Brady, et al. v. Citizens Union Savings Bank, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-025-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-308 Appeals Court NANCY BRADY, executrix,[1] & another[2] vs. CITIZENS UNION SAVINGS BANK[3] & another.[4] No. 16-P-308. Bristol. December 6, 2016. – March 9, 2017. Present: Green, Agnes, & Desmond, JJ. Probate Court, Attorney’s fees, Trust. Trust, Attorney’s fees. Executor and Administrator, Attorney’s fees. Practice, Civil, Attorney’s fees. Complaint in equity filed in the Bristol Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on July 13, 2011. Following review by this court, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 416 (2015), an award of attorney’s fees, costs, and compensation for professional services was entered by Virginia M. Ward, J. Carol L. Ricker for Dale Eggers. Edwin F. Landers, Jr., for W. Nancy Brady. Ben N. Dunlap for Edwin J. Haznar, Jr. GREEN, J. On remand following our decision in a previous appeal in this case, see Brady v. Citizens Union Sav. Bank, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 416 (2015) (Brady I), the Probate and Family Court judge entered a thorough and detailed written memorandum of decision, in which she reduced from $ 457,902.09 to $ 350,680.80[5] the amount the plaintiffs could recover as reimbursement for fees and costs their decedents incurred in defense of a lawsuit brought against them by the defendant Dale Eggers and her daughter. Eggers has again appealed, contending that (1) the amount of fees is unreasonable in light of the nature and complexity of the underlying litigation; (2) the amount of fees represents an unreasonable proportion of the value of assets held by the Wilson O. Smith Trust (trust); and (3) the judge failed adequately to consider the availability of insurance proceeds as an alternative source of reimbursement. We affirm, addressing Eggers’s arguments in turn.[6] Lodestar method.[7] In determining the amount of a reasonable fee, we consider “the nature of the case and the issues presented, the time and labor required, the amount of damages involved, the result obtained, the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of awards in similar cases.” Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-389 (1979). Determination of a reasonable fee is in the first instance largely committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to evaluate the […]