was payable in full on demand, pursuant to terms set forth in a promissory note (the “W&R Note”) with payments of interest to be made on a monthly basis. The W&R Note is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit A. In addition to requiring payment on demand, the W&R Note gave Bright Horizon the […]
Commonwealth v. Caruso (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-013-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us. SJC-09656 COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVEN CARUSO. Middlesex. September 9, 2016. – January 13, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Confrontation of witnesses, Assistance of counsel. Evidence, Expert opinion, Information stored on computer, Of agency, Prior consistent statement, Testimony at prior proceeding, Videotape, Impeachment of credibility. Agency, What constitutes. Witness, Expert, Impeachment. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Confrontation of witnesses, Assistance of counsel. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 23, 2000. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles M. Grabau, J., and the case was tried before him. David A.F. Lewis for the defendant. Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney (Elizabeth Dunigan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth. LOWY, J. On January 20, 2000, Sandra Berfield, the victim, received a package containing a pipe bomb, which exploded when she opened it, blowing her body asunder and killing her instantly. A jury in the Superior Court found the defendant, Steven Caruso, guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity and cruelty. The defendant appeals from his conviction, claiming that (1) the admission of testimony by a jailhouse informant violated the defendant’s confrontation rights; (2) a ballistics expert improperly testified to a report prepared by an unavailable expert; (3) the testimony of the Commonwealth’s wire expert should have been excluded; (4) the Commonwealth failed to establish adequately the reliability of computer forensics evidence; and (5) the admission of the victim’s prior recorded testimony and limitations on the defendant’s ability to attack its veracity violated the defendant’s confrontation rights. We conclude that no reversible error occurred, and we affirm the jury’s verdict. Background. We recite the facts the jury could have reasonably found in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving certain details for our analysis of the issues. Defendant’s relationship with victim. The defendant was a long-time regular customer at a restaurant in Medford where the victim worked as a server. The defendant often patronized the restaurant more than once daily, and typically requested a particular server. When the defendant became angry after a long wait for his previously preferred server, the victim became the defendant’s server of choice. The defendant and the victim established an amicable […]
Commonwealth v. Gernrich (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-011-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12078 COMMONWEALTH vs. BRIAN E. GERNRICH. Worcester. September 8, 2016. – January 12, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Practice, Criminal, False report. Police Officer. Sheriff. Statute, Construction. Complaint received and sworn to in the Clinton Division of the District Court Department on June 4, 2014. The case was heard by Christopher P. LoConto, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Darla J. Mondou for the defendant. Michelle R. King, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. Following a jury-waived trial in the Clinton Division of the District Court, the defendant, Brian E. Gernrich, was convicted of making a false report of a crime to a police officer in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 13A. The complaint charged that the defendant, an inmate, falsely reported a sexual assault to a deputy sheriff employed at the facility. The defendant appealed, claiming that a deputy sheriff is not a police officer within the meaning of the statute and, as a consequence, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We granted his application for direct appellate review. The issue as presented here requires us to determine whether, as the Commonwealth argues, the term “police officers” used in G. L. c. 269, § 13A, includes the broad class of law enforcement officers authorized to perform certain police duties. We conclude, for the reasons explained below, that a deputy sheriff is not a “police officer” within the meaning of G. L. c. 269, § 13A; the statute includes within its reach only those law enforcement officers with the full authority to serve as police officers under G. L. c. 41, § 98. Therefore, we reverse the defendant’s conviction. Background. The material facts are undisputed. In May, 2014, the defendant was an inmate at the Worcester County house of correction (jail). A correction officer entered the defendant’s cell to conduct an inspection. After inspecting the cell, the officer told the defendant that material covering the air vent would have to be removed. The defendant then walked out of the cell, exclaiming, “Well why are you touching [my] dick?” After his interaction with the correction officer, the defendant telephoned the Prison Rape Elimination Act[1] (PREA) hotline[2] and reported that the correction officer, who earlier had inspected his cell, sexually […]
Genentech v. Commissioner of Revenue (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-012-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12083 GENENTECH, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE. Suffolk. October 7, 2016. – January 12, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Taxation, Corporate excise, Manufacturing corporation. Constitutional Law, Taxation, Commerce clause, Interstate commerce. Appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Catherine A. Battin, of Illinois (Richard C. Call also present) for the taxpayer. Brett M. Goldberg (Jamie E. Szal also present) for Commissioner of Revenue. BOTSFORD, J. Under the Massachusetts corporate excise tax statute, G. L. c. 63, corporations that generate business income in Massachusetts and other States pay taxes on that income according to a statutory formula that seeks to apportion and tax the corporation’s income generated in the Commonwealth. Beginning in 1996, for a “manufacturing corporation,” the apportionment formula has been based solely on the corporation’s sales, see G. L. c. 63, § 38 (l), inserted by St. 1995, c. 280, § 2. The taxpayer Genentech, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in California and earns business income in the Commonwealth as well as other States. In this appeal from a decision of the Appellate Tax Board (board), Genentech challenges the board’s determination that it qualified as a manufacturing corporation for the tax years 1998 through 2004 (tax years at issue); it also challenges the board’s rejection of its claim that application of § 38 (l)’s single-factor apportionment formula based on sales to the company violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. We affirm the decision of the board. Facts. We summarize the findings of fact made by the board. See G. L. c. 58A, § 13 (“The decision of the board shall be final as to findings of fact”). Genentech is a biotechnology company that develops drugs derived from proteins produced by living cells. Through a four-step process, Genentech employees modify the genetic codes of living cells to produce “proteins of interest” with desired pharmacologic effects.[1] First, Genentech scientists and other employees alter the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the selected cells to instruct them to produce a specific “protein of interest.” Second, employees facilitate the production of the protein of interest by placing the genetically altered […]
Commonwealth v. Calvaire (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-010-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12084 COMMONWEALTH vs. DONALD CALVAIRE. Suffolk. October 6, 2016. – January 11, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Incompetent Person, Criminal charges. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Dismissal, Competency to stand trial. Constitutional Law, Equal protection of laws. Due Process of Law, Substantive rights. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on January 29, 2016. The case was reported by Cordy, J. Barusch, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Beth L. Eisenberg also present) for the defendant. Darcy A. Jordan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BUDD, J. Under G. L. c. 123, § 16 (f) (§ 16 [f]), a defendant who is found incompetent to stand trial is entitled to dismissal of the criminal charges against him or her at the point corresponding to one-half the maximum sentence the defendant could have received if convicted of the most serious crime with which he or she was charged. We consider in this case how to calculate the date of dismissal when the most serious crime is within the concurrent jurisdiction of both the Superior Court Department and the District Court or Boston Municipal Court (BMC) Department, but the case is pending in the BMC. We conclude that the basis for the calculation is the maximum sentence provided for in the statute, regardless of the court in which the charges are pending at the time of the calculation. We also conclude that in this case, pursuant to § 16 (f), dismissal of the charge before the computed date may nevertheless be appropriate in the interest of justice. Background. On July 3, 2012, a woman was stabbed with a pocket knife at the Ashmont station of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority in the Dorchester section of Boston. Two days later, the BMC issued a criminal complaint charging the defendant, who has a history of mental illness, with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). He has been in custody ever since, spending most of that time committed at Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater).[1] Since the complaint issued, the defendant has been competent to stand trial only intermittently.[2] The Commonwealth made attempts to proceed to trial in the BMC during the […]
Commonwealth v. Meneus (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-009-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12105 COMMONWEALTH vs. McGREGORY MENEUS. Middlesex. September 8, 2016. – January 11, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Firearms. Constitutional Law, Investigatory stop, Stop and frisk, Reasonable suspicion, Search and seizure. Search and Seizure, Threshold police inquiry, Protective frisk, Reasonable suspicion. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress. Complaint received and sworn to in the Cambridge Division of the District Court Department on June 30, 2006. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by James L. LaMothe, Jr., J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him; and the case was heard by Michele B. Hogan, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. David Gerson for the defendant. Randall F. Maas, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HINES, J. After a jury-waived trial in the Cambridge District Court, the defendant was convicted of various firearms charges. The firearm was discovered after the defendant and a group of young black males were stopped by Cambridge police officers to investigate a report of shots fired at a vehicle. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the firearm, claiming that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. The motion judge denied the motion, as well as a motion for reconsideration thereof filed in light of our decisions in Commonwealth v. Martin, 457 Mass. 14 (2010), and Commonwealth v. Narcisse, 457 Mass. 1 (2010).[1] The defendant appealed from his convictions and the Appeals Court affirmed in an unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28. We allowed the defendant’s application for further appellate review. We conclude that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop and that the denial of the motion to suppress was error. Therefore, we vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial. Background. We summarize the facts as found by the motion judge, supplemented by uncontroverted evidence drawn from the record of the suppression hearing and evidence that was implicitly credited by the judge.[2] Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015). In the late evening hours of April 29, 2006, Debra Santos reported to police that a gunshot struck her vehicle as she was driving on Windsor Street in Cambridge. At approximately 10:50 […]
Commonwealth v. Horne (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-008-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12068 COMMONWEALTH vs. CALVIN HORNE. Suffolk. October 7, 2016. – January 10, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Controlled Substances. Evidence, Expert opinion, Relevancy and materiality. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 4, 2012. The cases were tried before Linda E. Giles, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Justin Florence for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & others, amici curiae. Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, see Commonwealth v. Horne, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1109 (2015), and we granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. The question before us is whether the admission in evidence of so-called “negative profiling” testimony, suggesting that the defendant did not look like a “crack” cocaine addict, gave rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. We conclude that it did.[1] Background. a. The defendant’s arrest. We recite the relevant facts the jury could have found. In the early morning hours of September 14, 2012, the defendant was stopped by police on Colonial Avenue in the Dorchester section of Boston for traffic violations. The automobile that the defendant was driving was registered to a woman named Denise Barton.[2] The officer who conducted the stop, Boston police Sergeant Thomas Brooks, determined that the defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended. When Brooks, joined by Boston police Officer Pele James, attempted to arrest him, the defendant forcefully resisted. With the assistance of three additional officers, the defendant was subdued and placed under arrest. Thereafter, the arresting officers found nearby a clear plastic bag containing twenty-six individually wrapped “rocks” of crack cocaine, totaling 3.87 grams. The defendant apparently had kept the bag in his boot, which came off during the melee. Later that night, Boston police Officer David Lanteigne conducted an inventory search of the motor vehicle. He found two cellular telephones and eighty-three dollars in cash in the center console of the automobile, another cellular telephone on […]
Adoption of Zak (and two companion cases) (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-004-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-393 Appeals Court ADOPTION OF ZAK (and two companion cases).[1] No. 16-P-393. Norfolk. October 7, 2016. – January 9, 2017. Present: Hanlon, Sullivan, & Blake, JJ. Adoption, Visitation rights, Standing. Parent and Child, Adoption. Minor, Adoption, Visitation rights. Practice, Civil, Adoption, Standing. Petitions filed in the Norfolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on May 19, 2010, and September 9, 2011. Following review by this court, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 540 (2015), the cases were heard by Dana Gershengorn, J. Julia A. B. Pearson for the mother. Sherrie Krasner for the father. Kari B. Kipf Horstmann for Department of Children and Families. Steven B. Rosenthal for Zak. Yvette L. Kruger for Carol & another. SULLIVAN, J. In this case we consider whether a mother and father, whose parental rights have been terminated, have standing to participate in a hearing on posttermination visitation under the following circumstances. Termination of parental rights and posttermination visitation were originally litigated in a single trial. The termination of parental rights was affirmed on appeal, but the matter was remanded to the Juvenile Court on the question of posttermination visitation. The parents were not notified of the remand hearing and did not participate. Following the entry of an “amended order for posttermination/adoption visitation” (posttermination visitation order), the parents appealed again to this court. We now conclude that the remand hearing was a continuation of the original proceeding, and that the parents had standing to participate in the remand hearing. Accordingly, we vacate the posttermination visitation order and remand for further proceedings. Background. In Adoption of Zak, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 540 (2015) (Zak I), we affirmed the entry of decrees by a judge of the Juvenile Court terminating parental rights and dispensing with consent to adoption, but remanded on the question of posttermination visitation. Although the judge had considered the effect of domestic violence on the question of termination of parental rights, her order on the visitation issue was silent as to the impact of domestic violence on the question of posttermination visitation.[2] We remanded the case for further findings and rulings in order to permit the judge to consider that issue. We also noted the authority of the judge to consider whether circumstances had changed since the issuance of the original […]
Commonwealth v. Grassie (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-006-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12061 COMMONWEALTH vs. BRYAN M. GRASSIE. Plymouth. September 6, 2016. – January 6, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Homicide. Assault and Battery by Means of a Dangerous Weapon. Evidence, Self-defense. Self-Defense. Practice, Criminal, Argument by prosecutor, Verdict, Grand jury proceedings. Grand Jury. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 21, 2012. The cases were tried before Frank M. Gaziano, J., and a renewed motion for a required finding of not guilty was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Kenneth H. Anderson (Greg L. Johnson with him) for the defendant. Robert C. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. Argie K. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. BOTSFORD, J. The defendant appeals from his convictions of murder in the second degree and a related charge. He argues that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the prosecutor’s closing argument, his murder conviction should be reversed or reduced to a conviction of manslaughter. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of murder in the second degree and that the prosecutor’s closing argument was not improper. However, for the reasons discussed below, we do not decide whether the defendant is entitled to a reduced verdict. The defendant argues as well that this court should expand its holding in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 (2012), to require that in all cases where the Commonwealth seeks to indict a person for murder, whether the person is a juvenile (as in Walczak) or an adult (as here), and there is substantial evidence of mitigating circumstances or defenses presented to the grand jury, the grand jury must be instructed on the elements of murder and the significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses. We conclude that this defendant is not entitled to relief based on the absence of any such instructions. However, we also believe it is important for the court to gain a better understanding of current grand jury instruction practices before deciding whether the holding of the Walczak case should be expanded in the future. Accordingly, we will appoint a committee to study and make recommendations […]