Parr, et al. v. Rosenthal (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-139-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12014 MICHAEL PARR[1] & another[2] vs. DANIEL ROSENTHAL. Essex. April 5, 2016. – September 2, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[3] Limitations, Statute of. Medical Malpractice, Statute of limitations. Negligence, Doctor, Medical malpractice. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 9, 2009. The case was tried before Thomas R. Murtaugh, J., and a motion for a new trial was heard by him. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Myles W. McDonough (James S. Hamrock, Jr., with him) for the defendant. David J. Gallagher for the plaintiffs. Annette Gonthier Kiely, Adam R. Satin, & Thomas R. Murphy, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. John J. Barter, for Professional Liability Foundation, Ltd., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. GANTS, C.J. The plaintiffs commenced this medical malpractice action against the defendant in the Superior Court for his alleged negligence in connection with a “radio frequency ablation” (RFA) procedure he performed on the leg of their minor son, which caused severe burning and eventually resulted in the amputation of the child’s leg. The jury did not reach the issue of negligence because they found that, more than three years before the plaintiffs filed the action, they knew or reasonably should have known that the child had been harmed by the defendant’s conduct, so the action was barred by the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims. The plaintiffs contend that the jury should have been instructed on the so-called “continuing treatment doctrine” applicable to medical malpractice claims, a doctrine that heretofore has not been recognized under Massachusetts law. Generally speaking, the doctrine states that a cause of action does not accrue, and therefore the statute of limitations clock does not begin to run, for medical malpractice claims during the period that an allegedly negligent physician continues to treat the patient for the same or a related condition. See, e.g., Borgia v. New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 156-157 (1962). We now recognize the doctrine under Massachusetts law and hold that the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice claim generally does not begin to run while the plaintiff and the defendant physician continue to have a […]