Commonwealth v. Figueroa (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-085-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11189 COMMONWEALTH vs. RICHARD FIGUEROA. Essex. January 10, 2014. ‑ May 19, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Duffly, JJ. Homicide. Search and Seizure, Probable cause, Search incident to lawful arrest, Exigent circumstances, Standing to object. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Instructions to jury, Presumptions and burden of proof, Deliberation of jury, Question by jury, Verdict, Lesser included offense, Capital case. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Identification, Burden of proof. Due Process of Law, Identification, Burden of proof. Evidence, Identification, Presumptions and burden of proof, Intent, Intoxication. Identification. Jury and Jurors. Intent. Intoxication. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 25, 2008. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Howard J. Whitehead, J.; a second pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J., and the case was tried before him. Donald A. Harwood for the defendant. Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. On the evening of January 31, 2008, the defendant walked into a Lawrence restaurant and shot and killed Luis Alex Alcantara (victim), with whom he had been feuding. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1. On appeal, the defendant raises five claims: (1) that a motion judge erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized during warrantless entries into two apartments; (2) that a different motion judge erred in denying a motion to suppress a showup identification of the defendant; (3) that the trial judge’s instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires reversal of his conviction; (4) that the judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication; and (5) that the judge erred in furnishing the jury with an instruction in accordance with Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 364 Mass. 87, 101-102 (1973), and Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62 Mass. 1, 2-3 (1851) (Tuey–Rodriquez instruction), limited to their consideration of murder in the first degree, in response to a note from the jury asking whether they were a “hung jury” because some jurors “feel it is first degree, some feel it is second degree.” The defendant also contends that we should exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce […]