Morgan v. Massachusetts Homeland Insurance Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-005-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-216 Appeals Court ANTHONY G. MORGAN vs. MASSACHUSETTS HOMELAND INSURANCE COMPANY. No. 16-P-216. Hampden. November 9, 2016. – January 20, 2017. Present: Kafker, C.J., Kinder, & Lemire, JJ. Consumer Protection Act, Class action, Insurance. Practice, Civil, Class action, Consumer protection case. Motor Vehicle, Insurance. Insurance, Motor vehicle insurance, Settlement of claim, Regulation, Amount of recovery for loss. Words, “Actual cash value,” “Retail book value.” Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 8, 2012. Motions for class certification and for summary judgment were heard by Edward J. McDonough, Jr., J.; and the case was heard by Bertha D. Josephson, J. Brett J. Vottero (Eric D. Applebaum also present) for the plaintiff. Michael S. Batson (Michael C. Kinton also present) for the defendant. KAFKER, C.J. The plaintiff, Anthony G. Morgan, brought this civil action against the defendant, Massachusetts Homeland Insurance Company (Homeland or insurer), alleging that Homeland engaged in unfair or deceptive claim settlement practices in violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3(9), and G. L. c. 93A, in the course of settling his total loss auto insurance claim.[1] See G. L. c. 93A, §§ 2, 9. Even though the claim was settled within two months of the accident, with the plaintiff’s acceptance of the insurer’s offer, the plaintiff claimed that the insurer violated c. 176D and c. 93A because it did not take into account the “retail book value” of his vehicle, as required by 211 Code Mass. Regs. § 133.05(1)(a) (2003). The plaintiff also filed a motion to certify a class action pursuant to G. L. c. 93A, § 9(2). A judge of the Superior Court (motion judge) denied class certification and entered a summary judgment on that count of the complaint. After a jury-waived trial on the plaintiff’s individual c. 93A claim, the trial judge (who was not the motion judge) found that, although Homeland had violated c. 93A, the plaintiff was not injured by the violation, and entered judgment for Homeland on that count of the complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the judges erred by (1) denying his motion for class certification; and (2) concluding that he was not injured by Homeland’s c. 93A violation. Homeland cross-appeals, challenging the trial judge’s ruling that it violated c. 93A. We conclude that the motion for class certification was properly denied, and […]