Rodriguez v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-099-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-942 Appeals Court RAQUEL RODRIGUEZ[1] vs. MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY. No. 16-P-942. Suffolk. April 7, 2017. – July 31, 2017. Present: Grainger, Sullivan, & Kinder, JJ.[2] Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, Contract. Railroad. Contract, What constitutes, Offer and acceptance. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 10, 2015. A motion to dismiss was heard by Mitchell H. Kaplan, J. Thomas G. Shapiro (Robert Richardson & Edward C. Cumbo also present) for the plaintiff. David S. Mackey (Christina S. Marshall also present) for the defendant. KINDER, J. In this case we address whether a public transportation authority breaches a contract with its commuter rail customers when extraordinary winter storms interrupt the service schedule. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that in the circumstances presented here, it does not. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of dismissal pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), for failure to state a breach of contract claim. On April 22, 2015, the plaintiff, Raquel Rodriguez, brought this action against the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) and its commuter rail operator, Keolis Commuter Services, LLC (Keolis), on behalf of a putative class of purchasers of monthly rail passes in January, February, and March, 2015. The complaint alleged that the MBTA commuter rail service suffered severe delays and cancellations during the record-setting snowstorms of 2015. Rodriguez claimed that these service disruptions were in breach of the MBTA’s implied contract “to provide timely, reliable commuter rail service . . . for January, February and March of 2015.” In a comprehensive written decision, a Superior Court judge allowed the MBTA’s motion to dismiss. Among other things, the judge concluded that even if the MBTA had some form of contractual obligation to its monthly pass holders, “the complaint fails to allege an essential element of a breach of contract claim: an agreement between the parties on a material term of the contract at issue.” This appeal followed.[3] Background. We summarize the allegations in the operative complaint and the items appearing in the record of the case. See Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000). The MBTA is charged by statute with providing commuter rail and subway service in eastern Massachusetts. G. L. c. 161A, §§ 1 and 2. The MBTA provides service […]
Categories: News Tags: 1109917, Authority, Lawyers, massachusetts, Rodriguez, Transportation, Weekly
Massachusetts Fine Wines & Spirits, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-094-17)
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, ss. SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION 2017–003120-C MASSACHUSETTS FINE WINES & SPIRITS, LLC[1] vs. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS This is an action for judicial review, pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14, of a decision of the Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission (“ABCC” or the “Commission”) finding that the plaintiff, Massachusetts Fine Wines and Spirits, LLC d/b/a Total Wine & More (“Total Wine”), sold certain alcoholic beverage products at a retail price below their “invoiced cost” in violation of 204 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.04(1). The matter is before the Court on the parties’ Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. For the reasons set forth below, the Commission’s motion is DENIED and Total Wine’s motion is ALLOWED. BACKGROUND The material facts revealed in the administrative record are largely undisputed, and are as follows. Total Wine is a national alcoholic beverage retailer, and the holder of a retail license for the sale of alcoholic beverages to be consumed off of the premises under G.L. c. 138, § 15. This case concerns two of Total Wine’s Massachusetts stores, which are located in Natick and Everett. Total Wine purchases alcoholic beverage products for its Natick and Everett stores from wholesalers Horizon Beverage Company (“Horizon”) and Martignetti Companies (“Martignetti”). Horizon and Martignetti offer merchant customers like Total Wine a 1% discount for prompt payment (the “prompt payment discount”), and additional discounts based on the total quantity of a particular product purchased during a specified period of time (commonly referred to as the “promotional period”). The latter is known in industry parlance as a cumulative quantity discount (“CQD”), and the nature of this discount and its impact on downstream retail pricing lie at the heart of the present dispute. When wholesalers like Horizon and Martignetti deliver alcoholic beverage products to retailers, Commission regulations require them to “carry an invoice or sales slip, stating the names and addresses of the purchaser and seller, the date and the amount of the purchase, and also itemizing the number of the various kinds of containers and the kinds, quantities and brands of alcoholic beverages or alcohol.” 204 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(3). Horizon’s and Martignetti’s delivery personnel typically present these invoices (hereinafter, the “original invoice”) to Total Wine at the time of product delivery. The wholesalers’ original invoices state that a 1% prompt payment discount applies to the product order if the invoice is paid in full within 10 days. These original invoices are silent, however, as to the CQD. Total Wine’s policy is to pay the total cost stated on […]
Niles v. Huntington Controls, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-100-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-229 Appeals Court ADRIAN NILES vs. HUNTINGTON CONTROLS, INC., & another.[1] No. 16-P-229. Norfolk. January 12, 2017. – July 31, 2017. Present: Kafker, C.J., Hanlon, & Agnes, JJ. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment. Labor, Public works, Wages. Public Works, Wage determination. Administrative Law, Wage administration. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 22, 2013. Motions for summary judgment were heard by Thomas A. Connors, J. Joseph L. Sulman for the plaintiff. Stephen P. Kolberg for the defendants. AGNES, J. The Massachusetts prevailing wage law, G. L. c. 149, §§ 26-27 (prevailing wage law), is designed “to achieve parity between the wages of workers engaged in public construction projects and workers in the rest of the construction industry.” Mullally v. Waste Mgmt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 526, 532 (2008). Under this law, the “rate per hour of the wages” paid to “mechanics and apprentices, teamsters, chauffeurs and laborers in the construction of public works” may not be less than “the rate or rates of wages” determined by the commissioner of the Department of Labor Standards (department). G. L. c. 149, § 26, as amended by St. 1967, c. 296, § 3. The commissioner determines the minimum rate by preparing a classification of “the jobs usually performed on various types of public works” by “mechanics and apprentices, teamsters, chauffeurs and laborers” employed in such construction. G. L. c. 149, § 27, as amended by St. 1967, c. 296, § 4.[2] The commissioner is authorized to “revise such classification from time to time, as he may deem advisable.” G. L. c. 149, § 27, as inserted by St. 1935, c. 461, § 27. In the present case, Adrian Niles filed a four-count complaint in the Superior Court alleging a violation of the prevailing wage law (count one), breach of contract (count two), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count three), and unjust enrichment (count four). The judge allowed a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Huntington Controls, Inc., and its president, Paul Milano (collectively, Huntington), on all four counts and denied Niles’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability under count one. Niles appealed. The sole question presented is whether the judge was correct in ruling that Huntington did not violate the prevailing wage law because none of the […]
Commonwealth v. Wallace (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-098-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 15-P-1262 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LARON WALLACE. No. 15-P-1262. Hampden. April 13, 2017. – July 28, 2017. Present: Kafker, C.J., Grainger, & Massing, JJ.[1] Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Plea, Conduct of government agents, Sentence. Due Process of Law, Plea, Sentence. Practice, Criminal, Plea, New trial, Conduct of government agents, Sentence, Affidavit. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 20, 2011. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty was heard by Tina S. Page, J. Sara A. Laroche for the defendant. Benjamin Shorey, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KAFKER, C.J. The defendant, Laron Wallace, appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute a Class B substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A(c). He argues that the motion judge abused her discretion in denying the motion because of the Commonwealth’s misconduct in a prior case of his involving the chemist Sonja Farak, which came to light after the guilty plea was entered in this case. Although Farak was not the chemist in this case, the defendant contends that her misconduct in the prior case casts doubt upon the justice of this plea because he considered the concurrent sentences he received in the two cases to be interrelated. Essentially he contends that because his motion for a new trial was allowed and his sentence reduced in the other case involving Farak, the same should occur in this case. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Background. The following facts are undisputed. On March 2, 2011, the defendant was arrested by Springfield police executing a search warrant at an apartment located within 100 feet of a public park. The defendant was observed with a bag containing thirty-seven rocks of a substance later determined to be crack cocaine, packaged in smaller individual bags, at his feet. A search of the defendant’s person revealed $ 378 in cash and two cellular telephones. Police also found two digital scales in the apartment. The defendant was indicted in Superior Court, docket no. 2011-00300 (the 2011 case) on two counts: (1) possession with intent to distribute a Class B substance, subsequent offense, G. L. c. 94C, § 34A(d); and (2) a drug violation in a […]
Commonwealth v. Marcus M., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-097-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1200 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MARCUS M., a juvenile. No. 16-P-1200. Suffolk. June 6, 2017. – July 27, 2017. Present: Green, Hanlon, & Kinder, JJ. Practice, Criminal, Revocation of probation. Juvenile Court, Probation. Complaints received and sworn to in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on December 19, 2014. A proceeding for revocation of probation was had before Peter M. Coyne, J. Alison R. Bancroft for the juvenile. Julianne Campbell, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HANLON, J. After a probation violation hearing, a judge in the Juvenile Court found that the juvenile had violated the terms of his probation because he was charged three times with subsequent offenses allegedly committed while he was on probation. The judge committed the juvenile to the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until his eighteenth birthday. The juvenile now appeals, arguing that the only evidence offered on two of the three offenses was his court activity record information (CARI) record indicating that new complaints had issued. While we agree with the judge that the evidence supported a finding of violation regarding one offense on one complaint, for which there was other evidence, judicial notice of the CARI records, without more, was insufficient to support finding the other two violations. Background. The juvenile was placed on probation and his case continued without a finding, on May 8, 2015, after he admitted to facts sufficient to support findings of delinquency on charges of malicious destruction of property and vandalizing property. Ten days later, a probation officer issued a notice of probation violation after the juvenile was arrested for possession of a firearm, possession of ammunition, carrying a rifle or shotgun on a public way, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon. The probation case was continued a number of times and, on February 10, 2016, a second notice of probation violation was served on the juvenile as a result of other new charges, this time, affray and disturbing of public assembly. On March 11, 2016, a third notice of probation violation issued, alleging a “violation of the criminal law, namely, larceny.” At the probation violation hearing in June, 2016, a Boston police sergeant testified that he had responded to a call regarding a dispute among neighbors on Blue […]
Silverwood Partners, LLC v. Wellness Partners, LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-096-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1174 Appeals Court SILVERWOOD PARTNERS, LLC vs. WELLNESS PARTNERS, LLC.[1] No. 16-P-1174. Middlesex. May 9, 2017. – July 25, 2017. Present: Agnes, Massing, & Lemire, JJ. Financial Institution. Arbitration, Stay of judicial proceedings. Contract, Arbitration. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. Estoppel. Securities, Registration of broker-dealer. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 4, 2015. A motion to dismiss was heard by Elizabeth M. Fahey, J. Michael Paris for the plaintiff. Christopher Robertson for the defendant. MASSING, J. In this appeal we consider whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars the plaintiff corporation, which agreed to arbitrate its claims against the two principals of the defendant corporation, from litigating nearly identical claims against the defendant corporation itself. In the circumstances of this case, we hold that it does. Background. The plaintiff, Silverwood Partners, LLC (Silverwood), initiated this lawsuit alleging that its former employees, Nicolas McCoy and Michael Burgmaier, breached their contractual and fiduciary duties by secretly creating a competing firm — the defendant Wellness Partners, LLC, doing business as Whipstitch Capital (Whipstitch) — stealing Silverwood’s clients, converting Silverwood’s property, and diverting Silverwood’s business opportunities to Whipstitch. Silverwood, a broker-dealer registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), is a member of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA). McCoy and Burgmaier are registered with FINRA and, as senior executives with Silverwood, had the status of FINRA “associated persons.” Whipstitch is not a member of FINRA. Silverwood’s original complaint named McCoy, Burgmaier, and Whipstitch as defendants.[2] The three codefendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative to stay the proceedings, on the ground that Silverwood’s claims fell within the scope of FINRA’s mandatory arbitration provision, which governed McCoy’s and Burgmaier’s relationship with Silverwood. In response, Silverwood filed a first amended complaint in which it dropped McCoy and Burgmaier as parties, leaving Whipstitch as the sole defendant.[3] Whipstitch filed a renewed motion to dismiss or stay, maintaining that Silverwood was equitably estopped from proceeding against Whipstitch outside of arbitration. A Superior Court judge allowed Whipstitch’s motion to dismiss on the ground that “the entire matter is required to be arbitrated.”[4] According to the allegations in Silverwood’s amended complaint, McCoy’s and Burgmaier’s employment relationship with Silverwood was governed by Silverwood’s “Supervisory Procedures and Compliance Manual,” […]
Lunn v. Commonwealth, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-123-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557- 1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12276 SREYNUON LUNN vs. COMMONWEALTH & another.[1] Suffolk. April 4, 2017. – July 24, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. Alien. Arrest. Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk on February 7, 2017. The case was reported by Lenk, J. Emma C. Winger (Mark Fleming, of New York, & Alyssa Hackett, Committee for Public Counsel Services, also present) for the petitioner. Joshua S. Press, of the District of Columbia, for the United States. Jessica V. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General (Allen H. Forbes, Special Assistant Attorney General, & Sara A. Colb, Assistant Attorney General, also present) for the Commonwealth & another. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Sabrineh Ardalan, of New York, Philip L. Torrey, Mark C. Fleming, & Laila Ameri for Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program at Harvard Law School. Christopher N. Lasch, of Colorado, for David C. Baluarte & others. Karen Pita Loor for Criminal Defense Clinic at Boston University School of Law. Omar C. Jadwat, of New York, Spencer E. Amdur, of Pennsylvania, Cody H. Wofsy, of California, Matthew R. Segal, Jessie J. Rossman, Laura Rótolo, Carlton E. Williams, Kirsten V. Mayer, Kim B. Nemirow, & Laura Murray-Tjan for Bristol County Bar Advocates, Inc., & others. BY THE COURT. After the sole pending criminal charge against him was dismissed, the petitioner, Sreynuon Lunn, was held by Massachusetts court officers in a holding cell at the Boston Municipal Court at the request of a Federal immigration officer, pursuant to a Federal civil immigration detainer. Civil immigration detainers are documents issued by Federal immigration officers when they wish to arrest a person who is in State custody for the purpose of removing the person from the country. By issuing a civil detainer, the Federal officer asks the State custodian voluntarily to hold the person for up to two days after he or she would otherwise be entitled to be released from State custody, in order to allow Federal authorities time to arrive and take the person into Federal custody for removal purposes. The United States Supreme Court has explained that, “[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States,” Arizona v. United […]
Commonwealth v. Hampton (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-095-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1355 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. RAYMOND HAMPTON. No. 16-P-1355. Barnstable. June 5, 2017. – July 24, 2017. Present: Sullivan, Henry, & Shin, JJ. Indecent Assault and Battery. Minor. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Relevancy and materiality. Complaint received and sworn to in the Barnstable Division of the District Court Department on November 2, 2015. The case was tried before John M. Julian, J. Darla J. Mondou for the defendant. Elizabeth M. Carey, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SULLIVAN, J. The defendant, Raymond Hampton, appeals from his conviction of indecent assault and battery on a minor under the age of fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B.[1] The defendant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion when he allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the defendant had watched adult pornography. We agree that the admission of this evidence was error, but, under the circumstances presented, we affirm. Background. Adele[2] testified that she lived at home with her parents, her sister, other tenants, and the defendant. The defendant was the child’s great uncle. While living in the home, the defendant slept in a bedroom belonging to Adele and her sister. For this reason, the sisters slept on the couch or with their parents. The sisters often went back to the bedroom to play games, get toys, or watch movies on the defendant’s computer. On October 1, 2015, Adele, then nine years old, was in the defendant’s room, when the defendant grabbed her wrist tightly. At trial she testified that he put her hand under his clothes, forcing her to touch the skin of his penis. Before trial, Adele told an interviewer that the defendant forced her to touch him over his clothes. Adele also testified at trial that the defendant touched her chest, a fact not previously reported. Adele told her sister about the incident the next day, but told her not to tell anybody. The second reported incident occurred on October 4, 2015. Adele testified that the defendant touched her vagina with his finger, under her clothes, and caused her to bleed. The defendant told her not tell anybody about what happened. Adele told her sister about this incident at some later point. Adele did not tell anyone else about the incidents until October 21, […]
Commonwealth v. Hammond (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-122-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12096 COMMONWEALTH vs. AMANDA L. HAMMOND. Plymouth. October 6, 2016. – July 21, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. Rape. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Sentence, Sex offender. Due Process of Law, Sentence, Sex offender. Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Videotape, Sexual conduct. Practice, Criminal, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Redaction, Argument by prosecutor, Sentence. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 10, 2012. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard J. Chin, J.; the cases were tried before Cornelius J. Moriarty, II, J., and a motion for postverdict relief was heard by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Nancy A. Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant. Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LOWY, J. The defendant, a twenty-two year old woman, was convicted of raping a fourteen year old boy and two thirteen year old boys, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23. On appeal, the defendant claims that there were three main defects with her prosecution: (1) the incriminating statements she made to police should have been suppressed; (2) the video recording of these statements that was shown at trial should have been further redacted; and (3) the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper. In addition, the defendant contends that the trial judge’s lack of authority to relieve her from registering as a sex offender under G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), constitutes a due process violation, as applied to her. We conclude that there was no reversible error and affirm the convictions. We further conclude that, based upon the record before us, there is no as-applied due process violation. Background. We summarize the evidence the Commonwealth adduced at trial, reserving further details for discussion of the specific issues raised on appeal. The charges in this case stem from two separate but related episodes that took place in June, 2012, in Brockton. The first episode began when the defendant met up with two of the victims, Roy,[1] then age thirteen, and David, then age fourteen,[2] in a park. The boys, whom she knew before these events, accompanied […]