Commonwealth v. Cruz (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-044-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1299 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. ROBERTO CRUZ. No. 16-P-1299. Essex. November 8, 2017. – April 13, 2018. Present: Milkey, Blake, & Singh, JJ. Indecent Assault and Battery. Practice, Criminal, Required finding. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 15, 2015. The cases were tried before Richard E. Welch, III, J. Daniel P. Tarlow for the defendant. Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. SINGH, J. Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a child,[1] subsequent offense,[2] and sentenced to fifteen years to fifteen years and one day in State prison.[3] On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We agree and therefore reverse the judgments and set aside the verdicts. Facts. In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following facts. Jane (a pseudonym), a thirteen year old girl, was an intern at an aviation company in the summer of 2014. While she was working one day, the defendant, an almost sixty year old man who she had met before at the airport, waved her over to him. After a brief conversation, the defendant told her he would like to get her a gift for her upcoming birthday. He said that he would like to give her a hug, but that they should do it in another room. Jane went into a nearby hallway for a while, and waited, then returned to work after a couple of minutes. When she later saw him again in the airplane hangar, she asked if the defendant still wanted the hug,[4] and he hugged her briefly around the shoulders. The defendant then asked if Jane wanted another hug, and said that they should go into another room. He led her to a separate room, with no one else present. He gave her a second hug, a little tighter, with a kiss on the neck. This was not “anything that necessarily alarmed [her]” because she believed it was consistent with the way people of “European descent” greeted each other.[5] The defendant then gave Jane a third hug without her permission, which was lower down, on her waist and hips. […]
Commonwealth v. Cruz (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-103-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-1160 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. MIGUEL CRUZ. No. 11-P-1160. Suffolk. March 1, 2016. – August 18, 2016. Present: Cypher, Cohen, & Neyman, JJ. Controlled Substances. “School Zone” Statute. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Public trial, Assistance of counsel. Constitutional Law, Public trial, Assistance of counsel. Words, “Preschool.” Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 6, 2008. The cases were tried before Regina L. Quinlan, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on August 22, 2012, was heard by Raymond J. Brassard, J. James E. Methe for the defendant. Matthew P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth. CYPHER, J. Following a jury trial, the defendant, Miguel Cruz, was convicted of two counts of trafficking in cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E(b); two counts of distribution of cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A(c); and four counts of distributing drugs in a school zone, G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. On the defendant’s consolidated appeal from his convictions of the four school zone violations and the denial of his motion for a new trial, the primary issue is whether a child care facility that enrolls younger than school aged children can qualify as a “preschool” within the meaning of the school zone statute. Concluding that it does, and finding no merit in the defendant’s remaining claims, we affirm. Background. Taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence showed that, on four occasions between November 20, 2007, and December 12, 2007, the defendant sold cocaine to a police officer working undercover.[1] Three of the drug transactions occurred at a street address located approximately 259 feet from the parking lot of the East Boston YMCA, and a fourth transaction was conducted in a vehicle parked 173 feet and 4 inches from the same YMCA property.[2] A private, nonprofit social service organization, the East Boston YMCA operates within its building a health center, teen programs, and the East Boston Child Care Center (center). The center is licensed as a child care facility by the Massachusetts department of early education and care. It is also accredited by the National Association for the Education of Young Children, which assesses the center’s staffing levels and the educational capabilities of its teachers. Ninety-three children between the ages of fifteen months […]
Commonwealth v. Cruz (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-131-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1552 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. FILIP M. CRUZ. No. 13-P-1552. Bristol. February 27, 2015. – September 4, 2015. Present: Vuono, Milkey, & Blake, JJ. Wanton or Reckless Conduct. Practice, Criminal, Duplicative convictions, Lesser included offense. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on August 18, 2011. The cases were tried before D. Lloyd Macdonald, J. Joseph J. Czerwonka for the defendant. Owen J. Murphy, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. VUONO, J. The defendant’s mother, Olivia Cruz, was ninety-one years old when she died of sepsis caused by an infection from wounds that developed on her buttocks as a result of sitting in her feces and urine over a period of several weeks. The defendant was Olivia’s[1] caretaker. A Bristol County grand jury returned two indictments charging the defendant with offenses that, as alleged by the Commonwealth, resulted in Olivia’s death. The first indictment charged him with wantonly or recklessly permitting serious bodily injury to Olivia, an elder or person with a disability under his care. See G. L. c. 265, § 13K(e). The second charged him with having wantonly or recklessly committed or permitted another to commit abuse, neglect or mistreatment upon Olivia. See G. L. c. 265, § 13K(d 1/2). He was then convicted on both charges. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence claiming, in particular, that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted wantonly or recklessly. He also argues that his convictions are duplicative because § 13K(d 1/2) is a lesser included offense of § 13K(e). We affirm. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), the jury could have found as follows. In September, 2008, the defendant lived with his parents, Olivia and Antonio, in Fall River. Olivia suffered from dementia associated with Alzheimer’s disease. She was obese and could not move without assistance. Antonio, who was eighty-nine years old at the time of the events in question, was also in poor health and could not care for Olivia on his own.[2] Thus, the defendant assumed responsibility for his mother’s care. He claimed to have bathed, dressed, and fed Olivia daily, and had left his job in order to provide her with full-time care. On September 28, 2010, paramedics were dispatched to the Cruz’s home in […]
Cruz, et al. v. Siddiqi (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-146-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11274 SENAYA ZAYAS SANTANA CRUZ & another[1] vs. JAVED SIDDIQI. August 5, 2013. Medical Malpractice, Bond. Negligence, Medical malpractice. Practice, Civil, Bond, Judicial discretion. Bond. The plaintiffs seek interlocutory review of the judge’s order refusing to reduce the amount of the $ 6,000 bond they were required to file in order to pursue their medical malpractice claim against defendant Dr. Javed Siddiqi after a tribunal convened pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 60B (§ 60B), determined that there was not sufficient evidence to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry as to Dr. Siddiqi. The appeal was entered in the Appeals Court, and we then transferred the case to this court on our own motion. For reasons set forth in our decision in Faircloth v. DiLillo, ante (2013) (Faircloth), we conclude that the judge abused his discretion where he denied the plaintiffs’ motion based solely on his belief that plaintiffs’ attorney was paying or advancing the court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the indigent plaintiffs, including the cost of the bond.[2] Background. The plaintiffs, Senaya Zayas Santana Cruz and her mother Suleyka Zayas Santana, brought a medical malpractice action against a number of defendants allegedly involved with Senaya’s prenatal care. As part of the plaintiffs’ offer of proof before the tribunal, they submitted an opinion letter from Dr. Berto Lopez, wherein Dr. Lopez opined that Dr. Siddiqi “deviated from the prevailing professional standard of care in the treatment of [the plaintiffs] by failing to obtain informed consent from Suleyka, including but not limited to discussions concerning shoulder dystocia and permanent neurological injury to Senaya and the availability of alternative mode of delivery via cesarean section.” The tribunal determined that the evidence in the offer of proof was insufficient to support a finding of liability as to Dr. Siddiqi. Pursuant to § 60B, the plaintiffs were informed that they had to provide a $ 6,000 bond to avoid dismissal of the claim. In response, the [p]laintiffs filed an emergency motion to reduce the amount of the bond, asserting that they were indigent and that “[f]ailing to lower the bond amount [would] result in the dismissal of this case against Dr. Siddiqi, thereby denying [p]laintiffs the right to have the case heard by a jury of their peers.” […]