Minkina v. Frankl, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-114-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 13-P-1480 Appeals Court NATALY MINKINA vs. LAURIE A. FRANKL & others.[1] No. 13-P-1480. Suffolk. May 12, 2014. – September 15, 2014. Present: Cypher, Kafker, & Hanlon, JJ. Attorney at Law, Malpractice, Withdrawal. Anti-Discrimination Law, Arbitration, Employment. Arbitration. Practice, Civil, Notice of appeal, Amendment of complaint, Costs. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on May 11, 2009. A motion to strike expert testimony was heard by Edward P. Leibensperger, J.; a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint was considered by Janet L. Sanders, J.; and the case was heard by Peter M. Lauriat, J., on a motion for summary judgment. Richard L. Neumeier for the plaintiff. Kevin G. Powers (Robert S. Mantell with him) for the defendants. KAFKER, J. Nataly Minkina contends that her former counsel, Laurie A. Frankl, Jonathan J. Margolis, and Rodgers, Powers and Schwartz, LLP (hereinafter, collectively, RPS), committed legal malpractice during their representation of her in an employment discrimination action. More particularly, she claims that RPS mishandled its opposition to a motion to compel arbitration by failing to recognize that the reasoning in a then-controlling decision of this court, Mugnano-Bornstein v. Crowell, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 347 (1997) (Mugnano-Bornstein), would be rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court in a later decision, Warfield v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Center, Inc., 454 Mass. 390 (2009) (Warfield). Minkina also contends that RPS breached its fiduciary duty to her when it withdrew from her representation after she criticized the performance of Frankl and other lawyers in the firm and accused at least Frankl of unprofessional conduct. In addition, Minkina contends that the judge abused his discretion in denying her second motion to amend her complaint. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court judge rejecting the malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims and allowing the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We also conclude that the denial of the second motion to amend the complaint was not an abuse of discretion. Background. In 2002, the plaintiff, Nataly Minkina, was hired as a physician by the Affiliate Physicians Group of Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (APG). At that time, she executed an employment agreement that contained an arbitration clause. The clause provided: “In the event that any dispute arising out of or relating […]
Minkina v. Frankl, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-061-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11338 NATALY MINKINA vs. LAURIE A. FRANKL & others.[1] April 9, 2013. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. The petitioner, Nataly Minkina, is the plaintiff in a civil action that is currently pending in the Superior Court. After a judge in that case denied two of her motions — for leave to amend her complaint, and for leave to supplement certain discovery responses –- the petitioner sought interlocutory appellate review, first from a single justice of the Appeals Court under G. L. c. 231, § 118, first par., which was denied, and then from a single justice of this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3, which was also denied. She now appeals from the latter ruling. The case is before us on her memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). We affirm. The petitioner claims that she was entitled to have the single justice employ the court’s extraordinary power of general superintendence because the Superior Court judge’s rulings were an abuse of discretion, and that she was entitled to have the rulings corrected by the single justice immediately because otherwise she would be required to incur the cost of a trial and appeal to vindicate her claims. This demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the general superintendence power.[2] The court’s superintendence power is not a substitute for the ordinary process of trial and appeal. McGuinness v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 495, 497 (1995). Foley v. Lowell Div. of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 398 Mass. 800, 802 (1986). The orders at issue here are eminently correctable on appeal after trial if they prove to be wrong. The petitioner’s additional assertion that general superintendence relief was somehow required because the Superior Court orders were subject to the doctrine of present execution is also meritless; if she believed the orders were subject to present execution (a dubious proposition), she should have sought to appeal them to the Appeals Court as a matter of right on that basis, not file an extraordinary petition in this court. See McMenimen v. Passatempo, 452 Mass. 178, 185-187 (2008). Judgment affirmed. The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by a memorandum of law. Christopher Maffucci for the petitioner. [1] Jonathan J. Margolis and Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz, LLP. [2] This is the […]