Chin v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-196-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11860 ALAN CHIN vs. COMMONWEALTH. December 10, 2015. Supreme Judicial Court, Appeal from order of single justice. Alan Chin appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying, without a hearing, his petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3. A petition for Chin’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person is pending in the Superior Court. Chin waived his right to a probable cause hearing, assented to a finding of probable cause, and was temporarily committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center for examination and diagnosis by two qualified examiners. The qualified examiners submitted their reports, and the Commonwealth petitioned for trial. Chin filed a motion in limine to preclude the Commonwealth from calling certain witnesses. The motion was denied. Chin’s G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition sought relief from that ruling. We affirm the judgment. Because Chin’s petition sought relief from an interlocutory ruling of the trial court, he is obligated to submit a record appendix and memorandum of law “set[ting] forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Chin has filed a brief and record appendix, which we are treating as a memorandum pursuant to rule 2:21.[1] He has failed therein to carry his burden under the rule. If the witnesses’ testimony is improperly admitted against him, he can raise that issue on appeal from any adverse judgment, as the admissibility of a witness’s testimony is a matter routinely addressed in the ordinary appellate process. He can limit and challenge their testimony at trial as well, through the use of objections and cross-examination. Because Chin has these alternative remedies available to him, the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion by denying extraordinary relief. Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law. John S. Day for the petitioner. [1] We note that the record appendix is incomplete, as it fails to include the entire record before the single justice. In particular, it omits Chin’s memorandum in support of his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition and the Commonwealth’s opposition. Full-text Opinions
Chin v. Merriot (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-012-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11715 CHESTER CHIN vs. EDITH E. MERRIOT.[1] Franklin. October 6, 2014. – January 30, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & Hines, JJ. Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Modification of judgment, Separation agreement. Statute, Retroactive application. Complaint for divorce filed in the Franklin Division of the Probate and Family Court Department on January 11, 2011. A complaint for modification, filed on March 11, 2013, was heard by Beth A. Crawford, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. William Sanford Durland, III, for Chester Chin. Leslie H. Powers for Edith E. Merriot. The following submitted briefs amicus curiae: Rachel B. Biscardi for Women’s Bar Association of Massachusetts. Richard M. Novitch, Maureen McBrien, & Charles P. Kindregan, pro se. David H. Lee & Holly A. Hinte, pro se. DUFFLY, J. After twelve years of marriage, Chester Chin and Edith E. Merriot were divorced by a judgment of divorce nisi in August, 2011. At the time of the divorce, Chin was sixty-seven years old and Merriot was sixty-nine. Pursuant to a merged provision of the parties’ separation agreement, Chin was obligated to pay alimony to Merriot in the amount of $ 650 per month until “the death of either party or the wife’s remarriage.” In March, 2013, Chin filed an amended complaint for modification in the Probate and Family Court in which he sought to terminate his alimony obligation. To support his claim for relief, Chin asserted as “changed circumstances” that he had attained the age of sixty-eight, “full retirement age” as defined by G. L. c. 208, § 48. He argued that, pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 49 (f) (retirement provision), “general term alimony orders shall terminate upon the payor attaining the full retirement age.” Chin thereafter filed an amended complaint asserting, as a further change in circumstances, that Merriot had “been cohabiting with another person . . . and maintaining a common household” for more than three months; cohabitation alone is a basis for termination of alimony under G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (cohabitation provision). The retirement and cohabitation provisions on which Chin relies were enacted as part of the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124 (alimony reform act or act). The act was made effective as of March 1, […]