Commonwealth v. Chambers (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-115-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1925 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. NAKIA CHAMBERS. No. 14-P-1925. Suffolk. January 29, 2016. – September 1, 2016. Present: Grainger, Hanlon, & Agnes, JJ. Destruction of Property. Wilful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct. Practice, Criminal, Required finding, Lesser included offense, Instructions to jury. Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division of the Boston Municipal Court Department on January 2, 2014. The case was tried before Jonathan R. Tynes, J. Max Bauer for the defendant. Kathryn Leary, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. AGNES, J. The defendant, Nakia Chambers, appeals from her conviction of the misdemeanor offense of wilful and malicious destruction of property with a value equal to or less than $ 250, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 127. We agree with the defendant that it was error to deny her motion for a required finding at the close of the Commonwealth’s case but, in the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that because the jury did not convict her of the offense as charged, instead returning a verdict on a lesser included offense that was supported by the evidence, the error was rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Lang, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 259 (1987). In view of the confusion that is evident in the record about the differentiation between the felony and the misdemeanor offenses set forth in G. L. c. 266, § 127, and the malice element required under two of the four offenses set forth in § 127, we take this opportunity to review the statute and the developments in the case law. Background. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury were warranted in finding the following facts. At the time of the events, the defendant resided in the third-floor apartment of 111 Fuller Street in the Dorchester section of Boston. Mary Louise Brown and her daughter lived in the first-floor apartment, which they rented from the property owner, a bank. Brown and the defendant had a hostile relationship due to disagreements regarding responsibility for trash collection in the building. On the morning of December 17, 2013, Brown’s vehicle was parked temporarily at the base of the driveway to 111 Fuller Street, blocking the exit to the street. The defendant’s vehicle was in the driveway, […]