Madison v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-197-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11539 LINANEL BROWN MADISON vs. COMMONWEALTH. December 11, 2013. Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. The petitioner, Linanel Brown Madison, appeals from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm. Brown Madison was indicted in April, 2013, on several charges, including murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted armed robbery. Shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a motion in the Superior Court for a protective order to limit the discovery of, among other things, witnesses’ identifying information, including names and addresses. A judge allowed the motion in part, ordering that witnesses’ addresses and telephone numbers not be disclosed to Brown Madison or his counsel. To the extent that the Commonwealth also sought to protect the witnesses’ names from Brown Madison, the judge denied the motion. Brown Madison thereafter filed his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court, arguing that the order deprives him of several State and Federal constitutional rights. In particular, he argued that the order will limit his ability to prepare a defense and infringes on his right to receive effective assistance of counsel. The case is now before us pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which requires a showing that “review of the trial court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available means.” S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2). Brown Madison has not made such a showing. He suggests the ways in which he believes that his constitutional rights will be violated if the protective order remains in place, but as to why review of the order cannot adequately be obtained in a direct appeal he argues only that “he will be irremediably and irreparably deprived of his” constitutional rights, and that “[i]f interlocutory review is not granted, the constitutional deprivation will perpetuate without remedy.” He does not elaborate on the point and has not, in short, presented any reason why the discovery order cannot be adequately reviewed in an appeal from any adverse judgment. See Deming v. Commonwealth, 438 Mass. 1007 (2002), citing Carr v. Howard, 426 Mass. 514, 517 n.3 (1998) (discovery disputes generally not appropriate for review under G. L. c. 211, § 3). See also Ray v. Commonwealth, 447 Mass. 1008, 1008-1009 (2006), […]