Commonwealth v. Gonzalez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-028-18)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-1035 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. RADHAMES GONZALEZ. No. 16-P-1035. Middlesex. September 12, 2017. – March 12, 2018. Present: Rubin, Neyman, & Henry, JJ. Controlled Substances. Firearms. Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, Confrontation of witnesses. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Investigatory stop, Reasonable suspicion, Confrontation of witnesses. Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Reasonable suspicion, Threshold police inquiry. Threshold Police Inquiry. Motor Vehicle, Firearms. Witness, Expert. Evidence, Expert opinion, Scientific test. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on October 31, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas P. Billings, J., and the cases were tried before him. Steven J. Rappaport for the defendant. Clarence H. Brown, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. HENRY, J. After a jury trial in Superior Court, the defendant, Radhames Gonzalez, was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, carrying a firearm without a license, possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, possession of a large capacity feeding device, and possession of a large capacity weapon during the commission of a felony.[1] The defendant argues that (1) his motion to suppress should have been allowed because the information supplied by a confidential informant (CI) did not justify the investigatory stop of his motor vehicle; and (2) the admission in evidence of a substitute chemist’s testimony deprived the defendant of his right to “confront” the witness. We affirm. Background. We set forth the facts as found by the motion judge, supplemented where necessary with uncontroverted evidence drawn from the record of the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 430 Mass. 725, 726 n.5 (2000). Sergeant William West of the Billerica police department testified that he had been a patrol sergeant for two years, and that he had formerly been a detective in the criminal bureau for sixteen years. As a detective, he had investigated all types of crimes including narcotics offenses and had worked with informants “no less than a hundred times.” In June, 2013, about one year after he had become a sergeant, West was contacted by a CI with whom West had worked on more than one occasion when he was a detective. On this occasion, the CI provided a description of a man who went by the name of “Eddie,” later identified as the […]
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-140-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11731 COMMONWEALTH vs. CAURIS GONZALEZ. Essex. December 11, 2015. – September 6, 2016. Present: Gants, C.J., Cordy, Botsford, Lenk, & Hines, JJ.[1] Homicide. Joint Enterprise. Evidence, Joint venturer, Intent. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Capital case. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 29, 2011. The case was tried before Mary K. Ames, J. Robert F. Shaw, Jr., for the defendant. David F. O’Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. LENK, J. Shortly before 6 P.M. on January 10, 2009, Robert Gonzalez was shot and killed while sitting in his minivan near an intersection in Lawrence. The shooting was carried out by four people who, seconds before, had been dropped off across the intersection by someone driving a Dodge Caravan minivan. In June, 2011, the defendant was indicted by an Essex County grand jury on one count of murder in the first degree based on evidence that she had been the driver of the Caravan. After a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted as a joint venturer of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial judge erred in denying her motion for a required finding of not guilty. In particular, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to allow a rational juror to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she was the driver of the Dodge Caravan, or that she knew of and shared the coventurers’ intent to kill the victim. The defendant also claims, among other things, that the judge erred by allowing the admission of (a) the opinion of one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses interpreting cellular site location information (CSLI) generated by the defendant’s cellular telephone, and (b) a video recording comparing still photographs from surveillance footage of the Dodge Caravan that had transported the four passengers involved in the shooting with the Dodge Caravan owned by the defendant’s mother. The defendant contends also that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of an audio recording of statements she made to police shortly after the killing. We conclude that the motion for a required finding of not guilty should have been granted. While the jury could have concluded, on this evidence, […]
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-111-16)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 14-P-1626 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. HECTOR GONZALEZ. No. 14-P-1626. Hampden. December 4, 2015. – August 29, 2016. Present: Cohen, Trainor, & Katzmann, JJ. Controlled Substances. Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. Search and Seizure, Probable cause. Probable Cause. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on July 11, 2013. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was allowed by Fernande R. V. Duffly, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her to the Appeals Court. Thomas E. Robinson for the defendant. Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. KATZMANN, J. In the instant appeal from the denial by a Superior Court judge of the defendant’s motion to suppress, the defendant challenges the warrantless search of his person and arrest based on information police received from a confidential informant. A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the defendant’s application for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the Superior Court’s order and reported the matter to this court. The primary issue posed by this appeal is whether the exclusionary rule precludes a judge from considering evidence of a prior incident in an unrelated case in evaluating the accuracy of a confidential informant’s “track record” where that evidence was suppressed in the unrelated case after a finding by a different judge that the informant’s veracity had not been adequately established. On the record before us, we answer that question in the negative and affirm the order denying the motion to suppress. Background. We recite the facts as found by the motion judge after an evidentiary hearing. On June 14, 2013, at approximately 7:40 P.M., Detective Edward Kalish, an experienced narcotics detective with the Springfield police department, received information from a confidential informant (CI) that, at that moment, a Hispanic male named Hector Gonzalez was in possession of a large quantity of heroin on Knox Street in Springfield. The CI further stated that Gonzalez was wearing dark shorts, dark shoes, and a light blue basketball jersey bearing number “8” with the name “Bryant” on the back. The CI said that Gonzalez was a passenger in a blue […]
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-207-15)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11411 COMMONWEALTH vs. STEVEN GONZALEZ. Hampden. September 11, 2015. – December 30, 2015. Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Botsford, Duffly, & Hines, JJ. Homicide. Firearms. Alibi. Evidence, Alibi. Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Instructions to jury, Cross-examination by prosecutor, Argument by prosecutor, Presumptions and burden of proof. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on December 17, 2008. The cases were tried before Mary-Lou Rup, J., and a motion for a new trial, filed on July 22, 2013, was considered by her. Joseph A. Hanofee for the defendant. Deborah D. Ahlstrom, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, C.J. At approximately 5 P.M. on October 17, 2008, a man approached the victim, Alexander Gautier, and shot him in the face at close range with a sawed-off shotgun, killing him. A Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation.[1] The defendant claims on appeal that he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. He contends, first, that his trial attorney called an alibi witness to testify in his defense without first interviewing her, which resulted in the witness providing testimony contradicting the defendant’s own alibi testimony. Second, he contends that his attorney should have called certain individuals to testify in his defense who witnessed the immediate aftermath of the shooting, and whose testimony would have created a reasonable doubt regarding the identification of him as the shooter. We conclude that these alleged errors were not “likely to have influenced the jury’s conclusion.” See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014). We therefore affirm the defendant’s convictions. Background. The evidence supported the following facts. The victim had controlled the sale of narcotics in the low-rise apartment buildings in the area of 244-266 Locust Street in Springfield, but left for Puerto Rico when a warrant issued for his arrest. In the victim’s absence, Sammy Ramos (Sammy), a friend who operated an automobile dealership on Locust Street, took over the drug business on the block, and permitted others to sell drugs there, including two brothers, both named Jose Rodriguez. Also during the victim’s absence, Jasson Gonzalez (Jasson) […]
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-109-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 11-P-1912 Appeals Court COMMONWEALTH vs. LUIS GONZALEZ. No. 11-P-1912. Essex. January 15, 2014. – September 5, 2014. Present: Cypher, Rubin, & Hines, JJ.[1] Jury and Jurors. Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Deliberation of jury, Question by jury, Voir dire. Constitutional Law, Delay in appeal. Robbery. Intimidation of Witness. Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 31, 2006. The cases were tried before David Lowy, J., and a motion for postconviction relief, filed on April 5, 2013, was heard by him. Sharon Fray-Witzer for the defendant. Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. RUBIN, J. Background. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of armed carjacking, armed robbery, and intimidation of a witness. See G. L. c. 265, §§ 21A, 17; G. L. c. 268, § 13B. This is his direct appeal. During deliberations, the jurors sent the judge a question which read: ”It has come to the group’s attention that one juror fell asleep during the presentation of evidence and is not willing to accept others’ recollection of what was missed. Is this grounds to have the juror dismissed?” Although the prosecutor sought a voir dire, the judge declined to conduct one. He reasoned, “[I]f I were to voir dire this issue the only way to voir dire it would be to ask questions that get into the deliberative process.” The judge did say that he had “looked at the jury numerous times.” And, apparently assuming he knew which juror the question referred to, he said, “Every time I looked over . . . he never had his eyes shut for a significant period of time. And every time I looked at him it seemed that he was alert [and] paying attention . . . . I made a decision every time I looked over that he didn’t seem to me to be asleep. I gave it serious [consideration] numerous times.” A subsequent jury question read, “We have a juror (#1) who seems to be biased towards police in general. He laughs every time the word police even comes up and refuses to even contemplate a witness’s testimony because he believes the police gave a deal. Is this grounds for an alternate juror to be used?” The judge seems to have concluded that the […]
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-144-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC-11428 COMMONWEALTH vs. MARIO GONZALEZ. Suffolk. April 11, 2014. – August 19, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ.[1] Homicide. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Dying declaration, Prior misconduct, Intoxication, Intent. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Instructions to jury. Intoxication. Mental Impairment. Intent. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on March 19, 2009. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Charles J. Hely, J., and the case was tried before Geraldine S. Hines, J. David Keighley for the defendant. Helle Sachse, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. GANTS, J. In the early morning hours of February 15, 2009, the defendant stabbed his girl friend multiple times shortly after they returned to his apartment from a local bar. The victim died of her wounds later that morning. A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1.[2] On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the statements the defendant made from his holding cell in response to police questioning should have been suppressed because he had earlier invoked his right to silence; (2) the admission in evidence of the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (3) the trial judge erred in admitting statements made by the victim as dying declarations; (4) the judge erred in admitting certain testimony regarding the defendant’s prior bad acts; and (5) the absence of an instruction to the jury that they may consider the defendant’s consumption of alcohol in determining whether the defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner in causing the victim’s death created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The defendant also requests that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the conviction to a lesser included offense. We reject the defendant’s first four claims, but agree with the fifth. We therefore reverse the defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree and remand the case to the Superior Court to allow the Commonwealth to choose between entry of a verdict of murder in the second degree or retrial of the defendant […]
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-120-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑10940 COMMONWEALTH vs. LUIS GONZALEZ.[1] Worcester. March 8, 2013. ‑ July 9, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Cordy, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Homicide. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Self‑defense, Intent. Self‑Defense. Intent. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Argument by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement. Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court Department on May 3, 2005. A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Janet Kenton‑Walker, J., and the case was tried before John S. McCann, J. Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. Jane A. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth. IRELAND, C.J. On March 9, 2010, a jury convicted the defendant, Luis Gonzalez, of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant argues error in (1) the denial of his motion to suppress statements, (2) the prosecutor’s closing argument, and (3) the judge’s instructions to the jury. The defendant also seeks relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. We affirm the order denying the defendant’s motion to suppress as well as the defendant’s conviction, and discern no basis to exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 1. Motion to suppress statements. a. Background and standard of review. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to police after he was arrested, but before he received the Miranda warnings. As relevant here, the defendant argued that his statements were not preceded by a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the motion. The judge concluded that the defendant’s statements were not the result of police interrogation, but rather were spontaneous and unprovoked and that, therefore, the lack of preceding Miranda warnings did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. The judge also found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s statements had been voluntary. In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, “we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error ‘but conduct an independent review of [the […]