Commonwealth v. Taylor (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-151-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11398 COMMONWEALTH vs. RODRICK JAMES TAYLOR. Suffolk. December 5, 2013. – August 29, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Homicide. Constitutional Law, Speedy trial. Practice, Criminal, Dismissal, Speedy trial, Discovery, Waiver, Argument by prosecutor. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 28, 2006. A motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial was heard by Stephen E. Neel, J., and the case was tried before him; a motion for postconviction relief, filed on April 28, 2011, was heard by Diane M. Kottmyer, J. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Chauncey B. Wood (John Swomley with him) for the defendant. Sarah H. Montgomery & Kathleen Celio, Assistant District Attorneys (Edmond J. Zabin, Assistant District Attorney, with them) for the Commonwealth. Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. William M. Jay, of the District of Columbia, Paul F. Ware, Jr., Joshua M. Daniels, & Kevin P. Martin, for Boston Bar Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. LENK, J. The defendant appeals from his conviction of murder in the second degree. He maintains both that a Superior Court judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b), as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996), and that errors in the prosecutor’s closing argument require reversal. As to the speedy trial claim, the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979) (rule 36). A total of 614 calendar days had elapsed between the defendant’s arraignment and the filing of his motion to dismiss, which tolled the running of time in which the defendant’s trial must have commenced. See Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285, 294 (1983). However, the Commonwealth met its burden of showing that at least 249 days were excludable from the speedy trial calculation, and that the defendant accordingly had been brought to trial within the requisite one-year period under rule 36.[2] Because the defendant acquiesced in certain delays, failed to object to every continuance sought by the Commonwealth, did not press a motion under Mass. […]