Edwards v. Commonwealth, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-101-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-12175 SAUNDRA R. EDWARDS vs. COMMONWEALTH & another.[1] Essex. February 6, 2017. – June 8, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Lowy, JJ. Governor. Privileged Communication. Evidence, Privileged communication. Libel and Slander. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on December 31, 2014. Motions to dismiss were heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Michael J. Pineault for Deval Patrick. William H. Sheehan, III (Thomas J. Flannagan also present) for the plaintiff. GAZIANO, J. On September 16, 2014, then Governor Deval Patrick removed Saundra R. Edwards from her position as chair of the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB). A few days later, in response to media inquiries about Edwards’s abrupt departure, Patrick explained that, among other reasons, he had decided to replace Edwards because she inappropriately had attempted to pressure a SORB hearing officer to change the outcome of one of his decisions on an offender’s classification level. In subsequent comments to the media, after Edwards had filed an action for defamation and wrongful termination in the Superior Court, Patrick repeated his explanation that he had decided to remove Edwards from office because she had interfered with the independence of a SORB hearing officer. Edwards filed an amended complaint, asserting a wrongful termination claim against the Commonwealth, and two defamation claims against Patrick, individually, one for each of the two statements. Patrick moved pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), to dismiss Edwards’s amended complaint on two grounds. He argued that the court should conclude, consistent with Federal law and with a number of other jurisdictions, that he, as governor, had an absolute privilege for statements made in the course of his official duties. In the alternative, Patrick argued that he had a qualified privilege, because the statements were made while acting within the scope of his official duties concerning Edwards’s status as a public official, and that the allegations in the amended complaint were not sufficient to overcome that privilege. Because, Patrick maintained, the amended complaint contained only bare conclusory assertions of actual malice without allegations of facts sufficient to support those assertions beyond the level of mere speculation, the complaint did not meet […]
Commonwealth v. Edwards (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-015-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11989 COMMONWEALTH vs. JOSHUA EDWARDS. Suffolk. September 6, 2016. – January 20, 2017. Present: Gants, C.J., Botsford, Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Reasonable suspicion. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Threshold police inquiry, Reasonable suspicion. Threshold Police Inquiry. Firearms. Alcoholic Liquors, Possession of opened bottle. Beverage Containers. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on April 23, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Botsford, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. Greg L. Johnson for the defendant. Matthew T. Sears, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. BOTSFORD, J. The defendant, Joshua Edwards, has been indicted for multiple offenses, including firearms offenses, with which he was initially charged following the seizure and search of a motor vehicle he had been driving. Before trial, he moved to suppress evidence seized during the search of the vehicle, invoking the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the defendant’s motion. A single justice of this court allowed the Commonwealth leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal and reported the case to the Appeals Court. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996). The Appeals Court reversed in an unpublished memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 1133 (2015). We granted the defendant’s application for further appellate review. Recognizing that this is an exceedingly close case, we conclude that the stop was predicated on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and therefore reverse the motion judge’s order allowing the motion to suppress. Factual background. One witness, Boston police Officer David Lanteigne, testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. In addition, a number of photographs, documents, and police radio transmissions, as well as a recording of a 911 call, were received in evidence. In reviewing […]
Edwards, petitioner (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-035-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11120 RAYMOND EDWARDS, petitioner. Norfolk. November 5, 2012. ‑ March 7, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, & Duffly, JJ. Practice, Civil, Dismissal of appeal, Intervention, Judicial discretion. Statute, Construction. Committee for Public Counsel Services. Witness, Expert, Fee. Evidence, Sex offender, Expert opinion. Petition filed in the Superior Court Department on August 1, 2008. Following transfer, the case was tried before Douglas H. Wilkins, J., and posttrial motions for supplemental funds and for reconsideration were considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for intervener. Anne M. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. The primary issue presented on appeal is whether, in determining the reasonable compensation to be paid to an expert retained by an indigent petitioner seeking release from commitment as a sexually dangerous person under G. L. c. 123A, § 9 (§ 9), a judge is bound by the hourly rate determined for that expert by the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) under § 9 (i). We hold that a judge is bound by CPCS’s determination of an hourly rate but still retains the authority to determine whether the total amount billed is reasonable by examining whether the services provided were reasonably necessary to provide the petitioner as effective a case as he would have had if he were financially able to pay. Because we conclude that the judge acted in accordance with these limits in determining the reasonable amount of the expert’s fee, we affirm. Background. In 2008, Raymond Edwards (petitioner), a person committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (§ 12),[1] filed a petition seeking release from commitment under § 9.[2] After being found indigent, the petitioner filed a motion under G. L. c. 261, § 27C (§ 27C), inserted by St. 1974, c. 694, § 3, requesting that the judge authorize funds in the amount of $ 5,000 to retain the services of an “independent qualified examiner” to evaluate the petitioner and assist in the preparation of his case.[3] In making this request, the petitioner asserted that “[t]he cost of an independent expert examination, report, and testimony typically totals about $ 5,000″ and “[r]arely” costs less than $ 4,000, and that an independent […]