Malden Police Patrolman’s Association v. City of Malden (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-103-17)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 16-P-494 Appeals Court MALDEN POLICE PATROLMAN’S ASSOCIATION vs. CITY OF MALDEN. No. 16-P-494. Middlesex. February 7, 2017. – August 11, 2017. Present: Trainor, Blake, & Shin, JJ. Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss, Summary judgment. Superior Court. Rules of the Superior Court. Administrative Law, Primary jurisdiction, Exhaustion of remedies. Unjust Enrichment. Contract, Collective bargaining contract, Unjust enrichment, Promissory estoppel. Public Employment, Collective bargaining. Police, Collective bargaining. Massachusetts Wage Act. Civil Service, Collective bargaining, Municipal finance. Municipal Corporations, Collective bargaining, Municipal finance. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on January 21, 2015. The case was heard by Bruce R. Henry, J., on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Christopher G. Fallon for the plaintiff. Albert R. Mason for the defendant. BLAKE, J. The plaintiff, Malden Police Patrolman’s Association (union), is a labor organization comprised of approximately seventy-nine police officers employed by the defendant, the city of Malden (city). The union and the city were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering three fiscal years from July 1, 2010, through June 30, 2013. The CBA set forth the provisions governing, among other matters, paid detail work performed by the officers.[1] During the summer of 2014, the union notified the city that it was in arrears on the payment of compensation to officers for detail work, requested a written explanation for the nonpayment, and demanded the outstanding detail pay. The city took the position that, because the officers earned the detail pay for work performed for third parties, the city was exempt from the provisions of the Massachusetts wage and hour laws, requiring timely payment of earned wages. On January 21, 2015, the union filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the city,[2] alleging that the city owed the officers approximately $ 410,000 in compensation for the performance of past detail work.[3] The complaint requested relief under theories of breach of contract (count I), breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count II), promissory estoppel (count III), unjust enrichment (count IV), and violation of the Massachusetts Wage Act, G. L. c. 149, § 148 (Wage Act) (count V). The union then filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The city moved to dismiss the union’s complaint or, in […]
Categories: News Tags: 1110317, Association, City, Lawyers, Malden, Patrolman’s, Police, Weekly
Licata v. GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-010-14)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11336 SALVATORE LICATA, JR., administrator,[1] vs. GGNSC MALDEN DEXTER LLC. Suffolk. September 4, 2013. ‑ January 13, 2014. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Arbitration. Health Care Proxy. Nursing Home. Agency, Scope of authority or employment, What constitutes, Ratification. Consent. Incompetent Person, Consent to medical treatment. Contract, Arbitration, Parties, Validity, Third party beneficiary. Estoppel. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on August 1, 2011. A motion to dismiss the complaint and to compel arbitration was heard by Paul E. Troy, J. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Joseph M. Desmond (Thomas T. Worboys with him) for the defendant. Michael R. Rezendes (Patricia J. Rezendes with him) for the plaintiff. Kelly Bagby, of the District of Columbia, & Rebecca J. Benson & Debra Silberstein, for National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (Massachusetts Chapter) & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. DUFFLY, J. The plaintiff, Salvatore Licata, Jr., commenced this wrongful death action in the Superior Court as the administrator of the estate of his deceased mother, Rita Licata.[2] The defendant nursing home operator moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement that Salvatore signed purportedly on his mother’s behalf. Because we conclude that Salvatore lacked authority to execute an arbitration agreement on Rita’s behalf, and the arbitration agreement does not otherwise bind Rita’s estate, we affirm the Superior Court judge’s denial of the defendant’s motion.[3] Background. On August 19, 2008, the day after Rita was admitted to a medical center for evaluation of increased confusion, she signed a health care proxy designating Salvatore as her health care agent, pursuant to G. L. c. 201D, § 5, in the event of her incapacity to make health care decisions. Three days later, on August 22, 2008, Rita was discharged from the medical center and transferred to a nursing facility operated by the defendant GGNSC Malden Dexter LLC (GGNSC). Rita’s attending physician at the medical center authored a transfer report containing a three-page summary of Rita’s condition upon entering and exiting the medical center and the treatment Rita received while a patient there. Upon her arrival at the nursing facility, Rita was taken to her room. The nursing facility’s admissions director meanwhile brought Salvatore to […]
Dixon v. City of Malden (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-032-13)
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA 02108-1750; (617) 557-1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us SJC‑11137 GARY DIXON vs. CITY OF MALDEN. Middlesex. November 6, 2012. ‑ March 4, 2013. Present: Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, & Lenk, JJ. Massachusetts Wage Act. Contract, Employment. Damages, Termination of employment contract. Employment, Termination. Municipal Corporations. Public Employment, Vacation pay. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on November 1, 2007. The case was heard by Thomas P. Billings, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the case from the Appeals Court. Alfred Gordon for the plaintiff. Kathryn M. Fallon for the defendant. IRELAND, C.J. We transferred this case from the Appeals Court on our own motion to consider whether undifferentiated gratuitous weekly payments made by the city of Malden (city) to the plaintiff, Gary Dixon, after he was discharged covered his claim for unpaid vacation days under G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act). The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his claim against the city. He asserts that a Superior Court judge erred in dismissing his claim under the Wage Act for vacation pay, costs, attorneys’ fees, and treble damages on the ground that, although the manner of the payments violated the express language of the Wage Act, the city nevertheless compensated the plaintiff. Because we conclude that the city could not cast those payments as vacation pay after the fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover his vacation pay in addition to costs and attorneys’ fees, we remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment consistent with our opinion. Facts and Procedure. We present the essential facts found by the judge after a jury-waived trial. In 1983, the city appointed the plaintiff as a director of a city-owned nursing home, where the plaintiff worked until March, 2007. Although a city ordinance provided for successive two-year terms of appointment, the city did not formally reappoint the plaintiff to his position after 1996. He continued working in a “holdover capacity,” apparently under a provision in a city ordinance providing that appointed officials hold office “until a successor shall be chosen and qualified.” As a city employee, the plaintiff was entitled to a certain number of vacation […]