Pugsley v. Police Department of Boston, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-133-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11740 SEAN PUGSLEY vs. POLICE DEPARTMENT OF BOSTON & others.[1] Suffolk. January 6, 2015. – July 31, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Boston. Municipal Corporations, Police. Police, Hiring. Anti-Discrimination Law, Sex, Bona fide occupational qualification. Employment, Discrimination. Practice, Civil, Standing. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 2, 2011. The case was heard by Carol S. Ball, J., on motions for summary judgment, and entry of final judgment was ordered by Frances A. McIntyre, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Joseph L. Sulman (David Isaac Brody with him) for the plaintiff. Nicole I. Taub for police department of Boston. Nicholas A. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General (Ronald F. Kehoe, Assistant Attorney General, with him) for Human Resources Division & another. The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jamie Ann Sabino & Leah Kaine for The Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts. Ralph C. Martin & Lisa A. Sinclair for Northeastern University. Simone R. Liebman & Constance M. McGrane for Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. CORDY, J. The plaintiff, Sean Pugsley, brought a claim of sex discrimination against defendants Boston police department (department) and the Commonwealth’s Human Resources Division (division) alleging a violation of G. L. c. 151B and of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, § 11I. The plaintiff’s claim arises from the department’s preferential treatment of females in hiring candidates for the December, 2010, police academy class. Summary judgment was entered for the defendants on the discrimination claim, G. L. c. 151B.[2] For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case for entry of a judgment of dismissal for lack of standing. 1. Background. Under G. L. c. 31 and the division’s personnel administration rules (rules), the department appoints entry-level police officers from a “main certification” list generated by the division at the department’s request. The division creates this list by ranking candidates on an eligibility list according to their scores on the most recent civil service examination (examination). The eligibility list is then augmented by candidates for “reemployment,”[3] and candidates who possess statutory preferences, including veterans’ preferences. The candidates for reemployment are required to be placed first on the main certification list, followed by those with statutory preferences,[4] […]